









Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Besters, M. (2016). A politics of (in)security: A philosophical analysis of collective security. [s.n.].
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 12. May. 2021
A POLITICS OF (IN)SECURITY
Michiel Besters
A Philosophical  Analysis  of  Collect ive Security





voor de openbare verdediging
van mijn proefschrift
A POLITICS OF (IN)SECURITY
A Philosophical  Analysis
of  Collect ive Security
op vrijdag 4 maart 2016
om 10.15 uur
in de Aula van Tilburg University.
Voorafgaande aan de verdediging
zal ik om 10.00 uur
een korte toelichting geven op
de inhoud van het proefschrift.
Na afloop nodig ik u van harte uit 
voor een receptie
in de nabijheid van de Aula.
Michiel Besters
Faurestraat 30


















A Politics of (In)security 




































Cover design by Xander Beusekamp 









A Politics of (In)security 




ter verkrijging van de graad van doctor 
aan Tilburg University 
op gezag van de rector magnificus, prof. dr. E.H.L. Aarts, 
in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van 
een door het college voor promoties aangewezen commissie 
in de aula van de Universiteit 






















Prof. mr. dr. M. Hildebrandt  
Prof. dr. B.M.J. van Klink 
Dr. N. Oudejans 
Prof. dr. N.M. Rajkovic 





















































































Introduction                      1 
Research Approach                     4 
Outline of the Book                     6 
 
Chapter 1 
Security as Technique of Government                   9 
1.1 Introduction                      9 
1.2 The Crisis of Security Studies                  11 
 1.2.1 The Birth of Security Studies                 11 
 1.2.2 Structural Realism                  12 
1.3 Securing Security Studies                  14 
 1.3.1 The Widening Debate                 14 
 1.3.2 The Securitization Theory                 15 
 1.3.3 Critical Security Studies                 17 
1.4 The Foucaultian Approach                  19 
 1.4.1 Security Framing                  20 
 1.4.2 Identity Politics                  21 
 1.4.3 Immigration                   21 
 1.4.4 De-Securitization                  22 
1.5 Foucault’s Theory of Governmentality                 23 
 1.5.1 Discourse Analysis                  24 
 1.5.2 Faceless Potentiality                  25 
 1.5.3 The Triangle Law – Discipline – Governmentality              28 
 1.5.4 Population                   30 
 1.5.5 Territory                   31 
 1.5.6 Security                   33 
Conclusion                    36 
 
Chapter 2 
Security as Collective Self-Preservation                 39 
2.1 Introduction                    39 
2.2 From a Normative to an Existential Concept of Security               40 
 2.2.1 Weber’s Concept of State                 40 
 2.2.2 The State as a Legal Unity                 41 
 2.2.3 The State Order as Legal Order                43 
 2.2.4 Schmitt’s Critique of the Normativist Interpretation of Security             45 
2.3 Public Order: Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution               48 
2.4 Concrete Order                   53 
 2.4.1 As Institution                  53 
 2.4.2 As Normal Order                  58 
 2.4.3 As Homogeneity                  61 
 2.4.4 As a Nomos                   62 
2.5 An Existential Concept of Security                 66 
 2.5.1 The Own and The Strange                 66 
 2.5.2 Collective Self-Preservation                 68 
 2.5.3 Strategies of Collective Self-Preservation               71 
 2.5.4 Sovereignty                   72 
Conclusion                    75 
 
Chapter 3 
Security as Collective Self-Assertion                 77 
3.1 Introduction                    77 
3.2 Existential Unity                   78 
 3.2.1 Collective Sameness and Selfhood                78 
 3.2.2 Temporal Permanence: Character and Promise                           82 
 3.2.3 Collective Self-Identification                             84 
3.3 Representation                   89 
 3.3.1 Collective Self-Reidentification                            89 
 3.3.2 Reflexive Collective Self-(Re)identification               93 
3.4 Collective Insecurity                   99 
 3.4.1 Normal Order                  99 
 3.4.2 Abnormality                              101 
3.5 Public Order                              106 
 3.5.1 Factual Anarchy                107 
 3.5.2 Normative Anarchy                           109 
3.6 Security                  113 
 3.6.1 Collective Self-Assertion               114 
 3.6.2 Boundary Setting                116 
 3.6.3 Violence                 118 
3.7 Assessment: Continuities and Discontinuities with Schmitt                         120 





A Politics of (In)security                             123 
4.1 Introduction                  123 
4.2 Two Conceptions of Security: Discourse vs. Existence             124 
 4.2.1 Existential Unity                124 
 4.2.2 Discursive Unity                126 
4.3 An Alternative Conception of Security                           129 
 4.3.1 Collective Subjectivity and Self-Representation                        129 
 4.3.2 Boundary Enforcement and Boundary Constitution            133 
4.4 Back to Security Studies                136 
 4.4.1 Beyond Objectivism and Constructivism             136 
 4.4.2 Exceptionalism                139 
4.5 Security and Immigration                143 
 4.5.1 Illegal Immigration and the Border Fences around Ceuta and Melilla         144 
 4.5.2 Politics of Insecurity                           149 
 4.5.3 Politics of Security                152 
 4.5.4 Politics of (In)security               154 
Conclusion                  158 
 
Conclusion                  159 
 
Bibliography                  167 
 
Abstract                  185 
 
















How to understand authorities defining behavior of individuals or groups as a security prob-
lem? Take for example behavior that is qualified by authorities as terrorist. In his notorious 
speech in the evening of September 11, 2001, the President of the United States, George W. 
Bush, qualifies the attack on the Twin Towers as an act of terrorism in that it is, in his view, 
aimed at disrupting and ending ‘our way of life’, that is, the way of life of Western liberal 
democracy.1 Subsequently, on September 20, 2001, Bush declares that ‘the enemies of freedom 
committed an act of war’ which will be responded to with a ‘war on terror’.2 And here is an 
example of behavior that was qualified as illegal. Overturning a verdict that acquits the accused 
for disturbing public order, the Dutch Supreme Court claimed that the act of climbing over 
crowd barriers and lying down right in front of the entrance of the American embassy with 
clothing smeared with a blood-like fluid is an instance of ‘abnormal’ behavior that disturbs the 
‘normal course of public life’.3 These two examples provide an initial illustration of the central 
problem of this thesis, namely, the problem of collective security. How to understand such 
forms of behavior as manifestations of collective insecurity? And, accordingly, in what sense 
can the responses by the authorities be understood as bringing about collective security? 
To further specify the research question of this thesis, let us turn to yet another ex-
ample: illegal immigration into the European Union (hereafter: EU). Some time ago a remark-
able photo was posted on Twitter by José Palazón,4 director of Asociación Pro Derechos de la 
Infancia, accompanied by the following comment: ‘Immigrants on the fence, expulsions and a 
                                                             
1 George W. Bush, ‘Address to the Nation on the September 11 Attacks’, Selected Speeches of George W. Bush 2001-2008, 
pp. 57-58, especially p. 57 (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Se-
lected_Speeches_George_W_ Bush.pdf, accessed 6 August 2015). 
2 George W. Bush, ‘Address to the Joint Session of the 107th Congress’, Selected Speeches of George W. Bush 2001-2008, 
pp. 65-73, especially p. 66 (http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Se-
lected_Speeches_George_W_ Bush.pdf, accessed 6 August 2015). 
3 Hoge Raad [Dutch Supreme Court], case number 00233/06, January 2007 (http://uitspraken.rechtbank.nl/inzien-
document?id=ECLI:NL:PHR:2007:AZ2104, accessed 28 August 2014). 
4 https://twitter.com/PRODEINORG/status/524927960961527808, accessed 29 July 2015. I wish to thank José 
Palazón for his kind permission to reproduce the picture in this book.  
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game of golf. Only in Melilla’.5 The photo features the ‘surreal scene’6 of two golf players at a 
golf course of Club Campo de Golf de Melilla, with, in the background, eleven African migrants 
sitting on top of the border fence separating the Spanish enclave Melilla from Morocco. In 
the right upper corner, standing on a ladder, a police officer is approaching the migrants. One 
of the golf players is making a swing while the other is turned towards the border fence. 
 
 
      Photo by José Palazón 
 
Certifying that the photo is not manipulated, Palazón emphasized its symbolism in an inter-
view with the Spanish newspaper El Pais. ‘The photo reflects the situation really well – the 
differences that exist here and all the ugliness that is happening here’.7 The symbolism of the 
photo concerns the economic disparities between the European Union (hereafter: EU) and 
African countries, a divide that is enforced by a border fence. The photo makes clear that 
migrants are predominantly viewed as a security problem by the EU, whereas the reason why 
the African migrants undertake the attempt to cross the border is often of an economic nature.  
The definition of migration as a security problem is deeply rooted in EU policies. In 
particular, since the end of the 20th century, immigration has been defined in EU policies as 
‘illegal immigration’. The Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) established that the EU shall adopt 
measures with respect to ‘illegal immigration and illegal residents, including repatriation of 
illegal residence’.8 In the course of implementing the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Tampere Pro-
gramme (1999) announced concrete measures ‘to stop illegal immigration’ and ‘to tackle [illegal 
                                                             
5 The Guardian, ‘African migrants look down on white-clad golfers in viral photo’, 23 October 2014 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/oct/23/-sp-african-migrants-look-down-on-white-clad-golfers-in-viral-
photo, accessed 29 Juy 2015). The Guardian mentions the original comment that accompanied the photo. I could not 
retrieve this original comment on the twitter-account of Asociación Pro Derechos de la Infancia. 
6 Time, ‘Surreal Scene of Migrants Atop Spanish Border Fence’, 23 October 2014 (http://time.com/3534491/spain-
african-migrants-melilla-golf/, accessed 29 July 2015). 
7 El Pais, ‘No es un montaje: la foto de la valle de Melilla y el campo de Golf’, 22 October 2014  
(http://verne.elpais.com/verne/2014/10/22/articulo/1414007054_000118.html, accessed 29 July 2015). The 
translation derives from the article of The Guardian. 
8 The Treaty of Amsterdam Amending The Treaty On European Union, The Treaties Establishing The European 
Communities And Certain Related Acts, 2 October 1997, article 73k.3.b. 
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immigration] at its source’.9 Some years later, when drafting a European security strategy en-
titled ‘A Secure Europe in A Better World’ (2003), the Council of the European Union iden-
tifies illegal immigration as a ‘key threat’ to the EU.10 And in the Hague Programme (2004), 
the follow-up of the Tampere Programme, the EU adopts a militaristic tone of voice speaking 
of the ‘fight’ and ‘combat’ against illegal immigration.11  
In response to this intensification of what scholars have called the ‘securitization’ of 
migration, the outcry of critics has become louder and louder. Scholars, NGO’s, and policy 
think tanks, they all send a similar message of distress.12 The security perspective has, in their 
view, taken the upper hand and has come to outweigh the economic and humanitarian ap-
proach to migrants. According to these critics, migration is primarily an effect of globalization 
and should be treated accordingly. Franck Düvell provides a concise formulation of the argu-
ment used by critics to dismiss the definition of irregular migration as illegal immigration. Ac-
cording to Düvell,  
 
‘the concept of “illegal migration” is a legal, political and social construct of the twen-
tieth century . . . It is a blurred concept; it is loaded with ideological import; it is highly 
politicized; and political intentions lurk behind its application and can occasionally 
be an iron too hot to touch. In fact, “illegal migration” has become a kind of war cry 
to be found worldwide in policies as diverse as trade agreements, development poli-
cies, military strategies and international relations’.13 
 
In short, in Düvell’s view, the understanding of irregular migration as illegal migration is a 
construction that can and needs to be overturned. For, as he argues, ‘what was once declared 
illegal can also be declared legal’.14 
The debate on illegal immigration in EU context provides an acute illustration of the 
central research question that I wish to examine in this thesis: How to define a critical concept of 
collective security? How to conceptualize collective security both providing a critical angle on the 
notion, while also accounting for its intrinsic value? I will approach the central question of this 
thesis adopting a philosophical perspective. Analyzing collective security from a philosophical 
                                                             
9 Presidency Conclusion, Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999, point 3 and 23. 
10 Council of the European Union, A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy, 12 December 2003, p. 
4. 
11 Council of the European Union, The Hague Programme: strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union, 
13 December 2004. 
12 See for example the CHALLENGE Project (‘The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security’), a re-
search project funded by the Sixth Framework Programme of DG Research of the European Commission: Didier 
Bigo, Sergio Carrera, Elspeth Guild & R.B.J. Walker, ‘The Changing Landscape of European Liberty and Security: 
The Mid-Term Report of the Challenge Project’, CEPS Research Paper No. 4, 2007; Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild & 
Sergio Carrera, ‘The CHALLENGE Project: Final Policy Recommendations on the Changing Landscape of Euro-
pean Liberty and Security’, CEPS Research Paper No. 19, 2009.  
13 Franck Düvell, ‘Irregular Migration: a Global, Historical and Economic Perspective’, in: Franck Düvell (ed.), Illegal 
Immigration in Europe. Beyond Control?, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke/New York, 2006, pp. 14-39, especially p. 29. 
14 Franck Düvell, ‘Framing and Reframing Irregular Immigration’, in B. Anderson & M. Keith, Migration: The COM-
PAS Anthology, COMPAS: Oxford, 2014 (http://compasanthology.co.uk/framing-reframing-irregular-migration/, 
accessed 29 July 2015). 
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perspective, I will inquire into its deep structure. My claim is that collective security presup-
poses the notion of collective subjectivity, which can be but need not necessarily conceived as 
the state.15  The notion of collective subjectivity refers to a collective in the first-person per-
spective as a (putative) acting unity. Although I will reflect on the distinction between security 
conceived from the perspective of the individual and from the perspective of the collective, I 
take the latter as the starting point, as it forestalls an easy juxtaposition between the individual 
and the collective perspective. I will argue that conceptions of collective security generally 
assume a reductive understanding of collective subjectivity, defining it predominantly as the 
object of security. This is reductive in that a collective subject is not only the instance that 
needs to be secured but also the instance that is secure or insecure and relates to itself as such. 
In order to account for the collective subject in the twofold sense of an instance that needs 
securing and an instance that is secure or insecure, I will reflect on its specific mode of being 
in a way that rejects the move to hypostatize or reify its existence. The key to analyzing the 
mode of being of collective subjectivity is a reflexive notion of collective identity. The shift to 
this ontological level will allow me to reassess questions such as: What are the existential mo-
dalities of collective insecurity? What are the social, political and legal manifestations of col-
lective insecurity? And what responses are available to a collective to deal with insecurity?   
The focus of this book is collective security. I am well aware that writing about secu-
rity in a collective sense is a tricky issue nowadays. Debates on collective security have the 
tendency to polarize between proponents and opponents, between advocates and critics. 
Whoever attempts to write about collective security in a positive way, even though critically, 
is vulnerable to the criticism of being an ideologist of the status quo. But, in my view, such a 
categorical rejection of approaches that make a stand for the value of security is a dead-end 
street because then the only way left is a total critique of security. Instead of taking a stance in 
this often polarized debate and thus affirming the terms in which it takes place, my aim is 
rather to open up the debate on collective security by reassessing its terms. In fact, one of the 
aims of this thesis is reconsidering the military, war-like understanding of collective security, 
taking it beyond the all or nothing problem of existence/non-existence.  
 
Research approach 
This is a thesis in the philosophy of law. The aim of this thesis is to develop a conceptual 
framework to assess what it means to define behavior as a security problem from the perspec-
tive of a collective. This means that I will be concerned to analyze how behavior appears as a 
security problem from the perspective of political and legal order. At the end, I will return to 
the problem of collective security at the policy level, related to the issue of illegal immigration 
in EU context, in order to show what the philosophical itinerary has given us. In this respect, 
my aim is modest. I do not intend to resolve the dilemmas with which policy makers struggle. 
                                                             
15 This philosophical focus distinguishes this book from Ian Loader’s and Neil Walker’s, Civilizing Security, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 2007, which provides a cogent and comprehensive analysis of security from which I 
have greatly benefited. Defining security as a ‘public good’, Loader and Walker hold a plea for a reappraisal of the 
state. Alternatively, I will cast the notion of the state in philosophical terminology of collective subjectivity, inquiring 
into the deep structure of collective security. 
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Instead, this thesis attempts to redirect the conceptual understanding of collective security, 
opening up new perspectives on the problem of illegal immigration. In offering an alternative 
conceptual framework to understand issues of collective security, it hopes to inspire policy 
makers and scholars. 
The general methodology of this book is conceptual analysis. I will start by scrutiniz-
ing the conceptual framework of security scholars. This means that my conceptual starting 
point is security studies, a sub-discipline of international relations. I will draw on the works of 
critical security scholars, especially the works of Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans, two authors 
who take their cue from Michel Foucault’s theory of governmentality. To the extent that these 
security scholars conceptualize security in a constructivist way, their reflections will direct us 
to the problem of the security referent, i.e. the notion of collective subjectivity. My claim is 
that the conception of security as technique of government is premised on a reductive under-
standing of collective subjectivity, namely,  as a discursive unity. This is where my philosoph-
ical perspective comes into the picture, and which will allow me to cast the problem of the 
security referent at a philosophical level.  
Searching an alternative for the critical, discursive conception of collective security, 
I will turn to discuss the existential conception of collective security that can be educed from 
the political and legal philosophy of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985). Although Schmitt’s conception 
of collective security lacks a critical angle, it does provide insight into its positive value. The 
central theme of Schmitt’s theory is the relation between politics and law; his oeuvre comprises 
texts on subjects such as dictatorship, sovereignty, political theology and constitutional theory. 
What makes Schmitt’s political and legal theory interesting with respect to our research ques-
tion is that rather than analyzing collective security starting from the perspective of the indi-
vidual, in line with the tradition that goes back to Thomas Hobbes, he can be read as concep-
tualizing collective security starting from what he calls the ‘suprapersonal’ perspective of a 
collective. I will read Schmitt as a concrete order thinker, a legal-theoretical approach that he 
defines in a polemical discussion with Hans Kelsen’s normativism, and that finds its place 
within the legal-theoretical strand of institutionalism. This reading of Schmitt has some re-
ceived some attention recently.16 Within the context of this book I will elaborate on Schmitt’s 
theory of concrete order for the purpose of teasing out the idea that collective security pre-
supposes the notion of collective subjectivity as an existential unity. For this reason my reading 
of Schmitt is selective, focusing on some aspects of his thinking, while leaving aside many 
others. I am well aware that Schmitt is not an uncontroversial author, as his political and legal 
theory is tainted by his engagement with the Nazi regime. The facts speak for themselves: 
Schmitt joined the Nazi-party in 1933 and acted as Kronjurist des Dritten Reiches between 1933 
and 1936. However, and despite Schmitt’s political engagement with the Nazi regime, I am 
interested in the conceptual theses that he puts forward, without wanting to defend his ideas 
on their own terms. This is less controversial. Schmitt is widely recognized for his conceptual 
                                                             
16 Cf. Mariano Croce & Andrea Salvatore, The Legal Theory of Carl Schmitt, Routledge: Abingdon, 2013. 
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contribution to political and legal philosophy.17 Initiating a conceptual debate with Schmitt, I 
attempt to get to the bottom of the problem of collective security. 
While Schmitt’s political and legal theory allows me to develop the concept of col-
lective security starting from the notion of collective subjectivity in first-person perspective, 
his analysis is highly problematic. Indeed, while casting collective subjectivity in existential 
terms, he does so in a reified sense. In order to transform the existential conception of security 
that I abstract from Schmitt, I will develop a reflexive interpretation of collective subjectivity 
on the basis of (post-)phenomenological theories of identity. In particular, I will draw on Paul 
Ricoeur’s (1913-2005) theory of identity, but I will also use the critical reconsideration of the 
phenomenological conception of identity by Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and, in his wake, 
Jean-Luc Nancy. (Post-)phenomenology is the movement in Western philosophy that starts 
from and aims to critically articulate the perspective of the first-person, singular or plural, 
adopting the radical reflexive stance that an experience is always the experience of an agent, 
as Charles Taylor puts it.18 The reassessment – or deconstruction, if one prefers – of Schmitt’s 
notion of collective subjectivity, conceptualizing existential unity in terms of the interrelated 
notions of sameness and selfhood, will allow me to develop a critical existential conception of 
security. 
 
Outline of the book 
The first Chapter elaborates the conception of security as a technique of government, analyz-
ing the conceptual framework of security studies. Steering away from the objectivism of tra-
ditional approach of security studies, critical security scholars have adopted a constructivist 
approach, especially those scholars that draw on Foucault’s theory of governmentality. Secu-
rity means essentially framing or construing an issue as a security problem. In contrast to other 
critical approaches in security studies, the Foucaultian approach not only perceives threats as 
constructs but also posits the security referent as a discursive unity. The problem with this 
instrumental understanding of security is that it can only account for collective subjectivity as 
the object of security and hence can at best postulate—but not properly explain—collective 
subjectivity as an instance that can be secure or insecure. Despite the opposition in their the-
oretical orientations, there is also an important continuity between the traditional and the Fou-
caultian approaches. They both assume security to concern the problem of existence/non-
existence of the security referent. 
In the second Chapter I will scrutinize the conception of security as collective self-
preservation on the basis of Carl Schmitt’s political and legal theory. This conception forms 
an alternative to the discursive conception of security in that it provides a positive definition 
of collective security, giving pride of place to the first-person perspective of a collective subject 
as an existential unity. I elaborate the notion of existential unity on the basis of the concept of 
concrete order, successively approaching it as an institution, normal order, homogeneity and 
                                                             
17 Cf. David Dyzenhaus, Legality and Legitimacy. Carl Schmitt, Hans Kelsen and Herman Heller in Weimar, Oxford University 
Press: Oxford, 1999; Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox, Verso: London, 2000. 




nomos. Defining insecurity in terms of the metaphysical notion of contingency, Schmitt’s anal-
ysis permits us to distinguish its various manifestations, ontological, social, political and legal. 
Yet, to the extent that Schmitt assumes collective subjectivity to exist as an original substantial 
unity, he does not adequately conceptualize the contingency of collective subjectivity. Schmitt 
does not distinguish between contingency as the experience of what a collective is as a unity 
and that it is a unity. As a consequence, like security scholars, Schmitt understands security in 
terms of the problem of existence/non-existence: to be or not to be. No wonder that security, 
thus defined, calls for an all or nothing response. This understanding of the contingency of 
collective subjectivity limits the possibilities available to deal with insecurity to boundary en-
forcement, that is, the enforcement of a collective subject’s original unity. 
The third Chapter offers a radical transformation of Schmitt’s conception of security 
and attempts to integrate and further develop the critical points put forward by security schol-
ars representing the Foucaultian approach. In this Chapter I will define security as collective 
self-assertion. Collective self-assertion concerns the idea that in responding to challenges col-
lective subjectivity can transform its existence as a unity. The key to this transformation is the 
reflexive understanding of the existential unity of collective subjectivity on the basis of Paul 
Ricoeur’s account of identity in terms of the interrelated notions of identity as sameness and 
as selfhood. Ricoeur’s notion of identity requires a deconstruction of the understanding of 
existential unity as an original unity in that it entails a radicalized understanding of the temporal 
mode of being of collective subjectivity. The reflexive mode of being of collective subjectivity 
implies that it exists as a represented unity, that is, as a claim to unity that must be forever re-
newed. As a representation, collective subjectivity only exists as a unity in a retroactive mode, 
hence is irreducibly contingent both in the sense what it is as a unity and that it is a unity. This 
distinction between contingency as that-ness and as what-ness requires a further differentia-
tion of the palette of manifestations of collective insecurity offered by Schmitt. I will argue 
that collective security fundamentally revolves around the problem of anarchy, both in a fac-
tual and in a normative sense. The twofold contingency of collective subjectivity also implies 
that the interpretation of a security threat is variable and should be understood as a challenge 
that can be responded to not only by boundary enforcement, as presupposed by Schmitt, but 
also by boundary constitution.     
Chapter Four compares the conceptions of security as a technique of government, 
as collective self-preservation and as collective self-assertion, both conceptually and as con-
cerns their practical implications. As concerns the conceptual ramifications, the Chapter es-
tablishes that the conceptions of security as a technique of government and as collective self-
preservation revolve around the understanding of collective subjectivity as an original unity. 
Whereas Schmitt celebrates the interpretation of collective subjectivity as an original, existen-
tial unity, the Foucaultian approach rejects it and replaces it with notion of a discursive unity. 
From these opposed appraisals of collective subjectivity follow opposed conceptions of secu-
rity. If security as collective self-preservation boils down to mere boundary enforcement, se-
curity as technique of government collapses into boundary constitution. I will show that the 
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conception of security as collective self-assertion forms an alternative to the other two con-
ceptions. By understanding collective subjectivity as a represented unity, my alternative con-
ception can do justice to the performativity of security practices as well as to the irreducible 
aspect of boundary enforcement. Subsequently, this Chapter applies the three conceptions of 
security to the case of the border fences around Ceuta and Melilla. Whereas the conception of 
security as a technique of government results in an utterly critical evaluation of the practice of 
the border fences, the conception of security as collective self-preservation provides a justifi-
cation of the current external border regime of the EU. Alternatively, the conception of secu-
rity as collective self-assertion interprets irregular migration both as a factual and as a norma-
tive challenge to the EU, i.e. as both threat and opportunity, thus opening up the possibilities to 
deal with it both by means of boundary enforcement and boundary constitution. 
Finally, the conclusion will summarize the argument of the book and formulate the 

















How to conceptualize collective security critically, taking into account both its civilizing and 
uncivilizing dimensions?19 That is, how to conceptualize collective security both in a construc-
tive and a critical sense? In order to develop a critical concept of collective security, in this 
chapter I will analyze the conceptual framework of security studies. There is much to learn 
from a theoretical enterprise that has security as its subject matter. Indeed, how do security 
scholars conceptualize collective security? Remarkably, this question cannot be answered in a 
straightforward manner. In fact, it has been noted that security studies are in ‘a considerable 
state of disarray’20 due to the fact that the discipline lacks a clear definition of its subject matter. 
This is not simply an observation from an outsider. It is also proclaimed by security scholars 
themselves that their discipline is struggling with an ‘identity crisis’.21 As we will see, although 
there is indeed much to learn from security studies, the discipline does not provide a satisfac-
tory conception of collective security. Instead, an analysis of the conceptual framework of 
security studies is helpful in that it enables us to formulate in a more precise way the core of a 
critical concept of collective security. I submit that by defining security in (anti-)objectivist 
terms, security scholars fail to get to the bottom of the problem of collective security because 
they do not account for security and insecurity as ontological notions, that is, as modes of 
being of a subject, individual or collective. In order to go beyond the dichotomy between 
objectivism and constructivism, my analysis demands a return to the philosophy of the (col-
lective) subject. In this respect, my analysis of the conceptual framework of security studies 
paves the way for the route that I will pursue in the following chapters. 
To the extent that the conceptual framework of security studies is based on a realist 
theory of international relations, security scholars have come to define the referent of security 
as an object, i.e. the ‘referent object’. Methodological reconsiderations have led to a critical 
assessment of the notion of the referent object. In fact, building on other contributions, a 
                                                             
19 The terms in which this question is phrased derive from Loader & Walker, Civilizing Security, 2007. 
20 Hans Lindahl, ‘Border Crossings by Immigrants: Legality, Illegality, and Alegality’, Res Publica, vol. 14, 2008, pp. 
117-135, especially p. 119. 
21 Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU. Routledge: London, 2006, p. 15 ff. 
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Foucaultian turn in security studies has taken place. Drawing on Foucault’s theory of govern-
mentality, security scholars have exchanged the objectivism of the realist approach for a radical 
form of constructivism. In this sense, the Foucaultian approach results in what I will call the 
conception of security as a technique of government. Rather than defining the referent of 
security as an object, the Foucaultian approach renders it as a construct, i.e. a ‘dependent ef-
fect’22 of security framing. While this approach contributes a number of very fruitful insights, 
some of the implications of this move are also problematic. For, ultimately, the Foucaultian 
approach erases the notion of the security referent as a subject in the first-person perspective, 
‘like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea’, to borrow Michel Foucault’s famous final 
words from The Order of Things.23  
I am well aware that the interpretation of the conceptual framework of security stud-
ies that I will develop in the following pages is quite limited in that I focus mainly on two 
theoretical positions, namely the traditional and the Foucaultian approaches, and ignore oth-
ers. In my view, the traditional and the Foucaultian approaches mark the extremes of the 
conceptual framework of security studies; they represent the most radical conceptual positions 
that can be adopted within the discipline of security studies. This simplification of the con-
ceptual framework of security studies is not problematic in so far that I don’t pretend that my 
analysis is exhaustive of the theoretical landscape of security studies. Rather, my argument in 
this chapter is concerned with what I deem to be the core problem of the conceptual frame-
work of security studies: the security referent. As will transpire, the key role of the Foucaultian 
approach within my analysis of the conceptual framework of security studies has an additional 
advantage. Foucault’s theory of governmentality actually permits me to elaborate the philo-
sophical notion of collective subjectivity that resists accommodation in the Foucaultian ap-
proach. 
The argument of this chapter unfolds in four steps. In section two, I discuss the 
traditional theoretical approach on the basis of Kenneth N. Waltz’s structural realism and its 
share in the crisis of security studies. Subsequently, in section three, I deal with three attempts 
to settle the crisis of security studies, three contributions that have set the stage for the Fou-
caultian approach: the widening debate, the securitization theory and critical security studies. 
In the fourth section I analyze the Foucaultian approach, i.e. the approach developed by se-
curity scholars who take their cue from Foucault’s theory of governmentality. In order to tease 
out the philosophical stakes of the Foucaultian approach, in the fifth section I zoom in on 
some elements of Foucault’s theory of governmentality. The conclusion ties together the ar-
gument of this chapter and draws the lesson that we can take from it in our attempt to develop 




                                                             
22 I borrow this notion from Rudi Visker, Truth and Singularity. Taking Foucault into Phenomenology. Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1999, p. 3. 




1.2 The Crisis of Security Studies 
In this section I discuss the traditional theoretical framework of security studies in view of 
identifying the problem underlying the crisis of security studies. To this end, the forthcoming 
discussion focusses on two aspects in particular. First, I attempt show that the traditional ap-
proach is a product of the historical context from which it emerged. The second aspect relates 
to the methodology of the traditional approach: objectivism.  
 
1.2.1 The Birth of Security Studies 
The emergence of security studies as a distinct field of study within the realm of international 
relations coincides with the beginning of the Cold War. The roots of security studies lie in the 
US and much of the research was conducted by think tanks such as the RAND Corporation. 
In fact, it is only in the 1960s that security studies were institutionalized at universities.24 Ini-
tially, the main focus of security studies was on national security and military threats, in par-
ticular ‘the revolutionary impact of nuclear weapons’.25 As Baldwin observes, ‘if military force 
was relevant to an issue, it was considered a security issue; and if military force was not rele-
vant, that issue was consigned to the category of low politics’.26 This preoccupation with mil-
itary threats implied that security studies became ‘militarized’.27 The period from the start of 
the Cold War to the outbreak of the war in Vietnam has been called the ‘golden age’ of security 
studies.28 It is also in this period that the discipline of security studies was ‘exported’ to Eu-
rope.29 The ‘golden age’ of security studies was followed by a period of decline, a period that 
spans the war in Vietnam.30 In fact, the end of the war in Vietnam marked a renewed interest 
in security studies in the US. Stephen M. Walt describes this period as the ‘renaissance’ of 
security studies.31 
The end of the Cold War challenged security studies again, but now more fundamen-
tally than during the Vietnam War. The reason for this is that the focus on military threats to 
national security lost its naturalness when the bipolar world order faded away. Actually, the 
termination of the bipolar world order ‘provided the shock to the theoretical systems from 
which international security had been born as a concept and “security studies” as its appropri-
ate academic discipline’.32 Some scholars continued to defend the traditional focus of security 
studies.33 Others claimed that this attempt is doomed from the start because ‘the Cold War 
                                                             
24 Ole Waever & Barry Buzan, ‘After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies’, in A. 
Collins (ed.) Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 463-483, especially pp. 470-473. 
25 Stephen M. Walt., ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 35, no. 2, 1991, pp. 211-
239, especially p. 214. 
26 David A. Baldwin, ‘The concept of security’, Review of International Studies, vol. 23, 1997, pp. 5-26, especially p. 9. 
27  David A. Baldwin, ‘Security Studies and the End of Cold War’, World Politics, vol. 48, no. 1, 1995, pp. 117-141, 
especially p. 125. 
28 Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, 1991; Baldwin, ‘The concept of security’, 1997. 
29 Waever & Buzan, ‘After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies’, 2010, p. 472. 
30 Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, 1991, p. 215-216; Baldwin, ‘Security Studies and the End of Cold War’, 
1995, p. 124. 
31 Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, 1991. See also Edward A. Kolodziey, ‘Renaissance in Security Studies? 
Caveat Lector!’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 36, no. 4, 1992, pp. 421-438. 
32 Bill McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999, p. 2. 
33 Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, 1991. 
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was not just another event to be analyzed; rather, it was the progenitor of the field and its 
central focus from 1955 on’.34 In fact, the question was discretely raised whether there is still 
any role at all for security studies after the Cold War. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War 
caused a ‘deep split’35 between security studies in the US and Europe. Whereas in Europe the 
post-Cold War situation stimulated critical research, in the US the new situation in world pol-
itics was experienced more or less as another disturbance of the main task of security studies.36 
In any case, what the post-Cold War situation revealed is that the theoretical framework of 
security studies is strongly, not to say exclusively, determined by the historical context from 
which it emerged. 
 
1.2.2 Structural Realism 
The traditional conceptual framework of security studies is Kenneth N. Waltz’s neorealist or 
structural realist theory of international relations. The core of Waltz’s theory is the notion of 
‘political structure’.37 Waltz argues that the structure of the international system is an enduring 
feature that provides an explanation for the behavior of ‘political units’ in the realm of inter-
national politics. The concept of political structure comprises two levels. The first and most 
fundamental level is the domestic political structure, that is to say, the level of states. The state 
is rendered as the ‘primary political unit’.38 According to Waltz, states are hierarchical and 
centrally organized units that seek to ensure their survival: ‘Survival is a prerequisite to achiev-
ing any goals that states may have, other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance 
as political entities’.39 This means, first of all, that at the heart of structural realism is the idea 
that states behave as self-interested, rational actors.40 And, secondly, security studies assume 
that security is about the problem of the existence/non-existence of political units. 
The second level of political structure concerns the relation between states, that is, 
the ‘co-action’ of states.41 Given the fact that states are all concerned with their own survival, 
the international system is fundamentally anarchical. In this respect, the international system 
is governed by the ‘principle of self-help’42: a state seeks to preserve its own autonomy. As 
Waltz submits, ‘in anarchy, security is the highest end. Only if survival is assured can states 
                                                             
34 Baldwin, ‘Security Studies and the End of Cold War’, 1995, p. 132. 
35 Waever & Buzan, ‘After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies’, 2010, p. 474. 
36 Waever & Buzan, ‘After the Return to Theory: The Past, Present, and Future of Security Studies’, 2010, pp. 474-
475. 
37 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics. Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979, p. 79 ff. 
38 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979, p. 91. The state-centeredness of structural realism implies that ‘the state is 
ontologically prior to the international system. The system’s structure is produced by defining states as individual unities 
and then by noting properties that emerge when several unities are brought into mutual reference. For the neorealist, 
it is impossible to describe the international structures without first fashioning a concept of state-as-actor’, Richard 
K. Ashely, ‘The poverty of neorealism’, International Organization, vol. 38, no. 2, 1984, pp. 225-286, especially p. 240, 
italics in original. 
39 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979, p. 92. 
40 Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, ‘From Strategy to Security: Foundations of Critical Security Studies’, in Keith 
Krause & Michael C. Williams (eds.) Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases. London: UCL Press, 1997, pp. 33-59, 
especially pp. 41-42. 
41 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979, p. 104. Waltz distinguishes between interaction and co-action:  interaction 
takes place at the level of units, co-action concerns the relation between units. 
42 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979, p. 91. 
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safely seek such other goals as tranquility, profit, and power’.43 The invocation of security by 
states legitimizes the use of force and exceptional powers.44 Because security is assumed to be 
about the all or nothing question of existence/non-existence, it is considered to concern the 
realm of exceptional rather than normal politics. According to Waltz, the quest to maintain 
the states’ autonomy and the enduring uncertainty about the intentions of other states results 
in the so-called security dilemma: actions by a state that are taken for the purpose of its own 
security can threaten the security of other states.45 
Waltz develops his structural realist account of international politics as a social sci-
entific theory. His theory is to be tested by inferring hypotheses from it and subjecting these 
to experimental or observational tests.46 This means that structural realism assumes that the 
world ‘out there’ is given, and it is the task of scholars to identify regularities in international 
politics and patterns of state behavior that can be validated with empirical research.47 In this 
respect, the structural realist approach is a genuinely positivist approach.48 When underpinned 
with empirical research, a security threat can be labelled as objective. Moreover, to the extent 
that structural realism regards security studies as a social scientific discipline, it posits the ‘state-
as-actor’ as an object.49 This has lead security scholars to define the referent of security, i.e. 
the state, as the ‘referent object’. Consequently, the traditional concept of security based on 
structural realism can be defined in terms of what I will call the ‘threat-referent object matrix’.  
Notice that the definition of security developed by the traditional approach implies 
a particular understanding of the distinction between inside and outside. It suggests that the 
referent object is a self-contained unit that is challenged by external threats. The traditional 
approach ‘presupposes that threats arising from outside a state are somehow more dangerous 
to its security than threats that arise from within’.50 In this respect, R.B.J. Walker argues, the 
traditional approach is confined to ‘the horizons of modern political imagination’.51 
The end of the Cold War demonstrated the failure of the traditional approach and 
has plunged security studies into a crisis. The traditional approach forfeited its explanatory 
power as it was unable to persuasively deal with new issues such as migration. Countering the 
neorealist establishment in the US and Europe, it was argued that the concept of security was 
                                                             
43 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979, p. 126. 
44 Barry Buzan, Ole Waever & Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework For Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner Pub-
lisher, 1998, p. 21. 
45 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979, pp. 186-187. Also Jennifer Mitzen, ‘Ontological Security in World Politics: 
State Identity and the Security Dilemma’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 12, no. 3, 2006, pp. 341-370, 
especially p. 341. 
46 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 1979, p. 13. 
47 Christine Agius, ‘Social Constructivism’, in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford University Press: 
Oxford, 2010, pp. 49-68, especially p. 59. 
48 Ashely, ‘The poverty of neorealism’, p. 248 ff.; Agius, ‘Social Constructivism’, 2010, p. 61. 
49 Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, ‘Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods’, Mershon 
International Studies Review, vol. 40, 1996, pp.229-254, especially p. 233; Krause & Williams, ‘From Strategy to Security: 
Foundations of Critical Security Studies’, 1997, p. 42; Steven Forde, ‘International Realism and the Science of Politics: 
Thucydides, Machiavelli, and Neorealism’, International Studies Quarterly, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 141-160. 
50 Richard H. Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’, International Security, vol. 8, no. 1, 1983, pp. 129-153, especially p. 133. 




an ‘inadequately explicated concept’.52 Indeed, as Baldwin observes, ‘despite widespread use 
of “security” by scholars and politicians during the last forty years, not much attention has 
been devoted to explicating the concept’.53 Because of the close relation between policy mak-
ers and academics in the security studies community, ‘the concept of security was seldom 
addressed in terms other than the policy interests of particular actors’.54 Krause and Williams 
provide an explanation for the lack of interest in conceptual analysis by security scholars: ‘To 
be a member of the security studies community has traditionally meant that one already knows 
what is to be studied. Both the object of security (what is to be secured) and the means for 
studying it are treated as largely given and self-evident’.55 Consequently, the challenge to secu-
rity studies in the post-Cold War era is to redefine the concept of security, i.e. the threat-
referent object matrix. What is the scope of security? That is, what range of issues should be 
labelled as security issues? And what is the primary site of security? Barry Buzan formulates 
the challenge to security studies even more radically. According to him, ‘the task is to habilitate 
the concept of security – it cannot be rehabilitated because it has never been properly devel-
oped’.56  
 
1.3 Securing Security Studies 
A number of attempts have been undertaken to secure security studies as a distinct field of 
study. In this section I will restrict myself to three contributions that aim to resolve the crisis 
of security studies, namely the widening debate, the securitization theory and critical security 
studies. To be sure, although these contributions are essential to the debate on the crisis of 
security studies, they do not exhaust this debate (nor does my discussion of these contribu-
tions, for that matter). Actually, the reason why I draw attention to these three contributions 
is that they prepare the stage for the approach inspired by Foucault’s theory of governmental-
ity. By discussing how the widening debate, the securitization theory and critical security stud-
ies each propose ‘to cut the Gordian knot in which security studies has tied itself’57 I will be 
able to  highlight some elements that have shaped the Foucaultian approach.  
 
1.3.1 The Widening Debate 
An early attempt to settle the crisis of security studies is to ‘widen’ the threat-referent object 
matrix. This attempt is known as the ‘widening debate’ and involves two separate theoretical 
moves.58 The first is to ‘broaden’ the range of potential threats to state security by including, 
                                                             
52 Baldwin, ‘The concept of security’, 1997, p. 12. 
53 Baldwin, ‘The concept of security’, 1997, p. 24. 
54 Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear. An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold Era, Lynne Riener: 
Boulder, 1991, p. 4. 
55 Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, ‘Preface: Towards Critical Security Studies’, in: Keith Krause & Michael C. 
Williams (eds.) Critical Security Studies. Concepts and Cases. UCL Press: London, 1997, pp. vii-xxi, especially p. ix, italics 
in original. 
56 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 1991, p. 3. 
57 This phrasing derives from Keith Krause & Michael C. Williams, ‘Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: 
Politics and Methods’, 1996, p. 247. 
58 Krause & Williams, ‘Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies: Politics and Methods’, 1996; Huysmans, The Politics 
of Insecurity, 2006, pp. 19-22. 
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amongst others, migration.59 The second move is to ‘deepen’ the agenda of security studies, 
including non-state referent objects like individuals and society. The attempt to widen the 
threat-referent object matrix has met strong criticism. This critique concerns the fact that it 
views the threat-referent object matrix as encompassing too many different referent objects 
and threats.60 The widening debate seems to be about adding adjectives to security (societal, 
environmental, etc.) without scrutinizing the meaning of the noun ‘security’ itself.61 Moreover, 
the widening debate has triggered a fierce reaction by scholars who defend the traditional 
interpretation of the threat-referent object matrix. These scholars submit that it is better to 
have a narrowly defined threat-referent object matrix than one which is too comprehensive. 
Indeed, as an advocate of the traditional approach argues, without a determinate definition of 
security the widening approach runs ‘the risk of expanding “Security Studies” excessively’ 
thereby endangering the discipline’s ‘intellectual coherence’.62 
Self-evidently, since the widening debate seeks to innovate the threat-referent object 
matrix, it also enforces this matrix. In this respect, the widening debate remains firmly within 
the bounds of the traditional approach. This seems to be the reason why the widening debate 
is considered to be an unsuccessful attempt ‘to cut the Gordian knot’ of security studies. A 
case in point is the argument that Barry Buzan develops in his People, States and Fear.63 Recog-
nizing that the traditional concept of security is too narrowly defined, Buzan aims to widen 
the traditional approach, yet at the same time wishes to maintain its main principles.64 Conse-
quently, at the very moment that Buzan opens up the traditional approach so as to include 
‘non-state units’ and new ‘sectors of threats’, he sees himself compelled to reaffirm that the 
state remains the ‘dominant unit’, to privilege the concept of national security and to maintain 
the ‘theoretical primacy’ of military threats.65 
  
1.3.2 The Securitization Theory 
The second contribution to the debate on the crisis of security studies that I want to discuss 
is the securitization theory of the so-called Copenhagen School. In order to resolve the crisis 
of security studies, the scholars associated with the Copenhagen School have appealed to the 
theory of language, building on the shift from a representational to a performative account of 
language.66 The key idea of the securitization theory is that security should be conceptualized 
as a speech act.67 By conceptualizing security in terms of a speech act, security is rendered as 
                                                             
59 Ullman, ‘Redefining Security’, 1983. 
60 Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, Security, 1998, p. 2; Ole Waever, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, in: Ronnie D. 
Lipschutz (ed.) On Security, Columbia University Press: New York, 1995, pp. 46-86, especially pp. 47-54. 
61 Jef Huysmans, ‘Security! What Do You Mean? From Concept to Thick Signifier’, European Journal of Internatiol 
Relations, vol. 4, no. 2, 1998, pp. 226-255, especially p. 227. 
62 Walt, ‘The Renaissance of Security Studies’, 1991, p. 213. 
63 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 1991 (first published in 1983). 
64 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 1991, p. 20 ff. 
65 Buzan, People, States and Fear, 1991, p. 19, 133, 371. 
66 Jef Huysmans, ‘Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies: The Normative Dilemma of Writing Security’, 
Alternatives, vol. 27, 2002, pp. 41-62, especially p. 45. 
67 Waever, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, 1995, p. 55; Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, Security, 1998, p. 26. 
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a ‘self-referential practice’.68 That is, the meaning of the concept of security lies in its usage,69 
implying that the security utterance is the ‘primary reality’ of security.70 Crucially, the self-
referentiality of security utterances means that ‘there is no reference made to real existential 
threats existing independently of definitional practices’.71 An act of securitization does not 
imply the real existence of a threat but rather that the issue at hand is presented as an existential 
threat. Therefore, the ‘nominalist’72 or ‘linguistic’73 turn in security studies brought about by 
the securitization theory implies a focus on the rhetoric of security, that is, the political con-
struction of an issue as a security threat. What is essential to an act of securitization is its 
performativity. The security utterance creates something that didn’t exist before. I will return 
to this aspect of performativity and its temporal structure later on, when dealing with the 
Foucaultian approach. 
The focus on the rhetoric or political construction of security assumes that ‘security is 
the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue 
either as a special kind of politics or as above politics’.74 In other words, an act of securitization 
brings about the exceptionalization of an issue. An act of securitization comes about when a 
‘securitizing actor’ utters a security speech act, proclaiming the presence of an existential threat 
to a referent object: 
 
‘when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue 
out of what under those conditions is “normal politics”, we have a case of securitiza-
tion . . . A discourse that takes the form of representing something as an existential 
threat to a referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a securitizing 
move, but the issue is securitized only if the audience accepts it as such’.75 
 
Thus, something can only be meaningfully designated as ‘security issue’ when a securitizing 
actor successfully mobilizes a discourse in which a referent object is existentially threatened, 
such as politicians who talk about immigration as a security threat.  
Despite the shift from the reality of security to the language of security, the securiti-
zation theory still adheres to the traditional interpretation of the threat-referent object matrix. 
Actually, advocates of the securitization theory explicitly state that they aim to ‘incorporate’ 
the traditional position into their own theory.76 First of all, this concerns the definition of the 
referent object. Despite distinguishing between a security referent and a securitizing actor, the 
                                                             
68 Ole Waever, ‘European Security Identities’, Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 34, no. 1, 1996, pp. 103-132, 
especially p. 107; Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, Security, 1998, p. 24. 
69 Waever, ‘European Security Identities’, 1996, p. 106. 
70 Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, Security, 1998, p. 26; Waever, ‘Securitization and Desecuritization’, 1995, p. 55. 
71 Jef Huysman, ‘Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, On the Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe’, 
European Journal of International Relations, vol. 4, no. 4, 1998, pp. 479-505, especially p. 493; also Huysmans, The Politics 
of Insecurity, 2006, p. 24. 
72 Andrew Neal, Exceptionalism and the Politics of Counter-Terrorism. Liberty, Security and the War on Terror. Routledge: Lon-
don/New York, 2010, p. 103. 
73 Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity, 2006, p. 8. 
74 Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, Security, 1998, p. 23.  
75 Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, Security, 1998, p. 25, italics in original. 
76 Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, Security, 1998, p. 4. 
17 
 
securitization theory retains the notion of referent object to denote the security referent, which 
is defined as ‘things that are seen to be existentially threatened’.77 Secondly, the securitization 
theory reaffirms that security is a ‘state-dominated field’, although this does not mean that it 
necessarily implies a ‘state-centered approach’.78 Indeed, the securitization theory includes dif-
ferent levels of analysis, i.e. different kinds of ‘ontological referents’ (international system, 
units, individuals, etc.), and identifies a range of security sectors (military, political, economic, 
societal, environmental). Thirdly, the securitization theory takes over the ‘militaristic’ core of 
the traditional understanding of security. For an issue to be defined as security problem, it has 
to be framed as an ‘existential threat’ to a designated referent object, that is, a threat requiring 
emergency measures.79 
The critical purport of the securitization theory concerns the responsibility of secu-
ritizing actors talking about security.80 These actors need some awareness of the fact that their 
words have the potential of securitizing an issue. In other words, treating something as a se-
curity issue implies a choice to do so, and this choice could have been made differently.81 In 
this respect, the securitization theory does not merely present an alternative approach to secu-
rity but also proposes a particular ‘political ethic’.82 Considering that a successful act of secu-
ritization legitimizes the use of emergency measures to deal with that security issue, the repre-
sentatives of the securitization theory argue that it is better to be sparing with security talk. 
Moreover, they propose to neutralize security issues and ‘de-securitize’ them, shifting security 
issues out of their emergency mode into the realm of normal politics.83 In this respect, the 
securitization theory advocates a ‘negative agenda’84 for security studies, ‘an agenda for mini-
mizing security’.85 
 
1.3.3 Critical Security Studies 
The third contribution to the debate on the crisis of security studies that I wish to discuss is 
critical security studies, which is actually less a defined approach than a movement initiating 
intellectual self-reflection among security scholars. Reflecting on the structural realist legacy 
of security studies, scholars have gathered to develop ‘a self-consciously critical perspective’.86 
                                                             
77 Buzan, Waever & De Wilde, Security, 1998, p. 36, my emphasis, MB. 
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The aim of critical security studies is to analyze the limitations of the traditional approach in 
order to open up possibilities for conceptual reorientation.87 In so far that critical security 
studies entail a reflection on the traditional approach, they aren’t so much representing a new 
theory,88 as in the case of the securitization theory, but rather calling into question the tradi-
tional ‘culture of inquiry’89 of security studies. At the heart of critical security studies is a dis-
comfort with the state-dominance and state-centrism of the traditional approach. For this rea-
son, critical security studies is preoccupied with the notion of the referent object, both from 
an epistemological and a conceptual point of view. 
As concerns the epistemological point, critical security studies criticize the objectiv-
ism of the traditional approach. As Krause and Williams notice, the ‘claim to know objectively 
means that the discipline [i.e. security studies, MB] must treat the phenomena under consid-
eration as given, unproblematic objects’.90 However, treating something as an object presup-
poses a process of objectification, that is, a ‘prior definition’ of this object.91 This means that 
the notion of the referent object entails a constructivist element; the referent object is a theo-
retical construct.  
From a conceptual point of view, critical security studies inquire why the traditional 
approach is so resistant to giving up its statist definition of the referent object. The reason for 
this seems to be that the traditional approach presupposes a particular conception of political 
order:  
 
‘Realists’ accounts, for example, rest on a theory of domestic politics and defend a 
particular vision of the possibilities of political order – the political – that sees it as 
inextricable from the modern conceptions of sovereignty and the state. Its conception 
of security follows and is similarly derivative . . .’92  
 
Therefore, a critical account of the referent of security implies making explicit the problem of 
political order presumed by a conception of security. ‘By making the definition of the political 
a question rather than an assumption, one can illuminate the dynamics of contemporary secu-
rity debates . . .’93 Put differently, the concept of security presupposes a prior understanding 
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of who or what is to be secured. As R.B.J. Walker formulates it, ‘the crucial subject of security 
is . . .  the subject of security’.94 
As we will see, the approach within security studies that takes its cue from Foucault’s 
theory of governmentality builds on elements from the widening debate, the securitization 
theory and critical security studies. First of all, the Foucaultian approach deems it necessary to 
‘broaden’ and ‘deepen’ the threat-referent object matrix. Secondly, it takes over the notion of 
securitization, in the Schmittian sense of exceptionalization.95 And thirdly, the Foucaultian 
approach can be labelled as a critical approach in that it seeks to disclose the constructivist 
nature of the threat-referent object matrix.  
 
1.4 The Foucaultian Approach 
Drawing on other contributions that have sought to resolve the crisis of security studies, some 
scholars have appealed to Foucault’s theory of governmentality. My analysis of what I will 
denote as the Foucaultian approach will be limited to the work of two scholars in particular: 
Didier Bigo and Jef Huymans.96 These scholars develop a theory of security ‘in extension of 
Michel Foucault’s work’97 on governmentality; they adopt a ‘Foucaultian lens’98 in order to 
redefine the subject matter of security studies. Drawing on Foucault, Bigo and Huysmans 
adopt what we could call a discursive conception of security. Bigo and Huysmans develop 
their respective notions of security in relation to the same problem, namely, immigration in 
the context of the European Union. Yet, notwithstanding the correlation between the work 
of Bigo and Huysmans, let there be no misunderstanding that I construe their work in terms 
of the Foucaultian approach. In my view, despite significant differences Bigo and Huysmans 
share a common theoretical basis. The fact that Bigo and Huysmans draw on Foucault’s con-
cept of governmentality does not mean that they use it strictly in the sense that Foucault has 
defined it. Actually, I will elaborate Foucault’s own definition of the concept of governmen-
tality in the next section, not so much to distinguish Foucault’s theory of governmentality 
from the Foucaultian approach, but rather to explicate the implications of the latter’s solution 
to the problem of the security referent.  
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1.4.1 Security Framing 
The Foucaultian approach revolves around the conception of security as a ‘technique of gov-
ernment’.99 The central idea is that a response to a threat presupposes that an issue is framed 
as a security problem. Security framing implies that a threat is socially and politically con-
structed, and not an objective condition. Now, techniques of government produce insecurity 
insofar as they frame an issue as a security problem. In fact, the production of insecurity is 
what Huysmans calls the ‘constitutive dimension’ of security framing. For if the referent is 
conceived as being threatened, security framing renders it as ‘that what needs securing’,100 and 
hence as insecure. Reflecting on both the threat definition and the security referent, we could 
say that the Foucaultian approach further pursues the deconstruction of the threat-referent 
object matrix as initiated by the securitization theory. Whereas the securitization theory fo-
cuses on the construction of threats, the Foucaultian approach also draws attention to the con-
structed nature of the security referent. 
Besides its more radical reconsideration of the threat-referent object matrix, the Fou-
caultian approach can be distinguished from the securitization theory in that it redefines the 
concept of securitization. An act of securitization does not stand on its own but is part of a 
broader process of security framing. Whereas the concept of securitization, in its initial defi-
nition, is confined to the performativity of security language, the notion of security framing 
draws attention to the institutional, technological and technocratic processes that form the 
background of the security statement. As Bigo submits, ‘there is no process of securitisation 
independent of a field of security constituted by groups and institutions that authorize them-
selves and that are authorized to state what is security’.101 This suggests that the knowledge 
and technological instruments like databases, i.e. what Bigo calls the ‘field of security’,102 that 
are used for the definition of a threat, should be taken into account.103 So, it is not sufficient 
to analyze the security utterance on its own. We should also pay attention to the ‘power posi-
tion’ of the securitizing actor.104 Consequently, if the definition of security as a speech act 
represents the ‘linguistic turn’ in security studies, 105 the definition of security as technique of 
government represents the ‘discursive’ turn in security studies, taking into account the under-
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1.4.2 Identity Politics 
Besides the notion of securitization, there is another continuity between the securitization 
theory and the Foucaultian approach, which goes back to the traditional approach, namely, 
the basic understanding of security as an exceptional problem that relates to the problem of 
existence/non-existence. By framing an issue as a security problem, it is given an exceptional 
status that overrules the realm of normal politics. Linking up with the securitization theory, 
Huysmans seeks to make explicit the Schmittian roots of the traditional understanding of se-
curity. In Huysmans’ view, Schmitt’s existential politics represents in a paradigmatic way the 
‘political rationality’ or ‘logic of political identification’ implicit in security framing.106 In a nut-
shell, ‘in its constitutive Schmittian rendering, securitization . . . refers to a political technique 
(i.e. a method of doing politics) with a capacity to politically integrate a society by staging a 
credible existential threat in the form of an enemy’.107 Now, in so far that the manifestation of 
an enemy implies a disruption of normal politics, it creates an emergency situation that requires 
‘exceptional political action to assure the survival of the community’.108 Therefore, security 
framing suggests that it is necessary to make a move from normal to exceptional politics in 
order to respond to an existential threat.109  
According to Huysmans, the snag is that in Schmitt’s interpretation of politics the 
enemy is constitutive of the identity of a community. In a Schmittian understanding, Huys-
mans argues, exceptional politics reveals the authentic identity of a community; normal politics 
concerns the realm of inauthenticity. The problem is that the Schmittean logic entails a peculiar 
‘political dialectic’: securitization ‘is a peculiar process of constituting a political community of 
the established that seeks to secure unity and identity by instituting existential insecurity’.110 
This means that the existence of a political community as an autonomous unity requires that 
it should first be freed from existential threats. Paradoxically, in order to free itself from exis-
tential danger, a community should first securitize the issue at hand, implying that it has to re-
iterate its insecure existence. In other words, the Schmittean political rationality of security 
framing implies a vicious circle in that the quest for security boils down to an intensification 
and reproduction of insecurity. Importantly, security framing places the unity and identity of 
a political community beyond doubt. That is, the very framing itself of an issue as a security 




The definition of security advocated by the Foucaultian approach is elaborated in relation to 
one issue in particular: immigration. According to Huysmans, the securitization of immigration 
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is a ‘political act’, and not simply a matter of law enforcement.112 That is to say, the framing of 
immigration as a security problem enables the ‘mobilization’ of political responses.113 In this 
sense, a security response assumes that immigration is raised from a source of unease to the 
level of a collective threat. The definition of immigration as a threat to the unity and identity 
of a political community seems to necessitate ‘exceptional measures beyond the normal de-
mands of everyday politics’.114 Bigo emphasizes that the problem of the securitization of im-
migration does not so much concern the legal status of immigrants. Rather, it concerns the 
social and political image that is constructed by politicians, security professionals and others.115  
Importantly, the securitization of immigration does not only mean that immigrants 
are framed as an existential threat to political community, it also invokes a particular image of 
political community, to wit ‘an image of a completed, harmonious unit that only seems to be 
experiencing conflict, disintegration, or violence if external factors such as migration, start 
disrupting it’.116 As a consequence, in as much as the definition of immigration as a threat is a 
social construction, this also holds for the image of the political community. Bigo states this 
in no uncertain terms: ‘the framing of the state as a body endangered by migrants is a political 
narrative activated for the purpose of political games . . .’117 As he continues, ‘politicians live 
in the myths about polity, sovereignty, and state. They participate in the illusion of the political 
field. These myths structure their space, their way of thinking and acting concerning a “political 
problem” . . .’118 So, once again, not only the threat is a construct, but also the security referent. 
As Huysmans argues, ‘securitizing migration makes immigrants, refugees and asylum-seekers 
both an index of fear and a vehicle for inscribing fear as a political currency and an organizing 
principle in social and political relations’.119 
 
1.4.4 De-Securitization 
What strategy does the Foucaultian approach propose to counteract the securitization of issues 
such as immigration? In line with the securitization theory, Huysmans labels this critical strat-
egy de-securitization. According to him, de-securitization is a strategy to neutralize ‘the excep-
tional political status of security questions’, making these questions appear ‘as problems similar 
to all problems a political community has to deal with’.120 For example, de-securitization by 
means of framing immigration in economic or human rights terms. If securitization is a strat-
egy to exceptionalize an issue, de-securitization implies ‘de-dramatizing’ it.121 In this regard, 
Huysmans coins an interesting turn of phrase. At bottom, he submits, de-securitization is 
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about ‘normalizing insecurities’.122 In other words, insecurity should not be perceived as some-
thing exceptional but rather as something that is part of everyday life, part of normal order.  
I think that Huysmans touches here on an important point: the exceptional manifes-
tation of insecurity finds its place besides normal manifestations thereof. However, the ques-
tion then is what the normal manifestation of insecurity entails and how to distinguish between 
normal and exceptional forms of insecurity. Despite broaching this point, Huysmans does not 
explicate what normal insecurity means and how it can be distinguished from exceptional 
manifestations of insecurity. In the following chapters I will further pursue the problem of 
normal insecurity. What I will take from Huysmans is that the preoccupation with the excep-
tional character of insecurity blocks a full understanding of the phenomenon of insecurity and 
hence also of the possibilities available to respond to threats. 
By defining security as a technique of government, the Foucaultian approach marks 
the culmination of a critical reflection on the traditional conceptual framework of security 
studies that runs from the widening debate to the securitization theory and critical security 
studies. For the Foucaultian approach does not only view the threat as social construction, like 
the securitization theory, but also as the referent object. The subject of security is a social 
construction, or so the Foucaultian approach argues. But what remains of security studies after 
the deconstruction of the threat-referent object matrix? The radical constructivism of the Fou-
caultian approach seems to imply a negative and skeptical approach: a threat is a dangerous 
illusion rather than an objective condition; the referent of security is a socially constructed 
image rather than an object. This means that, as Loader and Walker formulate it, ‘there is, on 
this view, little or no mileage in seeking to think in constructive terms about the good of 
security and the kind of good that security is’.123 Therefore, since it appears that the construc-
tivism of the Foucaultian approach is but the reverse of the objectivism of the traditional 
approach, it remains the question whether the Foucaultian approach really succeeds in resolv-
ing the crisis of security studies. 
 
1.5 Foucault’s Theory of Governmentality 
The aim of this section is to further inquire into the negative and skeptical nature of the Fou-
caultian approach by focusing on its philosophical underpinnings. For this purpose I will ex-
amine Foucault’s theory of governmentality. First, I focus on Foucault’s methodology and the 
ontological status that he assigns to the ‘security referent’ as security scholars term it, i.e. the 
object of governmental techniques. Then, after having introduced governmentality as a dis-
tinct form of power besides law and discipline, I discuss Foucault’s definition of the notions 
of security, territory and population, which are the three concepts included in the initial title 
of Foucault’s course on governmentality at the Collège de France.124 This implies that I will not 
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engage in an analysis of the degree to which the Foucaultian approach remains faithful to 
Foucault’s theory of governmentality. Rather, the following discussion of Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality is instrumental to examining the constructivism of the Foucaultian approach, 
in particular to analyzing the notion of existence pertaining to a collective as a discursive unity. 
 
1.5.1 Discourse Analysis 
Clearly, the Foucaultian approach builds on Foucault’s methodology: discourse analysis. In 
this respect, the conception of security as a technique of government represents what we could 
call a discursive conception. Foucault defines the notion of discourse in The Archeology of 
Knowledge in the following way:  
 
‘We shall call discourse a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same 
discursive formation . . . it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a 
group of conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is . . . from 
beginning to end, historical – a fragment of history, a unity and discontinuity in his-
tory itself, posing the problem of its own limits, its divisions, its transformations, the 
specific modes of its temporality . . .’125 
 
First of all, Foucault’s definition makes clear that discourse is about statements (énoncé); a state-
ment is the basic unit of discourse. In fact, this emphasis distinguishes Foucault’s definition 
of discourse from both formal-linguistic and empirical-sociological accounts thereof.126 
Whereas the latter two concentrate on enunciations (énonciation), the former focuses on dis-
courses at the level of the enounced, that is, the positivity of statements. Importantly, Fou-
cault’s shift to statements implies a rejection of the idea of ‘a sovereign subject’.127 As Gilles 
Deleuze clarifies, Foucault challenges the idea of a ‘subject of enunciation who seemingly has 
the power to begin a discourse’ involving ‘a linguistic “I” that cannot be reduced to “he” . . . 
since it sets things into motion or is self-referential’.128 Indeed, this is at stake in Foucault’s 
definition of discourse: showing that the first-person perspective of a subject is a dependent 
effect of discourse. ‘The subject . . . has the character of a first person with whom discourse 
begins, while the statement is an anonymous function which leaves a trace of subject only in 
the third person, as a derived function’.129 
The shift from enunciations to statements implies that Foucault concentrates on the 
positive existence of statements, more precisely, the positivity of a group of statements as a 
discursive formation. That is, Foucault aims to analyze ‘the law of existence of statements, that 
which rendered them possible – them and none other in their place: the conditions of their 
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singular emergence . . .’130 Rather than focusing on enunciations, i.e. on what is said, Foucault 
is interested in the limits of what can be said within the bounds of a discourse.131 By studying 
the ‘conditions of existence’132 of statements, Foucault seeks to disclose the conditions of 
discourse, that is, the relations between ‘institutions, economic and social processes, behav-
ioural patterns, systems of norms, techniques, types of classification, modes of characteriza-
tion’ that define discourse as a practice.133 The condition of discourse is what Foucault calls a 
historical a priori. As ‘a condition of the reality for statements’, the historical a priori concerns 
a set of historically determined rules that characterizes a discursive practice.134 
The overarching aim of Foucault’s discourse analysis is to demonstrate what he calls 
the synthetic nature of discursive formations.135 For to the extent that Foucault defines dis-
course in terms of a conglomerate of a multiplicity of statements, the unity of discourse is 
necessarily synthetic. Therefore, discourse lacks an ‘immediate’ and ‘homogenous’ unity.136 
The ‘variable and relative’ character of discursive unity has important implications with respect 
to the identity of discursive formations. According to Foucault, essential to the prevailing un-
derstanding of identity is the idea of permanence in time or sameness.137 However, by focusing 
on continuity, Foucault argues, the prevailing understanding ignores the phenomenon of dis-
continuity. Actually, if identity is interpreted as sameness, its temporal permanence is hypos-
tatized. Yet, to the extent that, as Foucault argues, the ‘pre-existing forms of continuity’ that a 
discursive formation is considered to possess is ‘the result of a construction’, discourse analysis 
demands renouncing the hypostatization of identity.138 For the unity of a discursive formation 
only appears as such in the sense of ‘a retrospective regrouping’.139 As a consequence, Foucault 
claims that essential to discursive formations is ‘their non-identity through time’, that is, ‘the 
internal discontinuity that suspends their permanence’.140 In other words, discourse analysis, 
in Foucault’s sense of the expression, desires to dispense with identity, understood as same-
ness, in order to secure difference, to exchange homogeneity for heterogeneity, continuity for 
discontinuity, and permanence for rupture. 
 
1.5.2 Faceless Potentiality 
Foucault’s definition of discursive identity implies a thesis about the ontological status of 
things. Paul Veyne deals with this issue in his article entitled ‘Foucault Revolutionizes His-
tory’.141 Analyzing Foucault’s methodology, Veyne discusses its underlying account of the 
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mode of being of what he calls ‘natural objects’. According to Veyne, key to Foucault’s meth-
odology is the principle of ‘objectivization’.142 A discursive formation cannot be said to have 
natural existence, to have independent existence as an object outside of discourse. Instead, 
‘things, objects, are only correlatives of practices’.143 The process of objectivization entails that 
a prediscursive referent comes to appear as something, as an object through discourse. This 
means that prior to its objectivization, the prediscursive referent has ‘a faceless, not yet objec-
tivized existence’.144 Indeed, the prediscursive referent does not exist as a natural object but 
appears ‘retrospectively’ as such.145 Therefore, in Veyne’s interpretation, the central problem 
for Foucault is the reification of the prediscursive referent, the fact that we treat it as having 
an objective mode of being.146 
According to Veyne, Foucault’s understanding of identity is based on an ontology of 
potentiality. That is, the prediscursive referent exists as potentiality and its objectivization is 
only a possible actualization. In this respect, Foucault’s account of the mode of being of nat-
ural objects challenges the prevailing thesis about the ontological status of objects which claims 
that objects have a ‘changeless face’.147 In Veyne’s interpretation, Foucault claims that a pre-
discursive referent exists as ‘faceless potentiality’, a potentiality that is actualized in a determi-
nate way.148 Hence, discursive identity is an actualization that is by no means the only possible 
one. Put differently, discursive practices give the prediscursive referents their ‘objective 
faces’,149 that is, actualizes their potentiality. It is for this reason that Foucault emphasizes the 
temporal structure of discursive formations. According to Foucault, we should hold the dis-
cursive identity of a referent in suspense, ‘depresentifying’ its existence as he calls it.150 Or, as 
Veyne puts it, ‘the prediscursive referent is not a natural object’151, it can only be considered to 
exist as such retrospectively.  
The ontology implied by Foucault’s discourse analysis is quite radical. For the ‘dep-
resentification’ of things means substituting ‘the enigmatic treasure of “things” anterior to 
discourse’ for ‘the regular formation of objects only in discourse’.152 This is in fact, according 
to Veyne, Foucault’s ‘most original thesis’: Although Foucault seeks to explain ‘what is made’, 
i.e. a discursive formation, on the basis of ‘what went into its making at each moment of 
history’, it would be wrong of us to explain ‘the making, the practice’ on the basis of ‘what is 
made’.153 This means that while it is insightful to make a distinction between a prediscursive 
referent and the discursive formation, as Veyne does, for Foucault the starting point is the 
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positivity of the discursive formation. In other words, there is no access to a prediscursive 
referent other than through discourse. Moreover, as Deleuze notes, for Foucault ‘no sense of 
possibility or potentiality exists in the realm of statements. Everything in them is real and 
reality is manifestly present’.154 Accordingly, in Foucault’s view, there is an insurmountable 
fissure between discourse and what precedes it, between actuality and potentiality. 
Foucault develops his account of the relation between potentiality and actuality on 
the basis of the distinction between the ‘material’ and the ‘discursive unity’ of a thing.155 In his 
view, a prediscursive referent exists as materiality. According to Veyne, as a material unity the 
prediscursive referent has only a ‘phantom existence’ as ‘unrealized potentiality’.156 In other 
words, Foucault defines the existence of prediscursive referents in terms of a ‘material uni-
verse’ of potentiality.157 Now, it is crucial, as Veyne explains, that this material universe is, as 
potentiality, in act.158 However, being in act, the material universe is the act of nothing. In this 
sense, Foucault understands the world to exist in the following sense: ‘a faceless and perpetu-
ally agitated matter brings into being on its surface, at constantly shifting points, faces that are 
always different and that do not exist, in which everything is individual, so much so that noth-
ing is’.159 So, if Foucault’s argument is essentially about the rejection of the reified existence 
of discursive formations, this does not mean that he claims that they are nothing. This seems 
in fact to be the whole problem with which Foucault is struggling: to the extent that a discur-
sive formation is the correlative of a practice, it is neither something nor nothing.160 Not some-
thing, some-thing, since the discursive formation cannot be said to have existence prior to 
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1.5.3 The Triangle Law – Discipline – Governmentality 
The methodology that Foucault adopts informs his analysis of governmentality. In order to 
demonstrate this I discuss three key concepts of governmentality, to wit security, territory and 
population.161 Indeed, Foucault’s discussion of these concepts assumes what Deleuze would 
call a third-person perspective. Yet, before zooming in on these concepts, let me first say a 
few words about the concept of governmentality.   
The occasion for inventing the ‘ugly word “governmentality”’162  is Foucault’s analy-
sis of bio-power, a topic that aroused his interest after publishing Discipline and Punish, Fou-
cault’s book on disciplinary power. Foucault introduces the notion of bio-power or bio-politics 
in The History of Sexuality and the lecture of 17 March 1976 of the course “Society Must Be De-
fended” at the Collège de France to demarcate a form of power besides law and discipline that is 
directed at the biological existence of human beings.163 To the extent that bio-power deploys 
security mechanisms to control the biological condition of a population, Foucault’s initial fo-
cus on bio-power shifts a little to the rationality of governing, at least in the two courses that 
Foucault taught at the Collège de France between 1978 and 1979.164 This shift led Foucault to 
introduce the concept of governmentality, which he defines as follows: ‘the ensemble formed 
by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics that allow the 
exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that has the population as its target, 
political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential 
technical instrument’.165 
Foucault distinguishes governmentality as a form of power from law and discipline. 
In a general sense, Foucault discerns two characteristics on the basis of which law, discipline 
and governmentality can be identified as distinct forms of power. The first characteristic that 
enables us to distinguish between law, discipline and governmentality is that they have a dif-
ferent object of power. Law targets legal subjects, discipline the bodies of individuals, and 
governmentality the whole of a population in the sense of the multiplicity of individuals con-
stituted as a collective. The second characteristic concerns the techniques of power. Law op-
erates mainly on the basis of mechanisms of punishment, discipline with techniques of sur-
veillance and correction, and governmental power is exercised by means of security mecha-
nisms.  
An important characteristic of these techniques of power is the process of normali-
zation. According to Foucault, the notion of normality as it functions in the governmental 
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form of power is completely different from those of the legal and disciplinary form of power. 
As regards the legal form of power, normality concerns the ‘normativity intrinsic to the law’.166 
In this sense, legal sanctions are a form of normalization, that is, of making behavior conform 
with the law. Disciplinary power on the other hand posits an ‘optimal model’ that functions 
as the norm to distinguish between normality and abnormality.167 Hence, disciplinary tech-
niques are means of ‘normation’, of making the individuals fit into the optimal model.168 In 
contrast to the legal and disciplinary form of power, governmentality lacks a pre-set definition 
of normality, i.e. a norm that defines normality and that enables us to distinguish between 
normality and abnormality. Instead, what is defined as normal in the context of the govern-
mental form of power is the outcome of ‘an interplay between different distributions of nor-
mality’,169 i.e. a ‘general curve’.170 This means that, as Foucault puts it, ‘the norm is an interplay 
of differential normalities. The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it . . .’171 In 
other words, normality is a construction. 
Foucault’s demarcation of law, discipline and governmentality as distinctive forms of 
power raises the question how they relate to one another. The first answer to this question is 
historical. According to Foucault, it is possible to categorize the forms of power historically. 
On the basis of Foucault’s historical schematization, we could say that law is the first dominant 
form of power.172 Subsequently, law diminishes as the dominant form of power and is over-
taken by discipline.173 And after the period characterized by discipline, governmentality be-
comes the dominant form of power.174 To be sure, in Foucault’s interpretation, all three forms 
of power are always at work in a given historical period but only one of them gains dominance. 
‘So we should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of 
discipline, and then of a society of discipline by a society, say of government. In fact, we have 
a triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management . . .’175  
In so far as the three forms of power are always operative simultaneously, the histor-
ical answer to the question about their interrelation also seems to demand a systematic answer. 
Admittedly, Foucault does not seem to provide a univocal answer to the systematic relation 
between law, discipline and governmentality. Yet, Foucault’s lectures of the course ‘Security, 
Territory, Population’ seem to contain some clues about the systematic relation between the 
three forms of power. My hypothesis is that, at least on the basis of the course ‘Security, 
Territory, Population’, Foucault’s analysis of discipline and governmentality revolves around 
the idea that law is not the sole form of power but that it is accompanied by other forms, 
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which not only support but also thwart the functioning of law. Discipline and governmentality 
decenter the legal form of power. As concerns disciplinary power, Foucault argues that it is 
supplementary to law in that the former is a perfection of the latter. In Foucault’s view, ‘the 
panopticon is the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign: None of my subjects can escape and 
none of their actions is unknown to me. The central point of the panopticon still functions, 
as it were, as a perfect sovereign’.176 Furthermore, when discussing the relation between gov-
ernmentality and ‘the juridical principle of sovereignty’, Foucault argues that an analysis of the 
governmental form of power does not eliminate the problem of sovereignty but makes it ‘more 
acute than ever’.177 In fact, in his discussion of the operation of normalization particular to the 
different forms of power, Foucault notes that he is interested in discipline and governmentality 
because they reveal ‘how techniques of normalization develop from and below a system of 
law, in its margins and maybe even against it’.178 
 
1.5.4 Population 
Foucault relates governmentality as a distinct form of power to the emergence of the popula-
tion as the ‘new subject-object’179 of political power. In Foucault’s interpretation, the popula-
tion has mainly two manifestations. On the one hand, the population refers to the biological 
existence of a collection of individuals as human species. On the other hand, the notion of 
population can be defined in the sense of a public, that is, ‘the population seen under the 
aspect of its opinions, ways of doing things, forms of behavior, customs, fears, prejudices, and 
requirements; it is what one gets a hold on through education, campaigns, and convictions’.180 
According to Foucault, the population is an object of power in that it is ‘that on which and 
towards which mechanisms are directed in order to have a particular effect on it’. That is, the 
population is ‘framed by a regulatory apparatus’ as the object of power.181 The population can 
also be conceived as the subject of power in the sense that ‘it is called upon to conduct itself 
in such and such a fashion’;182 the population as a subject in the sense of individuals that are 
turned into ‘an element of the thing we want to manage in the best way possible’ so that they 
‘conduct themselves properly’.183 In other words, governmentality causes individuals to sub-
ject themselves as a member of the population. Consequently, the primary object of govern-
mentality is the population, that is, the multiplicity of individuals constituted as a whole, and 
not the multiplicity of individuals as such.184 Indeed, governmentality establishes the individ-
uals as ‘the instrument, relay, or condition for obtaining something at the level of the popula-
tion’.185 To the extent that Foucault understands the population as a whole of individuals it 
seems to be reductive to approach it only from the perspective of the individual, as Foucault 
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does, and not also from the perspective of the population as a unity. The latter would imply 
interpreting the population as a collective subject, i.e. a collective as an acting unity. Indeed, 
what seems to be assumed by Foucault’s understanding of the population as a collective is the 
idea of collective self-relation, something that is irreducible to individual self-relation.  
The definition of a population as a subject raises the question about the distinction 
between governmentality and law. What is the relation between the notions of a population 
and a people ‘constituted and created by the social contract’?186 Foucault defines the popula-
tion as a subject in a different sense than the legal notion of a people: ‘the population as a 
political subject, as a new collective subject absolutely foreign to the juridical and political 
thought of earlier centuries . . .’187 In Foucault’s interpretation, the notions of a population 
and a people both indicate a ‘process of subjectivation’188, albeit in a different sense. Whereas 
in the case of governmentality subjectivation expresses the idea that an individual subjects 
itself as a member of a population and hence concerns an individual self-relation, the subjec-
tivation of a people concerns a collective self-relation, i.e. ‘collective subjectivation’.189 Central 
to collective subjectivation in the case of the legal form of power is the external relation of 
obedience between the sovereign and the individual subjects constituted as a collective.190 In 
the case of governmental power, the collective subjectivation triggers a process of individual 
self-subjection. 
Ultimately, at the root of Foucault’s shift from the legal notion of a people to the 
governmental notion of the population lies the idea that a collective subject is a ‘chimera’.191 
In Foucault’s view, the notion of a collective subject is nothing more and nothing less than a 
construction created to enable the exercise of power. This means that Foucault defines collec-
tive subjectivity from what Deleuze would call a ‘third person’ perspective, and not from a 
first-person perspective; Foucault accounts for collective subjectivity in terms of an object. By 
defining collective subjectivity in terms of a process of individual subjectivation, Foucault 
seems to ignore the more fundamental meaning of collective subjectivity implied by the notion 
of a people, namely the collective as an acting unity. In fact, key to the legal notion of a people 
is the self-relation of a collective, the fact that a multitude relates to itself as a whole, a self-




Let us now turn to another concept that is central to Foucault’s course at the Collège de France 
on governmentality: territory.192 This is an important notion as it illustrates the difficulties of 
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Foucault’s discourse analysis to come to terms with the problem of spatial unity and bounda-
ries, which is related to his reductive account of collective subjectivity. According to Foucault, 
the notion of a territory is essential to ‘the political effectiveness of sovereignty’.193 A territory 
is the fundamental element ‘of the juridical sovereignty of the sovereign as defined by philos-
ophers or legal theorists’; it is ‘the very foundation of the principality or of sovereignty’.194 In 
this sense, the notion of a territory relates for Foucault to a legal form of power. The spatial 
nature of the legal form of power implies that it functions by means of delimitation, more 
specifically, delimitation in the sense of ‘exclusion’.195 In Foucault’s view, disciplinary power 
also has a spatial nature. However, discipline is not so much concerned with delimitation as 
with the ‘construction’ or ‘structuring’ of space on the basis of a geometrical figure.196 The 
organization of space enables the most effective exercise of power. Discipline is about the 
‘treatment of multiplicities in space, that is to say, the constitution of an empty, closed space 
within which artificial multiplicities are to be constructed and organized’.197 
The relation between power and space outlined by Foucault in the context of gov-
ernmentality is quite different from law and discipline. Foucault develops the relation between 
power and space in the case of governmentality again in contradistinction to the legal form of 
power. If the exercise of legal power is related to a territory, the security mechanisms specific 
to governmentality relate what Foucault calls a ‘milieu’. A milieu is ‘the medium of an action 
and the element in which it circulates’198 and therefore represents ‘a multivalent and trans-
formable framework’.199 It is ‘a set of natural givens – rivers, marshes, hills – and a set of 
artificial givens – an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera’.200 Elsewhere Foucault 
also uses the notion of ‘a complex of men and things’201 of which, he adds, territory and prop-
erty are only ‘variables’.202 With the redefinition of territory into a milieu Foucault aims to 
capture a transition concerning the exercise of power. The transition from law and discipline 
to governmentality relates to the spatial structure of power, i.e. ‘the structuring function of 
space and territory’.203 Space should be considered not only in the sense of the material basis 
for exercise of power, but as structuring power itself. By rejecting the notion of a territory 
Foucault somehow must provide an alternative, which he finds in the notion of the milieu. 
The question remains of course whether Foucault does not simply define the milieu as the 
inverse of a territory, that is, as boundless extension that has an osmotic relation to ‘the out-
side’.204 Notice that both the notion of a territory and a milieu are definitions of space from a 
third-person perspective. Indeed, what is problematic about Foucault’s understanding of space 
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is that it does not provide an account of the unity of space, i.e. the notions of territory and 
milieu as a spatial unity, and hence of boundaries as the distinction between inside and outside. 
As a result, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to understand why and how maintaining 
this distinction could raise an issue for collective security. In effect, this distinction presup-
poses an actor perspective, the first-person plural perspective of a collective the members of 
which refer to a space as their own. In order to elaborate the notion of spatial unity we require 




Distinctive of governmentality as a form of power are its techniques: security mechanisms. 
But how does Foucault define security in his discussion of governmentality? As we will see, 
Foucault interprets security as an instrumental notion. In order to cast some light on the tech-
niques of power proper to governmentality, it is insightful to start from the distinction between 
legal power or sovereignty and bio-power as developed in The History of Sexuality. According 
to Foucault, whereas the legal form of power is essentially a ‘formidable power over death’,205 
bio-power exerts ‘a positive influence on life, that endeavors to administer, optimize, and mul-
tiply it, subjecting it to precise controls and comprehensive regulations’. The techniques par-
ticular to bio-power are regulatory control mechanisms, meaning that security is about con-
trolling life.206 Key to the shift from the legal function of power to bio-power is the idea that 
life, and not death, becomes the object of power.   
  In the course ‘Security, Territory, Population’ Foucault further develops the notion 
of security intrinsic to governmentality in the context of his analysis of the reflective practice 
of governmental reason, raison d’État, a form of governmental reason that has the state as its 
historical locus.207 Foucault argues that to the extent that the governmental rationality of a 
state is self-referential,208 it is essentially ‘conservative’ or ‘protective’.209 Accordingly, security 
has first of all the meaning of preserving ‘the integrity of the state’,210 ‘preserving the state in 
good order’211 and maintaining ‘public order’.212  That is, security includes the meaning of ‘the 
word “manutention”, preserving, maintaining’.213 But this is not all. In fact, as Foucault notes, 
‘the theory of the preservation of the state is completely insufficient to cover the real practice 
of politics and the implementation of raison d’État’.214 Besides preservation, security implies 
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the expansion of state power. In order to preserve the state, governmental reason is aimed at 
increasing the state’s forces.215 In this sense, Foucault claims that security is primarily about a 
state ‘asserting’ itself in a play of forces.216 So, rather than conceptualizing security in terms of 
preservation, Foucault argues that it should be defined as ‘self-assertion’.217 At a later stage, I 
will return to examine the distinction between the definition of security as self-preservation 
and as self-assertion as assumed by Foucault, and reconsider his instrumental and reductive 
interpretation of security as self-assertion.    
Foucault illustrates the distinction between self-preservation and self-assertion on the 
basis of two security techniques, to wit the ‘military-diplomatic apparatus’ and the ‘apparatus 
of police’.218 Whereas the military-diplomatic apparatus concerns security techniques at the 
inter-state level, the apparatus of police relates to them at the state level. According to Fou-
cault, at the inter-state level the definition of security as self-assertion suggests that states are 
not simply rivals seeking to preserve themselves but rather competitors: ‘states are situated 
alongside other states in a space of competition’.219 This implies that the ‘military-diplomatic 
apparatus’ is focused on maintaining a balance at the inter-state level. That is, a state seeks the 
maintenance of a power balance with other states while at the same time pursuing its own 
growth. In this sense, strong competition at the inter-state level is in the state’s own interest. 
As Foucault argues, at the inter-state level the objective is ‘to ensure the security in which each 
state can effectively increase its forces without bringing about the ruin of other states or it-
self’.220 
The security technique at the state level is, as mentioned, police.221 Historically speak-
ing, Foucault notes, police has a much broader definition than the way in which we understand 
it today. Whereas today we conceive police generally in the narrow sense of law enforcement, 
that is, the maintenance of public order, it used to refer to ‘the set of means by which the 
state’s forces can be increased while preserving the state in good order’.222 So, police is also 
about the expansion of state power. To the extent that police is about governing ‘men’s coex-
istence with each other’, this does not so much concern ‘the immediate problem of surviving 
and not dying’ but rather ‘the problem of living and doing a bit better than just living’.223 As a 
consequence, police covers ‘an immense domain’224 that potentially includes individual felicity: 
‘the objective of police is everything from being to well-being, everything that may produce 
this well-being beyond being, and in such a way that the well-being of individuals is the state’s 
strength’.225 Therefore, police covers a wide range of problems including, what Foucault calls, 
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‘the necessities of life’, such as the circulation of food, the problem of health and ‘anything 
that may support disease in general’, ‘the regulation of professions’, and ‘the number of 
men’.226 The latter issue, the number of men, is of special interest as it relates to the problem 
of immigration. In fact, it is in the context of his analysis of police that Foucault makes one of 
his sparse remarks related to immigration. 
According to Foucault, most of the time the regulation of the number of men is 
discussed on the basis of what Foucault calls an ‘essentialist definition of raison d’État’, meaning 
that ‘the state really conforms to what it is’.227 This relates to the definition of security as self-
preservation, and not as self-assertion. However, in so far that security concerns the expansion 
of state power, there is no essence on the basis of which the regulation of the number of men 
can be established. Therefore, the real security question is ‘how many men are really needed 
and what the relationship should be between the number of men and the size of the territory, 
and its wealth, for the best and most certain development of the state’s strength’.228 As Fou-
cault emphasizes, this means that ‘it is not the absolute number of the population that counts, 
but its relationship with the set of forces: the size of the territory, natural resources, wealth, 
commercial activities, and so on’.229 In other words, police does not regulate the number of 
men on the basis of ‘what men are’ but rather on the basis of ‘what men do’,230 i.e. what they 
can contribute to the strengthening of the state’s forces or what Foucault terms ‘the creation 
of a public utility’.231 For this reason police is the ‘regulatory apparatus’ that, for example, 
‘prevents emigration’ and ‘calls for immigrants’.232 
Let me round up this section on Foucault’s concept of governmentality by summa-
rizing its main findings. First of all, I have discussed in some detail the specific methodology 
adopted by Foucault: discourse analysis. Foucault aims to demonstrate the constructivist na-
ture of ‘things’ by analyzing them as a discursive formation. According to Foucault, we deceive 
ourselves if we take a discursive formation to exist in the reified sense of an object. Applying 
his methodology to governmental practices, Foucault defines the population as the object of 
power, as the ‘security referent’, to put it in the language of security scholars. The population 
as a subject-object is the dependent effect of governmentality. Importantly, the multiplicity of 
individuals as whole, as a population, is not only the object of power but is also constitutive 
of an individual’s self-relation. The construction of a population, so to speak, enables the pro-
duction of an individual self-relation. Accordingly, Foucault’s theory of governmentality 
makes it difficult to connect the notion of collective security to that of collective subjectivity 
as assumed by the legal form of power that turns on the relation that a range or actors take up 
with respect to themselves as a group or unity. The understanding of collective subjectivity 
from a third-person perspective is confirmed by Foucault’s analysis of the governmental spa-
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tiality of security. Last but not least, Foucault’s analysis of governmentality includes a funda-
mental definition of security. According to Foucault, security does not only mean self-preser-
vation but also self-assertion, which he interprets in the instrumental sense as the expansion 
of power. The ‘self’ that is engaged in self-assertion is the effect of techniques of government. 
This move makes it well-nigh impossible to explain security and insecurity as a mode of being 
of a collective subject. This, I submit, is the move that joins Foucault to the Foucaultian ap-
proach to security studies. 
 
Conclusion 
In order to diagnose the cause of the crisis of security studies, in this chapter I have analyzed 
its conceptual framework. Security scholars tend to be biased towards a military or exceptional 
understanding of security. In my view, the root of the crisis of security studies concerns the 
conceptualization of the referent of security. The traditional approach defines the security 
referent in an objectivistic way as a referent object. Building on insights from the widening 
debate, the securitization theory and critical security studies, the Foucaultian approach effec-
tuates a deconstruction of the threat-referent object matrix, arguing that the security referent 
is a construct. Notwithstanding their disagreement as concerns the subject matter of their own 
discipline, it seems that security scholars share the basic understanding of security in terms of 
the problem of existence/non-existence. 
In order to deepen my analysis of the Foucaultian approach I have reflected on Fou-
cault’s theory of governmentality. Rather than engaging in an analysis of the degree in which 
the Foucaultian approach remains faithful to Foucault, I have attempted to tease out some 
elements of what we could call the philosophical foundation of the Foucaultian approach. 
Foucault’s methodology results in a thesis about the ontological status of the ‘referent’ of 
governmental practices. In Foucault’s interpretation, a collective can be said to exist only as 
the dependent effect of governmental practices. Ontologically, the mode of being of a collec-
tive as the object of governmental practices is a purely discursive actuality. Outside of dis-
course the referent of power only has phantom existence as faceless potentiality. Now, this 
understanding of the ontological status of the referent of governmental power is reflected in 
Foucault’s definition of collective subjectivity. Foucault interprets collective subjectivity re-
ductively in the sense of an object, that is, from what Deleuze calls a third-person perspective. 
To the extent that the referent is but the dependent effect of security techniques reducing it 
to a discursive formation, Foucault’s analysis of governmentality approaches the notion of 
collective subjectivity only from the third-person perspective, thereby effacing the notion of 
collective subjectivity in a first-person perspective. As a result, security and insecurity become 
purely discursive effects, ceasing to be categories which could explain the mode of being of a 
collective: existence. This conclusion is taken over by security scholars who adopt a Foucaul-
tian framework. 
In sum, its critical analysis of the traditional theoretical framework notwithstanding, 
it appears that the Foucaultian approach cannot resolve the crisis of security studies. The im-
plication of my analysis of the conceptual framework of security studies is quite fundamental. 
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Security scholars seem to lack the conceptual resources to account for the security referent as 
the subject of security, as R.B.J. Walker puts it. And without the notion of a collective subject 
of which can be predicated that it is secure or insecure, what remains is an instrumental un-





















The conception of collective security as a technique of government elaborated in Chapter 1 
represents what we could call a constructivist conception. In this Chapter I will explore an 
alternative, existential concept of security, namely, the concept of security that can be ab-
stracted from Schmitt’s political and legal philosophy. Whereas the Foucaultian approach of 
security studies provides an utterly critical account of collective security, Schmitt provides in-
sight into its positive value. If Schmitt was one of the main targets of the Foucaultian approach, 
my aim in this Chapter is to turn the tables, considering, albeit critically, Schmitt’s contribution 
to an existential concept of security. In Schmitt’s view, the focus of the concept of security 
must be a collective that can be secure or insecure, i.e. a subject of security. A collective is, in 
Schmitt’s view, not merely a normative unity but first and foremost an existential unity. In other 
words, Schmitt’s political and legal philosophy is interesting and important because it entails a 
concept of security that, although extremely problematic in a number of ways, does take seri-
ously the notion of collective subjectivity, a notion, I want to argue, which is crucial in making 
conceptual and normative sense of the term. 
In this chapter I will argue that Schmitt defines security as collective self-preserva-
tion. Schmitt argues that the notion of public order is the legal determination of what he de-
fines ontologically as collective self-preservation. In Schmitt’s interpretation, what is at stake 
in the legal notion of public order is the existential unity of a collective subject. In this sense, 
the argument of this Chapter substantiates Schmitt’s ‘conviction’ that fundamental legal prob-
lems can only be elucidated on the basis of philosophical concepts.233 Schmitt’s existential 
definition of security is polemically oriented towards what he calls ‘normativism’, a branch of 
legal philosophy that reduces collective (in)security to (il)legality. However, as Schmitt argues, 
public order is precisely that situation in which the distinction between legality and illegality is 
challenged and the legal order does not provide a ready-made answer. In order to make the 
passage from a normative to an existential concept of security, I will establish step by step the 
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link between public order and collective self-preservation, hence between the legal and the 
ontological determinations of collective security. 
To be sure, I readily concede that the concept of security as such does not receive 
explicit attention in Schmitt’s political and legal philosophy, and thus will require some inter-
pretative work. It is for this reason that my interpretation of Schmitt’s political and legal phi-
losophy stands at some distance from more conventional readings of his work. In fact, since 
my interpretation focuses on the concept of security, my reading of the corpus of Schmitt’s 
writings is rather selective. I do not aim to develop an exegetical study that is faithful to 
Schmitt’s own intentions, if such a thing is possible at all. Instead, I am interested in making 
Schmitt’s political and legal philosophy useful for thinking through the concept of security, 
even though I will be highly critical of a number of his premises, as it can account for some-
thing that normativism could at best postulate without explaining, namely, a collective subject 
that can be secure or insecure. 
The argument of this Chapter unfolds in four steps. In the second section I trace the 
polemic between the normative and the existential concept of security back to Max Weber’s 
definition of statehood and discuss Schmitt’s critique of the normativist concept of security. 
The third section forms a prelude to Schmitt’s existential concept of security, analyzing 
Schmitt’s account of the notion of public order as it features in his discussion of Article 48 of 
the Weimar Constitution. In the fourth section I will turn to the problem of existential unity, 
introducing and reconstructing Schmitt’s concept of concrete order as an institution, as normal 
order, as homogeneity and as a nomos. The preceding sections find their culmination in section 
five, in which I will develop Schmitt’s definition of security as collective self-preservation. 
 
2.2 From a Normativist to an Existential Concept of Security 
Schmitt’s existential concept of security that we will unearth and explore in the course of this 
Chapter has its origins in his discussion with Hans Kelsen’s concept of state. Indeed, I will be 
concerned to show that there is an internal connection between the way in which Schmitt 
approaches the concepts of state and security, and that this internal connection is polemically 
oriented against what he takes to be the untoward reduction of the concept of state defended 
by normativism, notably the brand of normativism espoused by his most important intellectual 
opponent, Hans Kelsen. What is perhaps less well-known is that the debate between Schmitt 
and Kelsen has its roots in the ambiguous characterization of the state offered by Max Weber, 
the great German sociologist. Accordingly, the aim of this section is to prepare the stage for a 
discussion of Schmitt’s approach to the concept of security by briefly outlining Weber’s con-
cept of the state and its reception by Kelsen. 
 
2.2.1 Weber’s Concept of State 
The root of the polemic between the normative and the existential concepts of security can 
be traced back to Max Weber’s definition of statehood, as the latter allows for two possible 
interpretations. The first interpretation is the state as a normative unity. This is the line pursued 
by Kelsen. The second possibility is that of the state as a factual unity. This is the line followed 
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by Schmitt. I will briefly discuss the salient features of Weber’s concept of state insofar as they 
help us to clarify the different approaches to the concept of security which are available to 
Kelsen and to Schmitt. 
Max Weber’s definition of statehood is ambiguous and stems from his methodolog-
ical individualism.234 For Weber, the ontological substrate of sociological phenomena is indi-
vidual human conduct. This means that sociological categories of coordinated acts (Zusammen-
handeln) are considered to be reducible to individual conduct. From a sociological point of 
view, Weber argues, social collectivities (soziale Gebilde) are ‘the resultants and modes of organ-
izations of individual human beings’, that is, ‘a certain kind of development of actual or pos-
sible social actions of individuals’.235 Reflecting on the notion of the modern state, Weber 
notes that the state as a social collectivity is nonetheless perceived partly as something actually 
existing and partly as something normative. ‘These concepts of collective entities which are 
found both in common sense and in juristic and other technical forms of thought, have a 
meaning in the minds of individual persons, partly as of something actually existing (Seiendem), 
partly as something with normative authority (Geltensollendem)’.236 Indeed, as Weber notes, alt-
hough individual human acts are oriented towards the state and thus pertain to something 
normative, the state also has factual implications for the course of actions of real individuals. 
Therefore, Weber argues that the modern state exists as a complex of coordinated acts, inas-
much as the actions of certain human individuals are oriented to the idea that it exists or ought 
to exist.237  
As is well-known, Weber claims that the modern state deploys a specific organization 
of political domination. In Weber’s view, legal order is the characteristic form of the domina-
tion structure (Herrschaftsverband) in the modern state. Weber defines legal order as an abstract, 
objective system of rules. The legitimacy of this type of domination is based on the principle 
of legality. The legal order is deemed legitimate as a coercive apparatus (Zwangsapparat) if it 
functions as a formal, systematic whole.238 This means that the modern state derives its nor-
mative authority from its legality. 
 
2.2.2 The State as a Legal Unity 
Interestingly, Kelsen provides what is perhaps the most radical interpretation of Weber’s char-
acterization of the state as a normative concept. It is this interpretation of state as a normative 
unity against which Schmitt’s existential concepts of state and security are polemically oriented. 
According to Schmitt, by defining the state as a legal order, and a legal order as a unity or 
system of norms, Kelsen ends up conceptualizing security in strictly normativist fashion, 
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namely, on the basis of the distinction between legality and illegality. In fact, normativism does 
so in a way that empties (il)legality of its existential dimension, as Kelsen rejects the notion of 
collective subjectivity, which is the necessary presupposition of an existential concept of col-
lective security. Such, at any rate, is Schmitt’s claim. It should be noted, at the outset, that my 
aim in this and the following sub-section is not so much to present Kelsen’s theory of law in 
its strongest possible light but rather to single out those aspects of it with which Schmitt took 
strong issue, and which serve as a foil or contrast for Schmitt’s concept of security. 
Although Kelsen agrees with Weber’s reduction of social collectives to individual 
human conduct, he also questions Weber’s analysis of the modern state. According to Kelsen, 
Weber’s suggestion that the state exists both as a sociological-factual and as a legal-normative 
entity is ‘logically impossible’.239 If Weber defines the state as a complex of coordinated acts, 
Kelsen argues that he first needs to provide a criterion on the basis of which the state can be 
perceived as a unity. What defines the unity of a multitude of human acts? In Kelsen’s view, 
Weber cannot but resolve the problem of the unity of the state by shifting his analysis from 
the factual to a normative realm. A social collective is constituted as a unity through law. This 
means that the unity of the social collective is fundamentally a normative unity; the unity of a 
social collective can only exist as a legal unity. As Kelsen notes in his analysis of democracy, 
‘the “people” is by no means – as is naively believed – an embodiment, a conglomerate, as it 
were, of human beings, but merely a system of the acts of single human beings determined by 
the state’s legal order’.240 
By defining the unity of the state as a legal unity, Kelsen effectively claims that a 
unified social collective only appears as such in a passive sense, namely, as the object of rule. 
Formulating it in a Weberian fashion, Kelsen contends that ‘if the unity of the people is only 
a unity of human actions regulated by the state’s legal order, then in this normative sphere, in 
which “domination” means normative obligation, subordination to norms, the people as a 
unity is again only the object of rule’.241 Since the legal order only regulates a defined set of 
human behavior, the social collective appears primarily in a passive way as subject to the law. 
This is not to say, however, that Kelsen dismisses the role of individuals as active, ruling sub-
jects altogether. In a democracy, Kelsen argues, individuals are recognized as ruling subjects 
to the extent that they participate in creating the legal order, that is, to the extent that they are 
involved in the process of norm creation. Nevertheless, individuals can participate in norm 
creation only if they are recognized as addressees of the legal order. So, in Kelsen’s view, only 
the individual can act as a subject of rule, and not the social collective. Pointing to a pitfall of 
democratic political ideology, Kelsen notes that ‘not all those belonging to the people as sub-
ject to norms or rule can take part in the process of norm creation - the form in which rules 
is necessarily exercised - or can form the people as ruling subject’.242  
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Kelsen’s considerations on the concept of democracy are important because they 
illuminate how he deals with the problem of collective subjectivity, which, in his terms, 
amounts to a ‘supra-individual social organism made up of individual human beings’.243 Kelsen 
dismisses the notion of collective subjectivity out of hand as an extra-systemic hypostatization, 
relying to this effect on Max Weber’s methodological individualism. As Kelsen contends, ‘the 
state’s every expression of existence, its every act, can only appear as a legal act, as an act 
creating or applying legal norms’.244 For Kelsen the notions of state and legal order are iden-
tical, and not distinct from one another as assumed by Schmitt. ‘A closer look shows it [the 
state, MB] to be a coercive social system, which must be identical with the legal system since 
the very same coercive acts distinguish both systems, and since one and the same social com-
munity cannot be constituted by two different systems. The state, then, is a legal system’.245 
This is to say that, in Kelsen’s interpretation, the problem of the state as collective legal subject 
should be analyzed as a problem of imputation: the imputation of acts to a legal system.  
Behavior imputed to the state is, strictly speaking, the behavior of an individual hu-
man being. State behavior refers to a human being who is qualified as an ‘organ’ of the state.246 
It is only on the condition that the individual human being is empowered as a state organ that 
her acts can be imputed to the state. ‘By virtue of such empowerment, these coercive acts can 
be linked by imputation to the community, and thus it is the community that is responding to 
the unlawful acts with coercive acts . . . because they are linked by imputation to the commu-
nity.’247 Consequently, being identical to legal order, the notion of state is reduced to a norma-
tive unity, in particular a legal unity: a state is a legal order.  
 
2.2.3 The State Order as Legal Order 
Following Weber’s analysis of the modern state and its particular domination structure, Kelsen 
defines legal order as a system of norms. Kelsen seeks to understand the validity of positive 
law as it stands in purely legal terms, that is, as a valid coercive system that orders human 
behavior. The defining elements of law as a coercive social system are norms. As Kelsen sees 
it, norms have a ‘specific existence’248 that stands in contradistinction to material facts of hu-
man behavior. Importantly, in Kelsen’s interpretation, this split between norm and material 
fact, between normativity (Sollen) and factuality (Sein), secures the specific autonomy of the 
normativity of positive law. By conferring legal meaning to human behavior, norms function 
as ‘schemes of interpretation’249 of material facts of human behavior. As schemes for the in-
terpretation of human behavior, norms establishes which behavior ought to take place.  
Starting from the normativity proper to positive law, Kelsen argues that the ought 
character of positive law appears in the link between legal condition (the material facts of 
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human behavior) and legal consequence (a sanction). A legal norm, Kelsen notes, is ‘a hypo-
thetical judgment that expresses the specific linking of a conditioning material fact with a con-
ditioned consequence’250, that is, the linking of a condition (human behavior) with a conse-
quence (a sanction). Human behavior that qualifies as a condition for a sanction represents a 
case of illegality. Human behavior that doesn’t qualify as such is a manifestation of legality. 
Kelsen introduces the notion of imputation to define the normative relation between condi-
tion and consequence. This is a second form of imputation, ‘peripheral’ imputation, which 
Kelsen distinguishes from the form of ‘central’ imputation mentioned earlier.251 If a causal 
relation establishes that a certain condition ‘must’ have certain consequence as its effect, a 
normative relation establishes that a certain condition ‘ought’ to be sanctioned by a certain 
consequence.252 This suggests that a legal norm is essentially a ‘reconstructed legal norm’.253  
Having defined positive law in terms of legal norms, the crucial question for Kelsen 
concerns the validity of these norms. This problem boils down to the unity of a plurality of 
legal norms. What defines a manifold of legal norms as a unity? Put differently, what defines 
positive law as an order? According to Kelsen, ‘a norm is valid qua legal norm only because it 
was arrived at in a certain way – created according to a certain rule, issued or set according to 
a specific method’.254 This account of the validity of legal norms suggests that legal norms are 
not valid on the basis of their substance, i.e. their content. Rather, central to Kelsen’s definition 
of validity of legal norms is their formal character. The law, Kelsen contends, can have any 
social reality as its content. Instead a legal norm is valid because its creation can be traced back 
to another legal norm. A legal norm ‘is valid because and in so far as it was created in certain 
way, that is, in the way determined by another norm; and this latter norm, then, represents the 
basis of the validity of the former norm’.255  
In order to cut off the infinite regress of what Joseph Raz dubs the ‘chain of valid-
ity’,256 Kelsen claims that the law is a hierarchical order of legal norms grounded on the basic 
norm. The basic norm forms the ultimate basis of validity in that it is ‘the basic rule according 
to which the norms of the legal system are created’.257 Kelsen argues that the basic norm is the 
‘hypothetical foundation’ of the validity of legal norms: ‘given the presupposition that the basic 
norm is valid, the legal system resting upon it is valid’.258 This means that a positivistic under-
standing of law presupposes the ought character of legal norms; the validity of the basic norm 
needs to be presupposed if the legal system is to be a positive legal system. As a consequence, 
the validity of positive laws is founded on what Raz calls a ‘non-positive law’. For ‘only a non-
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positive law can be the ultimate law of a legal system; only it does not presuppose another 
norm from which it derives its normativity’.259 Kelsen emphasizes the crucial function of the 
basic norm for a positivistic understanding of law. In his view, only by presupposing the basic 
norm can positive law be understood as a system that governs its own creation, that is, a 
hierarchically structured and self-creating normative order.  
As a result, by taking for granted that there is a fundamental split between normativity 
and factuality, normativism reduces security and insecurity to legal constructs, or so Schmitt 
will argue. That is, human behavior can be considered as a cause of insecurity if it qualifies as 
a legal condition of a legal consequence, if it can be reconstructed as an illegal act. The empty 
or formal character of the normativist concept of security follows from the reduction of the 
state to a legal unity, and of legal order to a unity of norms. Consequently, it would seem that 
collective security and insecurity collapse into the aggregate security and insecurity of individ-
uals under a legal order. For Kelsen’s analysis precludes that there can be such a thing as a 
collective that can be secure or insecure; only individuals can be such. 
 
2.2.4 Schmitt’s Critique of the Normativist Interpretation of Security 
Schmitt claims that this approach to security and insecurity is highly problematic. In his view, 
there is an internal connection between the normative notion of the state as a legal unity and 
the reductive understanding of (in)security as (il)legality. Schmitt’s critique of Kelsen’s norma-
tivist interpretation of security presupposes a radically different concept of state from Kelsen’s 
normative one. Taking Weber’s conception of state in the opposite direction, Schmitt inter-
prets it as an existential unity. Therefore, before turning to Schmitt’s critique of Kelsen’s nor-
mativist concept of security, let me point out the stakes of Schmitt’s transformation of the 
concept of state, in fact an issue to which I will return and discuss in detail in terms of the 
notion of concrete order. 
If Kelsen attempts to purify Weber’s conception of state by defining the state as a 
strictly normative concept, Schmitt pushes Weber’s conception in the opposite direction, tak-
ing his cue from the factual or existential dimension of the state. In Constitutional Theory Schmitt 
takes a first step towards transforming the normative concept of state into an existential no-
tion, which can be viewed as a preparatory step towards his concept of concrete order as 
developed in On the Three Types of Juristic Thought. Recognizing that Kelsen develops an absolute 
concept of state, insofar as he defines the state as a unified whole, Schmitt elaborates an exis-
tential redefinition of this absolute concept of state. Opposing Kelsen’s ‘ideal’ (gedachtes) defi-
nition of state, Schmitt defines it as a ‘real’ (wirkliches) unity.260 According to Schmitt, if the 
concept of state is to be used as a meaningful concept, it should mean the political unity of a 
people, that is to say, the ‘actually present’ (seinsmäβige vorhandener) ‘complete condition’ 
(Gesamtzustand) of political unity and order.261 As Schmitt sees it, the actual existence of polit-
ical unity is the basic presupposition of a legal order. In this respect, he draws an analogy 
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between the status of the individual in private law and that of the state in public law. ‘A state 
. . . is as little able to advance a justification . . . as the individual living person must or could 
justify his existence normatively in the sphere of private law’.262 
So, in Schmitt’s view, the state is an existential rather than a normative unity. Actually, 
whereas Kelsen reduces the notion of state to legal order, Schmitt claims that the concept of 
legal order comprises two conceptually independent elements, namely the normative element 
of law and the existential element of order.263 As a consequence, rather than following Weber’s 
observation that the legitimacy of the modern state lies in its legality, as Kelsen does, Schmitt 
attempts to disentangle the problem of legitimacy from the problem of legality. Hans Blumen-
berg provides a clear description of Schmitt’s distinction between legitimacy and legality:  
 
‘Legitimacy for Schmitt is a diachronic-historical or horizontal relation of foundation, 
producing the inviolability of systems of order out of the depths of time, as it were, 
whereas legality is a synchronic structure, read vertically which supports a finding by 
its relation to a norm, a norm by its relation to a higher-level norm.’264 
 
As Schmitt argues in Constitutional Theory, a legal order is not legitimate because it functions as 
a closed, rational system of norms, but rather because it is grounded on the will of a collective 
subject. ‘In contrast to mere norms, the word “will” denotes an actually existing power as the 
origin of command (ein seinsmäβige Gröβe als den Ursprung eines Sollens). The will is existentially 
present; its power or authority lies in its being.’265 The legal order, Schmitt submits, presup-
poses ‘a subject capable of acting’266, i.e. a collective subject. Accordingly, Schmitt’s transfor-
mation of the concept of state implies a different solution to the ambiguity in Weber’s defini-
tion of statehood between normativity and factuality than that of Kelsen. Instead of reinforc-
ing the dualism between the realms of normativity and factuality, Schmitt leads the normative 
realm back to the realm of factuality and, more precisely, to the existential realm of the state.267 
Schmitt’s reconsideration of the distinction between factuality and normativity that 
follows from his existential definition of state provides the fuel for his critique of Kelsen’s 
normativist interpretation of (in)security. Schmitt takes issue with what he calls the ‘matter-of-
factness’ (Sachlichkeit) of normativism, that is, the normativist claim that (in)security can be 
reduced to legal concepts.268 According to Schmitt, collapsing security and insecurity into the 
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distinction between legality and illegality presupposes that ‘normativity and facticity are “com-
pletely different planes”: the ‘ought’ (Sollen) lies outside of the ‘is’ (Sein) and . . . retains its own 
inviolable sphere . . .’269 
Schmitt illustrates the impersonal, ‘juristic-normativist logic’ on the basis of the no-
tion of Tatbestand, i.e. the factual character of behavior.270 For normativism, the factuality of 
behavior can either be said to be in line with the norm or in breach thereof. According to 
Schmitt, the problem with the normativist notion of Tatbestand is that the result remains the 
same in either of the two cases. In both lawful and the unlawful situations, the Tatbestand can 
be subsumed under a general norm, namely either in the sense of affirming or breaching the 
norm. As consequence, the infringement of a norm does not have a concrete meaning since 
the norm ‘continues to operate unchanged’ in case of an infringement.271 The upshot of the 
normativist logic of the Tatbestand is that the concrete reality of the distinction between legality 
and illegality, order and disorder, security and insecurity, is only rendered as ‘the material basis 
for the application of norms’ and thus reduced to a normativist construct.272 Therefore, 
Schmitt submits, from the normativist point of view ‘the criminal does not break the peace or 
order; he does not even break the general norm as rule; “juristically considered”, he actually 
breaks nothing at all’.273 
Schmitt’s argument that the normativist argument that human behavior cannot actu-
ally breach a norm does not only hold for the individual norm. It also extends to the legal 
order as a whole, to its unity. This point follows from Kelsen’s account of the distinction 
between validity and efficacy. According to Kelsen, an individual legal norm that belongs to a 
positive legal order can be valid without being efficacious. For ‘the inefficacious norm remains 
valid because and in so far as it is part of the chain of creation of a valid legal system’.274 
Individual norms remain valid, despite being inefficacious, to the extent that they relate back 
to the basic norm. And, as Kelsen argues, the basic norm of a positive legal system is neces-
sarily both valid and efficacious. ‘The norms of a positive legal order are valid because the fun-
damental rule regulating their creation, that is, the basic norm, is presupposed to be valid, not 
because they are effective; but they are valid only as long as this legal order is effective’.275 Now, 
to the extent that the basic norm is a normative presupposition, it cannot be violated, Schmitt 
argues. Consequently, the violation of a legal norm seems to affect neither the validity of this 
individual norm nor the legal order as a unity. In this respect, the normativist conception of 
security, based on the distinction between legality and illegality, appears as rather abstract and 
formal. Illegality is a normative concept without concern for its factual and material content. 
It is a purely legal, and in that sense ‘ideal’, category which applies to the realm of validity, not 
to the realm of efficacy.  
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What I aim to do in the remainder of this Chapter is to reconstruct Schmitt’s political 
and legal philosophy in a way that illuminates the passage that leads him from the normative 
realm of security to its sources in an existential,  properly ontological, realm. If Kelsen would 
thematize security in terms of the legal/illegal distinction, Schmitt will argue that security is 
about the self-preservation of a collective over and against the strange which threatens its 
continued existence. The passage from the normative to the existential accounts of security is 
complex and requires several steps. Initially, we will identify the concept of public order as the 
legal manifestation of an existential concept of security. Public order is the legal concept in 
which the existential concept of insecurity acquires its most pregnant form. A second step 
takes us from public order to the notion of concrete order.   
 
2.3 Public Order: Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution 
In contrast to normativism, Schmitt claims that security should not be reduced to the problem 
of illegality; instead, it becomes an issue when public order is at stake. The notion of public 
order is, in Schmitt’s view, the legal category which thematizes collective security. In this sec-
tion, I will explore the notion of public order as it features in his interpretation of Article 48 
of the Weimar Constitution in view of identifying elements of the existential concept of secu-
rity. 
Whereas Schmitt doesn’t deal with the concept of security explicitly, the notion of 
public order features in nearly all of his writings, in which he uses different phrasings such as 
‘public order and security’ (‘öffentliche Ordnung und Sicherheit’) and ‘peace, security and order’ 
(‘Ruhe, Sicherheit und Ordnung’). The basic reference of the notion of public order in Schmitt’s 
work is Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, which concerns the emergency powers of the 
Reichspräsident. This is not surprising since Article 48 was a much discussed constitutional prob-
lem in Schmitt’s days.276 Nevertheless, Schmitt’s writings show a special interest in Article 48; 
it occupies an important position within the context of his political and legal philosophy. In-
deed, as Kelsen notes, to the extent that Schmitt’s theoretical enterprise can be read as a sus-
tained reflection on the Weimar Constitution, we could say that it finds its culmination in 
Article 48.277 Schmitt develops a comprehensive interpretation of article 48 in the appendix to 
the second edition of his book on dictatorship, an interpretation that was originally written as 
a contribution to the first annual meeting of the Association of German Constitutional Law-
yers in 1924.278 
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Before considering Schmitt’s interpretation of Article 48, let me first briefly discuss 
the interpretation against which he takes up a polemic position, namely, the standard interpre-
tation of Article 48 as developed by Richard Grau. Schmitt’s polemic with the standard inter-
pretation focuses on the relation between the first and second sentence of the second section 
of Article 48, which consists of five sections in total. The second section of Article 48 of the 
Weimar Constitution reads as follows: 
 
‘[1] If in the German Reich the public security and order are significantly disturbed or 
endangered, the President can utilize the necessary measures to restore public secu-
rity and order, if necessary with the aid of armed forces. [2] For this purpose, he may 
provisionally suspend, in whole or in part, the basic rights established in Articles 114 
[inviolability of person], 115 [inviolability of domicile], 117 [secrecy of communica-
tion], 118 [freedom of opinion and of expression thereof], 124 [freedom of assem-
bly], and 153 [inviolability of property].’279 
 
The standard interpretation suggests that sentence [2] has a limiting function to the emergency 
power of the Reichspräsident as provided in sentence [1], meaning that all articles of the Weimar 
Constitution are to be considered non-derogable, with the exception of the articles enumer-
ated in sentence [2]. In Grau’s interpretation, the addition of the sentence [2] can only mean 
that the Reichspräsident ‘should be permitted to do something which is not yet included in his 
power to take the necessary measures’.280 Therefore, if the emergency power of the Reichspräsi-
dent is restricted in a general sense by the inviolability of the Weimar Constitution, sentence 
[2] authorizes him to suspend the provisions of the enumerated fundamental rights. In this 
sense, Grau notes, sentence [2] involves ‘an exception to a limitation’.281 At stake in Grau’s 
interpretation of Article 48 is the protection of the fundamental rights of individuals against 
the state. As we will see, Schmitt’s interpretation takes the opposite direction, sacrificing fun-
damental rights for the sake of safeguarding the existence of a collective as a unity. 
Schmitt’s interpretation of Article 48 takes off by determining the purpose of the 
authority granted to the Reichspräsident. According to Schmitt, the purpose of the emergency 
power of the Reichspräsident is the restoration of public security and order. ‘The text merely 
says: for the purpose of restoring public security and order, the Reichspräsident can take 
measures and he may suspend certain fundamental rights’.282 So, in Schmitt’s view, the purpose 
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of Article 48 can be defined as the restoration of normal order. This is to say, if ‘the constitu-
tion says what the normal order in the state is’283, then, in Schmitt’s interpretation, the consti-
tutional authority of the Reichspräsident enables him to redress an abnormal situation. Schmitt 
points out that this interpretation of Article 48 essentially has two implications. First, that the 
emergency power of the Reichspräsident is ‘a constitutionally foreseen authority’.284 And second, 
related to the first, that Article 48 provides for the exception (Ausnahme) as a ‘constitutional 
legal institution’ (verfassungsmäβiges Rechtsinstitut).285 
As to the first point, concerning the idea that the emergency power of the Reichspräsi-
dent is a constitutionally foreseen authority, Schmitt claims that the Weimar Constitution in-
cludes commissarial dictatorship.286 Schmitt distinguishes between two forms of dictatorship, 
namely commissarial and sovereign dictatorship. Whereas commissarial dictatorship suspends 
the legal order in order to preserve it as a whole, sovereign dictatorship first constitutes legal 
order. ‘The commissarial dictatorship is the unconditioned action commissioner of a pouvoir 
constitué, the sovereign dictatorship the unconditioned action commission of a pouvoir constitu-
ant’.287 As a consequence, commissarial and sovereign dictatorships have a different constitu-
tional meaning. If commissarial dictatorship is constitutionally limited, sovereign dictatorship 
is constitutionally unlimited and hence is incompatible with a ‘constitutional legal order’ 
(rechtstaatlichen Verfassung).288  
 
‘The rightful plenipotency of a constitutional assembly rests on its exercise of the 
pouvoir constituent, a supreme power lasting only until the constitution comes into ef-
fect. In the moment when the assembly completes its work and the constitution be-
comes effective law, its sovereign dictatorship ends, as does the possibility of a sov-
ereign dictatorship at all.’289 
 
Despite this difference between commissarial and sovereign dictatorship, Schmitt perceives 
them as two forms of dictatorship because they both have a temporary nature; they both in-
dicate a transitional regime.290 Commissarial dictatorship is the constitutional enshrined au-
thority for bringing about the transition from the abnormal situation into normal order. Sov-
ereign dictatorship on the other hand effectuates the transition from legal chaos into legal 
order. In this sense, the Ausnahmezustand basically has two meanings: the state of emergency 
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(commissarial dictatorship) and the state of exception (sovereign dictatorship). In the emer-
gency situation the commissarial dictatorship is provided with ‘a free action space to issue 
measures that are necessary and effective’291 to restore normal order. In the state of exception 
there is no legal order; normal order first needs to be established.  
As to the second point, concerning the fact that the exception is a ‘constitutional 
legal institution’, Schmitt argues that the exception is anticipated by and therefore an intrinsic 
part of the legal order. As Schmitt sees it, ‘in every legal atom . . . there remains a structure 
that assumes an abnormal situation, different from the law that should apply to the normal 
situation’.292 This means that the exception, as the legal manifestation of abnormality, ‘pre-
sumes the continued validity of that norm from which it deviates. It belongs to the concept 
of the exception that it intervenes without setting aside, and deviates without superseding’.293 
In other words, the exception challenges the legal norms that apply to normal order and there-
fore at the same time presupposes their validity. 
To the extent that the exception calls into question the normativity of the legal order, 
Schmitt claims that it can only be responded to by a measure (Maβnahme), not by a law (Gesetz) 
in the proper sense of the word. Whereas a law is a general norm with a proper legal form, the 
measure that the Reichspräsident can proclaim lacks the formal status of a law in that its content 
is bound to a concretely given situation. ‘The characteristic of a measure . . . consists in its 
dependence on concrete circumstances . . . Its extent, i.e. content, procedure, and effect, are 
determined from case to case by the circumstances’.294 So, the measure has a legal effect similar 
to a law and in that sense legal validity, but only for the period during which the abnormal 
situation exists. This temporary and context-dependent nature of the measure’s validity makes 
it fundamentally different from proper legal norms. 
The distinction between the legal status of the measure and a proper law is central to 
Schmitt’s alternative interpretation of the relation between sentences [1] and [2] of the second 
section of Article 48. As stated in sentence [1], the Reichspräsident can take measures, and not 
laws, to restore public security and order. Indeed, as Schmitt notes, ‘the Reichspräsident is not a 
legislator’.295 While sentence [1] provides the Reichspräsident with a general authority to take the 
necessary measures that intervene in but do not supersede the legal order, Schmitt argues that 
sentence [2] provides a competence that is not contained in the competence of sentence [1], 
namely the suspension of the enumerated fundamental rights. According to Schmitt, the com-
petence to suspend the fundamental rights enumerated in sentence [2] of the second section 
of Article 48 is, from a legal point of view, more far reaching than the competence to deviate 
from them. In Constitutional Theory Schmitt provides a clear definition of what he takes to be 
the legal meaning of ‘suspension’. 
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‘The suspended constitutional provision has no validity for the time of its suspension 
. . . The suspension does not mean a rupture in the individual case, for no valid 
statutory provision is violated. Put more precisely, its validity is not eliminated. Nor 
is there a change, for after the termination of the possible suspension, which is always 
only temporary, the suspended provision again enters into force unchanged.’296  
 
In short, whereas the validity of the legal order remains intact in the case of a measure, the 
competence provided in sentence [2] implies the suspension of the validity of the enumerated 
fundamental rights.  
So, if the prevailing interpretation suggests a close connection between sentences [1] 
and [2], considering sentence [2] as an additional competence to the constitutionally limited 
emergency powers of the Reichspräsident, Schmitt, on the other hand, pulls sentences [1] and 
[2] apart. In his view, in order to redress the abnormal situation, the Reichspräsident can take the 
necessary measures and may also suspend certain fundamental rights. In other words, the 
Reichspräsident has, in Schmitt’s view, the ‘general authority’ to take measures and the ‘specific 
authority’ to suspend the enumerated fundamental rights.297 The contrast between the stand-
ard interpretation and Schmitt’s is revealing. Whereas the former emphasizes the limited emer-
gency powers of the Reichspräsident, the latter points to their indeterminacy and in that sense 
their relatively unlimited character. Instead of focusing on the protection of the fundamental 
rights of individuals, Schmitt sacrifices them completely for the sake of restoring normal order. 
Notice the implication that follows from Schmitt’s reading of Article 48 with respect 
to the scope of (in)security. Kelsen, as we have seen, argues that references to a collective 
subject involve a hypostasis. As a result, he is not prepared to countenance the notion of 
collective security or insecurity, at least to the extent that these categories would involve a 
claim about the existence of a collective independent of a legal order. By embracing Weber’s 
methodological individualism, Kelsen’s normativism can accommodate, in its own way, a con-
cept of (in)security that focuses strictly on individuals. Precisely for this reason, Kelsen’s nor-
mativism can be construed in a way that offers staunch support for fundamental rights and 
constitutionalism, as key elements of individual security. Schmitt, by contrast, subordinates 
individual security to the security of the collective: fundamental rights, and individual security 
in their wake, must give way when public order is at stake, i.e. when the existence of a collective 
is challenged. If Kelsen’s critique of collective subjectivity only leaves room for individual 
security, Schmitt’s critique of normativism only can accommodate collective security. 
There is a second reason for which Schmitt’s discussion of Article 48 is interesting 
as concerns the concept of security. Indeed, as we have seen, the backbone of his interpreta-
tion of Article 48 is the notion of public order in terms of normal order and the exception 
thereto—the abnormal. We can already see here how Schmitt is moving away from the nor-
mativist interpretation of security, which, in Kelsen’s reading, turns on the sharp distinction 
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between validity and efficacy, normativity and factuality. By introducing the notions of nor-
mality and abnormality, Schmitt offers an existential alternative to this normativist distinction. 
In effect, if, negatively, Schmitt’s analysis of Article 48 can be read as an argument against the 
claim that a state is a closed system of norms, it can also be read, positively, as an argument in 
favor of the claim that a state is a concrete order.  
 
2.4 Concrete Order 
My aim in this section is to unpack the notion of concrete order, which is pivotal to the shift 
which Schmitt seeks to make from a normativist to an existential concept of the state, and 
therewith from a normativist to an existential concept of security. I refer to concrete order as 
‘pivotal’ because, on the one hand, it spells out what is involved in the publicness of public order, 
and, on the other, because it anticipates the fundamental, properly ontological characterization 
of collective subjectivity in terms of the distinction between the own and the strange, the friend 
and the enemy. It is this properly existential distinction, in the strict sense of the continued 
existence or the turn to non-existence, which marks what is properly at stake, according to 
Schmitt, in the concept of collective security. While concrete order is a recurrent theme in 
Schmitt’s writings, he doesn’t offer a systematic account thereof which illuminates its diverse 
facets and features. Accordingly, I will reconstruct Schmitt’s concept of concrete order, ex-
ploring it from the following perspectives: as institution; as normal order; as homogeneity; and 
as a nomos. These facets give content to the ‘concreteness’ of concrete order and prepare the 
way for the discussion of security as an existential concept and its associated distinctions be-
tween friend and enemy, the own and the strange. 
 
2.4.1 As Institution 
The notion of concrete order as institution is important because it allows Schmitt to develop 
a concept of state which is alternative to its purely normative characterization as a legal order. 
Schmitt refers to the notion of concrete order in passing in Constitutional Theory: ‘the concept 
of legal order contains two entirely different elements: the normative element of law and the 
actually existing element of concrete order. The unity and order lies in the political existence 
of the state, not in statutes, rules and just any instruments containing norms’.298 Although a 
more developed account of the concept of concrete order will have to wait till Schmitt’s later 
essay, On the Three Types of Juristic Thought, in Constitutional Theory he already provides an incipient 
account of concrete order that draws on a specific reading of Aristotle’s notion of state.  
Central to Aristotle’s notion of state is, in Schmitt’s interpretation, the concept of 
order, which defines the existential unity of a collective.  
 
‘According to Aristotle, the state (πολιτεία) is an order (τάξις) of the naturally occur-
ring  association of human beings of a city (πόλις) or area. The order involves 
dominion in the state and how it is organized. By virtue of the order, there is a ruler 
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(κύριος). However, a component of this order is its living goal (τέλος), which is con-
tained in the actually existing individuality of the concrete political formation’.299 
 
The Aristotelian concept of state, in Schmitt’s reading thereof, highlights four elements that 
are constitutive of the state as a concrete order: (1) a natural association of human beings, (2) 
an area, (3) dominion, and (4) a living goal. The first element suggests that the people who 
constitute the state have a natural social bond. The second element is the notion of an area 
(πόλις, Gebiet). This means that a state can be defined as an order if it is a spatial unity. The 
third element highlighted by Aristotle’s definition of state is dominion (Herrschaft). The power 
over human beings is centralized; it is in the hands of a ruler. Lastly, the fourth element is the 
living goal. This living goal embodies the aspiration of naturally associated individuals to exist 
as a unity. In Schmitt’s view, the state is not simply an agreement between the individual will 
and the collective will. Instead, the individual wills are integrated into a collective will in that 
they are oriented towards realizing the living goal of the state. 
If Aristotle is the point of departure for Schmitt’s initial, largely implicit, attempt to 
conceptualize the state as a concrete order, Maurice Hauriou is his new interlocutor in the 
short essay, On the Three Types of Juristic Thought. Indeed, Schmitt’s interpretation of the state as 
a concrete order can be read as a certain, even idiosyncratic, reception and transformation of 
Hauriou’s theory of institution. Before turning to discuss Hauriou’s theory of institution, and 
how it informs the concept of concrete order, I wish to lodge three caveats. The first is that 
while Schmitt refers to Hauriou’s concept of institution, he does not develop it in detail. The 
notion of institution provides what Schmitt takes as the principle of unity of concrete order. 
But Schmitt indicates, rather than carefully elaborates, this point in his essay On The Three Types 
of Juristic Thought.300  By examining Hauriou’s concept of institution I will fill this lacuna in 
Schmitt’s definition of concrete order. In this respect, my reading of Schmitt’s concept of 
concrete order is constructive rather than reconstructive. Secondly, although drawing explicitly 
on Hauriou, Schmitt prefers the concepts of concrete order and empire (Reich) to the concepts 
of institution and state. Schmitt prefers the former because he sees Hauriou’s theory of insti-
tution as the French equivalent of the German, Hegelian tradition of concrete order thinking, 
in fact an insight that he attributes to the National-Socialist movement.301 Undeniably, this 
framing makes the concept of concrete order extremely fraught from a historical point of view. 
However, I am interested here in Schmitt’s conceptual analysis of concrete order. Despite the 
fact that Schmitt’s conceptual analysis and historical framing of concrete order are closely 
related, I agree with Croce and Salvatore that they can be treated as separate questions.302 
Third and lastly, although I will interpret Schmitt’s concrete order thinking as a form of insti-
tutionalism, I will not attempt to situate either Hauriou or Schmitt within the larger debate 
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about institutionalism,303 nor will I link it to contemporary contributions to neo-institutional-
ism.304 In the forthcoming, I am only interested in Schmitt’s concept of concrete order and its 
relation to institutionalism in so far as it provides the key to an existential concept of security. 
The fundamental problem of Hauriou’s theory of institution is the organizational 
formation of a social group. What renders a manifold of individuals into a social group, into a 
unity? Developing his concept of institution in a French context influenced by Henri Berg-
son’s vitalist philosophy,305 Hauriou defines social groups in terms of ‘social organisms’.306 
Like biological organisms, social groups are endowed with an inner force that is determinative 
of their slow, continual movement of conservation and transformation. In this sense, an or-
ganism can be defined as ‘a system whose form subsists despite the continual renewal of its 
matter’.307 Hauriou argues that a social group can be considered a living organism only if it has 
some form of organization, i.e. an organization that preserves itself, even if the social group 
undergoes transformations of its ‘human matter’ (matière humaine).308 So, in Hauriou’s view, an 
institution is a social group with a form of organization. Since I will discuss Hauriou’s theory 
of institution in what follows  only in so far that it contributes to clarifying Schmitt’s definition 
of concrete order, my analysis of Hauriou’s concept of institution is restricted to what he calls 
the category of ‘personified’ or ‘corporate institutions’, i.e. the category of institutions that 
includes the state.309 Yet my discussion does not lead to a truncated reading of Hauriou’s 
concept of institution since he assumes the state to be the basic model of an institution. The 
state, Hauriou submits, is ‘the perfect organization’ of a stable institution.310 
  Hauriou identifies three elements of the organizational formation of a social group: 
(a) a ‘working idea’ (idée d’oeuvre) or directing idea (idée directrice), (b) an organized power of 
government, and (c) manifestations of communion. In the article ‘The theory of the institution 
and of foundation’ (La Théorie de l’institution et de la foundation), Hauriou provides a succinct 
definition of his key concept,  
 
‘an institution is a working idea or enterprise that is realized and endures juridically 
in a social milieu; for the realization of this idea, a power is organized that equips it 
with organs; on the other, manifestations of communion occur among the members 
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of the social group interested in the realization of the idea, which are directed by the 
organs of power and regulated by procedures.’311 
 
Crucially, in Hauriou’s view, an institution presupposes ‘an interested group’ (un groupe d’intéres-
sés) of people that functions as the ‘bearer’ (porteur) of the directing idea:312  
 
‘the ascendancy of the working idea of the work and the interest the members have 
in its realization play a great role in that they explain the voluntary element in the 
support of these members. These interested members are adherents who run a per-
sonal risk in the success or failure of the enterprise.’313 
 
Let me briefly dip into the three elements of an institution: (1) the directing idea, (2) the or-
ganization of power and (3) manifestations of communion. As concerns the first element, the 
directing idea is what renders the interested group into ‘a social individuality’314 (une individualité 
sociale) with a ‘common vision’315 (vision commune) for which the members are willing to risk 
their lives. In this sense, the directing idea is the ‘soul’ of the social group qua institution.316 
Importantly, Hauriou argues that the directing idea of an institution cannot be reduced to the 
notion of an end or function.317 Whereas an end or function is fully determined and can be 
fully realized, at least in principle, the directing idea is fundamentally underdetermined, thus 
will always retain its openness. Therefore, Hauriou’s definition of state cannot be reduced to 
a functionalist understanding of state as, for example, in Weber and Kelsen. Instead, in 
Hauriou’s interpretation, the state includes both an ideal and a functional aspect.318  
As regards the second element of an institution, the organization of power, Hauriou 
identifies two principles, to wit the separation of powers and the representative regime. The 
separation of powers assures that governmental power is not ‘a simple force’ but ‘a rightful 
power’ (un pouvoir de droit).319 Furthermore, an institution requires a representative regime. ‘The 
governmental power of a corporate institution must act in the name of the body; its decisions 
must be considered as those of the body itself. The body is nothing without its organs, and it 
wills only through them . . .’320 This means that representation is a ‘technique’ to realize the 
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directing idea of an institution.321 To the extent that an institution consists of a group of indi-
viduals, it requires representation to assure the realization of the directing idea. 
The third and last element of an institution is the manifestation of communion 
among the members of the group. Manifestations of communion are rooted in both the ‘in-
tellectual assent’322 of the members to the directing idea and ‘common emotions’323 that the 
members have as a group. Crucially, the manifestations of communion suggest that the mem-
bers of the social group can experience their existence as a unity in an immediate sense. To 
the extent that a social group has both an intellectual and an emotional bond, it can be regarded 
as ‘a communion of action’ (une communion d’action).324 An example of the manifestation of a 
social group as a communion of action is acclamation.325 While speaking of manifestations of 
communion, Hauriou makes clear, however, that there is no such thing as a collective con-
science. The manifestations of communion, Hauriou notes, ‘cannot in any sense be analyzed 
as manifestations of a collective conscience; it is individuals who are moved by their contact 
with a common idea and who . . . become aware of their common emotion’.326 Moreover, 
Hauriou adds that manifestations of communion are not continuously lived by the group 
members; ‘they are brief moments separated by long intervals between rapid flashes of light 
that fade away in the night’.327 
According to Hauriou, the elements of the organized power of government and the 
manifestations of communion represent, respectively, the objective and subjective dimensions 
of the institution that ‘interiorize’ the directing idea.328 On the one hand, Hauriou identifies 
the governmental organization as the ‘objective individuality’ of the institution.329 The govern-
mental structure embodies the directing idea of an institution in an objective sense. Manifes-
tations of communion, on the other hand, are identified as the personification of the directing 
idea of the institution. Through the intellectual and emotional bond, the directing idea is inte-
riorized by the group members. The double process of interiorization, objective and subjec-
tive, guarantees the continuity of an institution. 
Hauriou’s notion of institution displays some overlap with Schmitt’s Aristotelian 
reading of state, but is also complementary thereto. First of all, Hauriou’s notion of the direct-
ing idea corresponds to the Aristotelian element of the living goal, telos. The living goal or 
directing idea integrates the group of individuals into a unity. As the integrating principle of a 
social group, the directing idea represents, in Schmitt’s interpretation, the ‘inner measure’ of a 
concrete order, as he calls it. In this respect, Schmitt’s speaks of ‘the specific legal essence’ (das 
spezifische rechtliche Wesen), the ‘own legal substance’ (eigene rechtliche Substanz), and the ‘own, inner 
order’ (eigenen, inneren Ordnung) of concrete order.330 As the inner measure, the directing idea 
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provides a ‘suprapersonal’ (überpersönlich) perspective as concerns legal order rather the ‘imper-
sonal’ (unpersönlich) perspective advocated by normativism.331 In this respect, the notion of the 
directing idea or telos provides a crucial element to make sense of a concrete order as an exis-
tential unity of a collective subject in the specific sense of an acting unity. Another element 
that reveals overlap between Aristotle’s notion of state and Hauriou’s concept of institution is 
the centralized form of dominion by means of a ruler (kratos) or a government. The ruler or 
government is responsible for the realization of the living goal or directing idea of the social 
group. Importantly, Hauriou claims that a centralized government implies representation. The 
government acts ‘in the name of’ the group as a whole. This is something that is not necessarily 
the case in Schmitt’s Aristotelian interpretation of state. According to Schmitt, the Aristotelian 
notion of state assumes ‘the simultaneity of ruling and being ruled’ and thus can be conceived 
without the mediation of representation, at least in principle.332 Thirdly, the element of the 
natural association of human beings in Aristotle can be taken to correspond to what Hauriou 
intellectual and emotional bond of a social group. That is, whereas Aristotle emphasizes that 
the bond between the members of a group is natural, Hauriou points to its immediacy. This is 
an important point for Schmitt, as it suggests that the members of a state can be immediately 
self-present to themselves as a unity. We will return to this point when discussing the contrast 
between identity and representation, in Chapter 3. There is also an element of Schmitt’s Aris-
totelian interpretation of state that does not reappear in Hauriou’s concept of institution, 
namely its spatial dimension. Schmitt fills this gap in Hauriou’s concept of institution in The 
Nomos of the Earth, which we will turn to discuss in a minute. 
What is perhaps most important in Schmitt’s reception of Aristotle and Hauriou is 
that it introduces the concept of collective subjectivity into a theory of the state and, therewith, 
into a theory of security. Remember that Kelsen, endorsing Weber’s methodological institu-
tionalism, refused to accept the assumption that the state, qua unity, exists in the form of a 
collective subject. Such a move, or so Kelsen argues, amounts to a hypostasis. Aristotle’s 
politeia, and Hauriou’s institution offer Schmitt the conceptual framework he requires for ar-
guing that the state is a collective subject and, as such, an existential unity. To effect the passage 
from a normative theory of the state as a unity of legal norms to a political theory in which 
the state is a concrete order or unity is to effect the passage from a basic norm, as the ground 
of a legal order, to a collective subject, as its ground. This passage is the key to Schmitt’s 
political reading of public order and to his existential concept of security, even if the latter’s 
features still remain unclear at this stage of our argument. 
2.4.2 As Normal Order 
Schmitt also carries forward Hauriou’s notion of an institution by defining concrete order as 
normal order. Indeed, central to Schmitt’s interpretation of Hauriou’s notion of institution is 
a problem that we have already encountered in his analysis of Article 48 of the Weimar Con-
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stitution. The definition of concrete order as the condition of ‘effective normality’ of a collec-
tive is quite complex in that the notion of normality is ambiguous. Normality is not only a 
descriptive category that reflects a factual condition but is also a normative category in that it 
pertains to an ideal condition.333 This means that the condition of ‘effective normality’ refers 
to the factual condition of concrete order and is at the same time inherently normative. Actu-
ally, as we will see, it is precisely because of this ambiguous character, both factual and nor-
mative, that Schmitt replaces the Kelsen’s distinction between validity and efficacy with nor-
mality.  
In the essay On the Three Types of Juristic Thought, Schmitt defines the notion of nor-
mality in a twofold sense, distinguishing between the ‘normal situation’ (normale Situation, normal 
unterstellten Lage, Normal-Situationen) and the ‘normal type of man’ (normaler Mensch, normal unter-
stellten Menschentypus, Normal-Typen).334 Let me start with Schmitt’s definition of the normal sit-
uation. First of all, in the normal situation the behavior of a social group proceeds according 
to the ‘regularities’ (Regelmäβigkeiten) of a concrete order, regularities that materialize the con-
crete order’s inner measure.335 Put differently, in the normal situation behavior appears as 
‘natural’ in that it is in conformity with the rules of a concrete order.336 Schmitt argues that 
‘the various customs, regularities, and calculations within such orders cannot and should not 
seize and consume the essence (Wesen) of this order, but only serve it’.337 This means that the 
effective normality of a concrete order can never be reduced to a sum of rules and functions. 
It is not surprising that Schmitt takes regularity as an element of the normal situation. For the 
idea of regularity is etymologically rooted in the concept of normality: normal is that which is 
in accordance with the rule.338 Furthermore, we could add that Schmitt’s definition of the 
‘normal situation’ includes the aspect of duration. Normal order represents a stabilized whole 
of rules and regularities that are characteristic of the existence of a social group over time. It 
is also in this sense that we can speak of concrete order as collective subjectivity. Normal order 
refers to the rules and regularities that are constitutive of the social groups as an acting unity. 
The second element of normal order is the ‘normal type of man’. This is arguably the 
most problematic assumption of Schmitt’s concept of concrete order, as it implies a reification 
of Hauriou’s notion of an institution. According to Schmitt, the element of the normal type 
of man implies that the members of a group possess some form of ‘commonality’ (Gemeinsam-
keit), as he puts it in Constitutional Theory.339 More particularly, in Schmitt’s interpretation, this 
commonality has a substantial nature; the members of a group share a ‘substantial similarity’ 
(substantielle Gleichartigkeit).340 This means that Schmitt’s notion of substantial similarity implies 
that the existential unity of a collective subject is a substantial unity. Schmitt notes that the 
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substantial unity of a social group can be defined in various ways, including ‘ideas of common 
race, belief, common destiny, and tradition’.341 Schmitt will then go ahead and radicalize sub-
stantial similarity into the form of racial similarity in his notorious essay published in 1933, 
entitled State, Movement, People.342 Let there be no misunderstanding: I do not wish to defend 
Schmitt’s interpretation of existential unity in the sense of a substantial unity. Actually, in 
Chapter 3 I will argue that Schmitt’s reified, hence reductive interpretation of Hauriou’s con-
cept of institution is false, as it is based on a strongly reductive understanding of collective 
identity. 
Now, the notion of normal order provides the key to Schmitt’s redefinition of the 
normativist distinction between validity and efficacy, normativity and factuality. Replacing the 
abstract distinction between validity and efficacy with the concrete notion of normality, 
Schmitt claims that the factual normal order is an intrinsic part of the validity of legal norms. 
The effective normal order ‘is not merely an external, jurisprudentially disregarded presuppo-
sition of the norm, but an inherent, characteristic feature of the norm’s effectiveness and a 
normative determination of the norm itself’.343 Pointing out that the effective normal order is 
the normative ground of legal order, Schmitt aims to reverse the relation between normativity 
and factuality as assumed by normativism, hence to break down the ‘superiority’ and ‘emi-
nence’ of normativity over factuality.344 For, as Schmitt argues, ‘even if a norm is as inviolable 
as one wants to make it, it controls a situation only in so far as the situation has not become 
completely abnormal . . . ’345 In other words, by delimiting the validity of norms to the factual 
normal order, Schmitt aims to re-establish the relation between normativity and factuality. If 
the validity of the norm is restricted to the factual normal order, the norm is not ‘superior’ to 
factuality; instead ‘the rule follows the changing situation for which it is determined’.346 In this 
respect, the interplay between normativity and factuality implies that the validity of a norm is 
only relatively independent from the factual normal order. ‘The norm or rule does not create 
the order; on the contrary, only on the basis of a given order does it have a certain regulating 
function with a relatively small degree of validity, independent of the facts of the case’.347 
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In brief, the crux of Schmitt’s definition of concrete order as normal order is that it 
provides an alternative to the normativist distinction between efficacy and validity,348 a dis-
tinction that, in his view, was responsible for emptying the concept of security of its existential 
content. For whereas normativism conceptualizes security in terms of the formal distinction 
between legality and illegality, Schmitt makes a case for grounding the concept of security in 
the distinction between normality and abnormality, that is, normal and abnormal behavior. 
This means that the notions of legality and illegality should be understood in the concrete 
sense of, respectively, order and disorder. Illegal behavior is not, in Schmitt’s view, a ‘free-
floating’349 (freischwebend) legal category but rather involves a concrete case of disorder, that is, 
a disruption of normal order. 
 
2.4.3 As Homogeneity 
As mentioned, Schmitt provides a twofold definition of normal order. The normal situation 
concerns the rules and regularities of a concrete order. The normal type of man refers to the 
substantial similarity of the group members. Now, what is distinctive of normal order from a 
political perspective is homogeneity. Indeed, according to Schmitt, political unity requires ‘ho-
mogeneity’.350 Schmitt asserts that homogeneity presupposes a particular notion of identity, to 
wit identity as ‘equality’ or ‘sameness’ (Gleichheit).351 This suggests that normal order, in its 
twofold definition of the normal situation and the normal type of man, entails the idea that 
the group members do the same, insofar as they follow the rules of normal order, and are the 
same, in that they share a substantial similarity. Consequently, what is characteristic of normal 
order is the principle of identity, ‘the identity of homogeneous substance’ (der Identität der ho-
mogenen Substanz).352  
In Schmitt’s view, to the extent that concrete order presupposes homogeneity, all 
political thinking ‘centers on the idea of immanence’.353 The focus on identity in the sense of 
homogeneity implies that it is characteristic of politics that it ‘orients itself internally and not 
externally’.354 This means that a collective defines itself from within, internally, whence the 
equivalence of homogeneity and immanence. The link between homogeneity and immanence 
is crucial for Schmitt as it intimates a ‘feeling of . . . belonging (Zusammengehörigkeit)’.355 That is, 
concrete order is experienced by the members as their attachment or belonging to a group, as 
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the immanent sphere of what is their own. According to Schmitt, different elements can con-
tribute to the ‘quality of belonging’356 such as ‘common language, common historical destiny, 
traditions and remembrances, and common political goals and hopes’.357  
To the extent that a collective exists as a homogeneous unity, Schmitt argues that it 
is ‘a genuinely present entity in its immediate self-identity’.358 This means that Schmitt defines 
the existential unity of a collective as an immediate unity. We have already come across the 
immediacy of the existential unity of a collective in what Hauriou calls ‘manifestation of com-
munion’, of which an example is acclamation. Schmitt confirms this, stating that acclamation 
comes closest to the idea of the collective subject as an acting unity.359  Importantly, according 
to Schmitt, the definition of existential unity as immediate unity makes political representation 
utterly problematic. Although Schmitt agrees with Hauriou that representation is an essential 
element of an institution, it also implies the possibility of alienating the collective from its 
political substance. That is, for Schmitt representation essentially means the ‘presentation’360 
(Darstellung) of the existential unity of a collective. By interpreting ‘existential’ in the reified 
sense of homogeneity, representation appears indeed as a ‘danger’361 to, rather than a consti-
tutive feature of, the existential unity of a collective. It will be our task in Chapter 3 to critically 
reconsider the concepts of identity and representation, developing them in a way that sheds 
new and critical light on Schmitt’s concept of collective subjectivity and his ontological inter-
pretation of (in)security. 
The interpretation of normal order as homogeneity implies that the distinction be-
tween normality and abnormality, which Schmitt takes to be the basic distinction of security, 
is a thoroughly political distinction. Normal order refers to an existential condition of a col-
lective, to wit homogeneity, which a collective factually is and at the same time aspires to be. 
Heterogeneity, as the contrasting term of homogeneity, represents a perturbation of concrete 
order.362 It is in this sense, Schmitt contends, that the distinction between normality and ab-
normality provides the existential content of (in)security. Another implication is that the no-
tion of homogeneity and its contrasting term, heterogeneity, apply to the existential condition 
of a collective as a whole. In fact, by claiming that homogeneity is an immediate quality of a 
collective, (in)security, in Schmitt’s interpretation, is perforce a collective concept. Moreover, 
and more generally, Schmitt’s discussion of homogeneity and heterogeneity suggests that iden-
tity and representation are conceptual building blocks of an existential concept of collective 
security, as I will argue in Chapter 3.    
 
2.4.4 As a Nomos 
In the context of Schmitt’s interpretation of Aristotle’s notion of state and Hauriou’s concept 
of institution I noted that the aspect of spatiality does not appear in the latter. Schmitt fills this 
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gap in Hauriou’s concept of institution in The Nomos of the Earth, defining spatiality as a con-
stitutive element of concrete order. The importance of calling attention to the spatiality of the 
state is that it provides an important insight into the existential concept of security: to secure 
a collective is to enforce the boundary which separates the state as an inside in contrast to an 
outside. We will critically examine and transform this idea in the closing pages of this thesis, 
when discussing the problem of illegal immigration in the context of the EU’s Area of Free-
dom, Security and Justice.   
Schmitt’s analysis of law as a nomos focuses on the constitutive role of spatiality with 
regard to concrete order. Indeed, one of the aims of Schmitt’s analysis of nomos is to critique 
the normativist understanding of space as a ‘sphere of validity’.363 For Schmitt, this is need-
lessly abstract and reductive of the concrete meaning of space as the ‘solid ground’364 of human 
coexistence. In Schmitt’s view, space is first and foremost the protected space of a social group 
and the space that serves as a social group’s condition of subsistence. It is this sense of con-
creteness – disregarded as it is by normativism and by the doctrinal notion of a territory – that 
Schmitt seeks to recover on the basis of his analysis of nomos. Notice that my reading of The 
Nomos of the Earth is selective, as I consider it only as a complement to Schmitt’s analysis of 
concrete order as developed in his essay On the Three Types of Juristic Thought 
In the preface to The Nomos of the Earth Schmitt reveals the book’s aim in no uncertain 
terms. ‘Human thinking again must be directed to the elemental orders of its terrestrial being 
here and now’.365 The central thesis defended by Schmitt in The Nomos of the Earth is that law 
is spatially rooted. Legal order exists as a spatially emplaced order, that is, as a unity of order 
(Ordnung) and emplacement (Ortung). In order to examine the relation between law and space, 
Schmitt focuses on the ‘primeval act in founding law’ (rechtsbegründenden Ur-Aktes): the act of a 
Landnahme, i.e. an act of land-taking.366 He claims that the taking of land precedes legal order 
both conceptually and chronologically. ‘The taking of land precedes the order that follows 
from it not only logically but also historically. It constitutes the spatial original order, the origin 
of all further concrete order and all further law’.367 In order to elaborate the fundamental 
meaning of the German notion of Landnahme Schmitt traces it back to the Greek notion of 
nomos. ‘The Greek word for the first measure of all subsequent measures, for the first taking 
of land understood as the first partition and classification of space, for the primeval division 
and distribution, is nomos’.368 Since I am interested in the notion of nomos as a complement to 
the concept of concrete order, in the following I will take Schmitt’s definition of nomos as a 
conceptual thesis about the structure of legal order and will leave aside his historical and ety-
mological substantiation. 
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Let me first discuss the historical or chronological precedence of nomos over legal 
order. The act of land-taking, Schmitt argues, should be understood as a ‘legal-historical fact’ 
(rechtsgeschichtliche Tatsache), and not as an ‘intellectual construct’ (gedankliche Konstruktion).369 The 
act of land-taking is a ‘concrete, historical and political event (Ereignis)’370 performed by a land-
taking group. ‘The nomos by which a tribe, a retinue, or a people becomes settled, i.e. by which 
it becomes historically situated and turns a part of the earth’s surface into the force-field of a 
particular order, becomes visible in the appropriation of land and in the founding of a city or 
a colony’.371 In Schmitt’s view, as an act, an event, the taking of land has an originary character. 
‘Law and order are . . . one at this origin (Ursprung) of land-taking and can here, at this begin-
ning (Anfang), where emplacement and order coincide, not be separated’.372 
Next to this historical or chronological precedence, Schmitt claims that nomos also 
precedes legal order conceptually. To this end, Schmitt retraces the meaning of nomos to the 
word nemein. ‘The Greek substantive Nomos derives from the Greek verb nemein. These sub-
stantives are nomina actiones and designate a doing as an act, which receives its content from the 
verb’.373 If nemein is commonly taken to mean to divide (teilen) and to pasture (weiden), Schmitt 
argues that it contains a third, more fundamental meaning that is generally ignored. Besides 
dividing and pasturing, nomos means first of all ‘taking’, nehmen. This means that, as Julia 
Chryssostalis notes, ‘in Schmitt’s reading of nomos’ etymology, land-division, the act that nomos 
names in its very etymon, coincides with land-appropriation, the fundamental process that, ac-
cording to Schmitt, roots law to the land’.374 Consequently, Schmitt defines nomos as ‘the initial 
measure and division of pastureland’.375 The taking of land is the ‘first concrete and constitu-
tive distribution (Zuteilung)’.376 ‘All subsequent developments are either results of and expan-
sions on this act or else redistributions (anadasmoi) – either a continuation on the same basis 
or a disintegration of and departure from the constitutive act of the spatial order established 
by land-appropriation, the founding of cities, or colonization’.377 If, in Schmitt’s interpretation, 
nomos means the act that establishes the ‘supreme ownership of the community as a whole’, all 
subsequent acts reaffirm this first act.378 
Reflecting on the spatial nature of nomos, Schmitt argues that ‘a land-appropriation 
grounds law in two directions: internally and externally’.379 Internally, the land-taking group 
establishes itself as an inside. As Schmitt sees it, a land-appropriation grounds the law internally 
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in that it creates the ‘first order of all ownership and property relations’.380 Externally, the land-
taking group constitutes itself as an inside over and against an outside, which means that ‘the 
land-appropriating group is confronted with other land-appropriating groups and powers’.381 
Consequently, the act of land-taking effectuates a spatial closure that separates an inside from 
an outside. 
Importantly, the spatial closure of a concrete order can be made intelligible only from 
the ‘suprapersonal’ perspective of a social group or collective that engages in the act of land-
taking. In fact, the spatial concreteness of a concrete order has a two-way correlation with the 
suprapersonal perspective of a collective. On the one hand, the taking up of the suprapersonal 
perspective of a collective requires its emplacement as reflected by spatial boundaries. On the 
other hand, the distinction between inside and outside makes sense only from the su-
prapersonal perspective of an emplaced collective. Consequently, considered from the su-
prapersonal perspective of a collective, the distinction between inside and outside implies a 
preference for the inside. The inside marks what Schmitt calls elsewhere the ‘place’382 (Platz) of 
a collective. 
But this is not all. The spatial closure effectuated by an act of land-taking is defined 
by Schmitt as an original closure between inside and outside. In Schmitt’s interpretation, land-
taking is an inaugural act that establishes the framework for the subsequent and hence deriv-
ative acts of dividing and pasturing. Put differently, the act of land-taking is a constitutive act, 
an act that constitutes the closure between inside and outside. To the extent that the acts of 
dividing and pasturing are premised on the act of land-taking, they reaffirm this spatial closure. 
Crucially, in reaffirming the spatial closure of a collective, the acts of dividing and pasturing in 
their turn maintain and secure it. In this sense, if the act of land-taking can be defined as an 
act of boundary constitution, the subsequent acts of dividing and pasturing are acts of bound-
ary enforcement. The acts of dividing and pasturing enforce the spatial closure that is consti-
tutive of the existential unity of a collective as an inside over and against an outside. 
In Schmitt’s view, the act of boundary constitution precedes acts of boundary en-
forcement, both chronologically and conceptually. This point is of considerable importance 
for the concept of security available to Schmitt. Indeed, his account of the spatial closure of 
collective subjectivity implies an opposition between boundary constitution and boundary en-
forcement. Not only is collective security about preserving existential unity as an inside but 
also about enforcing the boundary between inside and outside. To put it in more general terms, 
Schmitt can only view security as an issue of boundary enforcement, where what is enforced 
are the boundaries which constitute a collective as an existential unity. Crucially, the existential 
unity of a collective, and the boundaries which concretely configure it, is given prior to and 
independently of acts of boundary enforcement. A collective’s insecurity turns on the fact that 
its boundaries can be breached, not because there is an irreducible groundlessness as to how 
its boundaries have been drawn, a crucial point to which we shall return later in this thesis. 
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2.5 An Existential Concept of Security 
We are now poised to enter the domain of an existential characterization of security. Before 
doing so, it may be helpful to look back and quickly summarize the argument developed here-
tofore. In a first step, this Chapter has outlined the contours of a normativist conception of 
security. This normativist concept of security involves a twofold reductive movement, or so 
Schmitt claims. On the one hand, it makes of (in)security a strictly legal category which de-
pends on the distinctions between legality and illegality, and between validity and efficacy. On 
the other hand, normativism can only predicate (in)security of individuals. To the extent that 
a state is but a legal order, only individuals can be secure or insecure. Rejecting what he takes 
to be this twofold reduction, Schmitt points to the concept of public order as the proper point 
of departure for an existential concept of security. The publicness of public order points, on 
the one hand, to a political domain, to the state as a concrete order, which is the necessary 
existential presupposition of the purely normative distinction between the legal and the illegal. 
And it points, on the other, to a collective subject, to the state as a political unity, which is 
most fundamentally at stake in security. Individual security is derivative thereof and must cede 
to the security of the state. Subsequently, I have unpacked Schmitt’s proposal to view a state 
as a concrete order. As will have become clear in the course of the exposition, the notion of 
concrete order does much more than simply shift the locus of security to the state; it interprets 
the state in a highly specific way: as institution, as normality, as homogeneity, and as nomos. 
These different aspects of Schmitt’s account of the state as the proper locus of security come 
together in the distinction between the own and the strange, and to which we must now turn.   
  
2.5.1 The Own and The Strange 
Famously, Schmitt defines the concept of the political in The Concept of the Political as the dis-
tinction between friend and enemy. According to Schmitt, ‘the friend and enemy concepts are 
to be understood in their concrete and existential sense’.383 The enemy constitutes an ‘existen-
tial negation’ (seinsmäβige Negierung) of the friend’s mode of being.384 War is the ultimate con-
sequence of the antagonistic distinction between friend and enemy. In case of extreme peril, 
the friend grouping has to destroy the enemy. ‘The friend, enemy, and combat concepts re-
ceive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing’.385 
On a closer look, Schmitt’s distinction between friend and enemy is based on another distinc-
tion, to wit the distinction between the own and the strange. Schmitt’s fateful move is to equate 
the enemy to the strange. Defining the friend-grouping as an ‘existential partaking and partic-
ipating’ in a particular political substance, Schmitt argues that the enemy appears to the friend-
grouping as ‘the other, the stranger (der andere, der Fremde)’.386 The enemy is in ‘a special intense 
sense existentially something other (anderes) and strange (Fremdes)’.387  
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The distinction between ownness and strangeness underlying Schmitt’s account of 
the friend and enemy distinction leads back to Hegel’s definition of the enemy, to which 
Schmitt refers in The Concept of the Political. In The Concept of the Political, Schmitt cites the fol-
lowing passage of Hegel’s System of Ethical Life: 
 
‘What is ethical must itself intuit its vitality in its difference, and it must do so here in 
such a way that the essence of the life standing over and against it is posited as strange 
and to be negativated . . . A difference of this sort is the enemy, and this difference, 
posited in its bearing, exists at the same time as its counterpart, the opposite of the 
being of its antithesis, i.e. as the nullity of the enemy, and this nullity, commensurate 
on both sides, is the peril of battle. For ethical life this enemy can only be an enemy 
of the people and itself only a people.’388 
  
Borrowing Hegel’s notion of the enemy, Schmitt defines it as ‘negating strangeness’ (negierendes 
Fremdes).389 That is, the enemy implies a negation of a collective’s existential unity. By tracing 
the friend-enemy distinction back to the distinction between the own and the strange, it be-
comes clear that the enemy concept represents the most radical form of strangeness. ‘In con-
ceptual terms, the enemy is something existentially other (Anderes) and strange (Fremdes), the 
most extreme escalation of otherness (Anders-Seins), which in the case of conflict leads to the 
denial of the own type of political existence’.390 I will return to Schmitt’s definition of the 
enemy and critically assess it in Chapter 3, exploiting the difference between the notions of 
otherness and strangeness. For now it suffices to note that the friend-enemy distinction rep-
resents only a certain manifestation of the distinction between ownness and strangeness, 
namely, its most extreme opposition.   
To the extent that concrete order in a normal condition is defined by Schmitt as ‘an 
organized political unity, internally peaceful, territorially enclosed, and impenetrable to 
strangers (Fremde)’,391 the strange forms a threat to the concrete order as a whole, that is, to 
the existential unity as such. According to Schmitt, the enemy is an ‘existential threat’ (seins-
mäβige Verneinung) to a collective.392 In other words, to the extent that the strange is an ‘exis-
tential negation’ of political unity, it confronts a collective with the possibility of its non-exist-
ence.  
 
‘For as long as a people exists in the political sphere, this people must, even if only 
in the most extreme case – and whether this point has been reached has to be decided 
by it – determine by itself the distinction between friend and enemy. Therein resides 
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the essence of its political existence. When it no longer possesses the capacity or the 
will to make this distinction, it ceases to exist politically.’393 
 
Schmitt’s thoughts about the enemy are linked to his account of heterogeneity. As the con-
trasting term of homogeneity, heterogeneity represents the abnormal. As Schmitt puts it in 
relation to the issue of national homogeneity, ‘a nationally homogeneous state appears then as 
something normal. A state lacking this homogeneity has an abnormal quality that is a threat to 
peace’.394 In Schmitt’s interpretation, to the extent that the heterogeneous breaks the homo-
geneity of concrete order it embodies the element of strangeness; the heterogeneous is what 
Schmitt calls a ‘strange (fremden) component’.395 Consequently, in Schmitt’s view, order/disor-
der, normality/abnormality, homogeneity/heterogeneity, ownness/strangeness and in-
side/outside are all related contrasts. They provide the existential content of the contrast be-
tween security and insecurity, respectively. 
 
2.5.2 Collective Self-Preservation 
The distinction between the own and the strange suggests that security is about collective self-
preservation, a notion which refers to in passing in some of his writings. For example in his 
discussion of the exception in Political Theology:  
 
‘In such a situation [i.e. when a legal order faces an exception, MB] it is clear that the 
state remains, whereas law recedes . . . The existence of the state is undoubted proof 
of its superiority over the validity of the legal norm. The state suspends the law in 
the exception on the basis of the right to self-preservation, as one would say.’396 
 
Moreover, in Constitutional Theory Schmitt specifies that he understands the notion of self-
preservation in a Spinozist way.  
 
‘Every existing political unity has its value and its “right to existence” not in the 
rightness or usefulness of norms, but rather in its existence. What exists as a political 
magnitude, has, considered juristically, value in that it exists. Consequently, its “right 
to self-preservation” is a prerequisite of all further discussions; it attempts, above all, 
to maintain itself in its existence, “in suo esse perseverare” (Spinoza); it protects “its 
existence, its integrity, and its constitution”, which are all existential values.’397 
 
Within the context of Constitutional Theory this passage can be read in a constitutional way, that 
is, as a further explication of the state’s right to self-preservation as outlined in Political Theology. 
This would amount to interpreting the concept of self-preservation in terms of what Schmitt 
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calls the distinction between constitution (Verfassung) and constitutional law (Verfassungsgesetz), 
that is, the distinction between the state and ‘its own constitutional forms’.398 But this is not 
the line of interpretation that I will pursue here. Indeed, the above cited passage includes a 
more fundamental understanding of self-preservation that would remain veiled in such a ‘con-
stitutional’ interpretation. In fact, Schmitt’s interpretation of self-preservation invokes the best 
known proposition of Spinoza’s Ethics, expressing the core of his conatus doctrine: unaquaeque 
res, quantum in se est, in suo esse perseverare conatur, ‘each thing, as far as it can by its power, strives 
to preserve in its being’.399 Rather than reading the notion of self-preservation in a constitu-
tional sense as elaborated explicitly in Schmitt’s writings, I will use Schmitt’s Spinozist inter-
pretation of self-preservation to further define the concept of security ontologically.  
Characteristic of Spinoza’s conatus doctrine is that it assumes that a being that is en-
dowed with an inner striving (conatus) to preserve itself qualifies as ‘substance’.400 Substance, 
in the context of Spinoza’s metaphysics, means self-causation. To the extent that self-causation 
is an internal force, a being lacks an inner factor of decay. Indeed, self-causation means that a 
being causes its own continuation in existence. To put it in Spinoza’s terminology, as sub-
stance, a being is existentially ‘inert’.401 This does not exclude however the possibility that a 
being is challenged by external causes. In the confrontation with external causes, the being in 
question is required to ‘exclude’ the external causes in order to persist in its existence.402 Now, 
it is this experience of external causes that marks the experience of contingency. Contingency 
refers to a being that experiences the vulnerability of its existence, which, in Spinoza’s inter-
pretation, relates to being threatened by external causes.403 Actually, this problem, Hans Blu-
menberg contends, is the modern problem par excellence, a problem in fact that finds its 
culmination in Spinoza’s conatus doctrine. I will return to Blumenberg’s analysis of contingency 
as a modern problem in Chapter 3, when elaborating an alternative interpretation of collective 
self-preservation.404 For the moment it suffices to note that Spinoza claims that a being is 
endowed with an inner striving to self-preservation and hence that contingency is related to 
the experience of an external cause that threatens a being’s continued existence.  
Crucially, Spinoza assumes a particular understanding of contingency, Blumenberg 
notes. If understood as substance, a being can either be said to be or not be the cause of its 
continued existence and hence persist or not persist in its existence. In this sense, Spinoza 
defines contingency as a problem of existence or non-existence. Either a being exists and per-
sists in its existence in that it is the cause of its being, or stops being such and surrenders to 
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external causes. What is problematic about this understanding of contingency is, in Blumen-
berg’s view, that it completely disregards contingency in the sense of the possibility of altera-
tion.405 By interpreting self-preservation as the persistence of a being in its actual state, Spinoza 
seems to overlook the problem of a being’s continued existence by transforming its actual 
state. 
Spinoza’s reference to the notion of self-preservation provides some important in-
sights with respect to Schmitt’s existential concept of security. First of all, the characterization 
of a collective as a substance, i.e. as a self-caused being. At one point Schmitt refers to the 
existence of a collective as a homogeneous substance. In order to claim that a concrete order 
is the ground of a legal order, Schmitt has to assume that concrete order is the ground of its 
own existence, that it is the cause of its own being. This however requires Schmitt to simply 
assume the existence of a collective as a unity, i.e. an existential unity; a legal order finds its 
ground, ultimately, in the existentiality of a collective, which Schmitt defines as substance. As 
Schmitt submits, ‘the special type of political existence need not and cannot legitimate itself’.406 
Secondly, that which appears in Schmitt’s analysis as the strange refers to the metaphysical 
notion of contingency. The strange represents an existential threat to a collective. Thirdly, to 
the extent that a collective is endowed with a pre-given, inner striving for self-preservation, 
the normal condition of concrete order can be defined as a condition of security. As Schmitt 
puts it, ‘the endeavor of a normal state consists above all in assuring total peace within the 
state and its territory’.407 In a normal state a collective subject is not confronted with the con-
tingency of its existence which, in a Spinozist interpretation, concerns the possibility of its 
non-existence. 
Another, fourth insight is that, in a Spinozist reading, contingency only comes into 
view in the experience of what Spinoza calls ‘external causes’. Defined as self-preservation, 
security means responding to external causes in order to safeguard the actual and pre-given 
state of concrete order. In this sense, security has the rather conservative meaning of main-
taining the original state of a collective subject. Indeed, in order to save a collective subject 
from falling back into non-existence, it is compelled to enforce the boundary between nor-
mal/abnormal, inside/outside, and ownness/strangeness that demarcates its existential unity. 
Lastly, reducing contingency to the problem of existence/non-existence, self-preservation 
does not include the possibility of change, that is, the ‘self’ changing its present state in order 
to safeguard its continued existence, an aspect that is actually contained in Hauriou’s vitalist 
concept of institution. In Hauriou’s view, an institution is a social organism and therefore 
subject to a continual movement of conservation and transformation. In Schmitt’s view, how-
ever,  an existential threat cannot but be understood as a confrontation with the possibility of 
non-existence, i.e. a challenge to the fact that the collective exists as a unity, and can therefore 
not be taken as a challenge to what it the collective is as a unity, to its ‘materiality’, as Hauriou 
puts it.  
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The latter point is absolutely decisive. I noted at the outset that self-preservation 
speaks to an ontological concept of security because contingent existence is the mode of being 
of (collective) subjectivity. Now the contingency of existence has two dimensions: that a sub-
ject exists (rather than doesn’t exist) and what it is as an existent being (rather than being oth-
erwise). Schmitt’s fateful move is to collapse contingency in the sense of that-ness, such that 
challenges to the collective subject can only be thematized in terms of existence/non-exist-
ence, i.e. as a threat, not in terms of an opportunity for the transformation of the collective to 
accommodate what challenges its unity. In other words, collective self-preservation, in 
Schmitt’s reading of security, makes no room for collective self-transformation. This entails that 
to secure or preserve the collective against the strange can only mean to enforce the boundaries 
of the collective by neutralizing the strange. This move drastically limits the range of responses 
available to the collective in dealing with what challenges its existential unity. We will return 
to this aspect at a later stage showing that the twofold understanding of contingency opens up 
the possibility to conceive security not only as boundary enforcement but also as boundary 
(re)constitution.  
 
2.5.3 Strategies of Collective Self-Preservation 
On the basis of Schmitt’s definition of security as collective self-preservation, the safeguarding 
of the continued existence of a collective subject means excluding external causes. Security as 
collective self-preservation is about responding to the strange that threatens the existential 
unity of a collective. When confronted with its contingency, i.e. the possibility of its non-
existence, a collective is compelled to enforce the boundary between the own inside and the 
strange outside. More particularly, in Schmitt’s interpretation, boundary enforcement means 
‘eliminating and eradicating’408, that is, neutralizing the strange. Schmitt distinguishes basically 
between three strategies to neutralize the strange, namely (1) assimilation, (2) expulsion and 
(3) destruction. 
Schmitt discusses the security strategies of assimilation and expulsion in the context 
of his analysis of the notion of national homogeneity. To the extent that Schmitt defines these 
strategies in relation to national homogeneity, he conceives them as solutions to problems 
related to migration. 
 
‘The resulting possible solutions vary, if there is not national homogeneity in real 
political terms, because a state consists of diverse nations and contains national mi-
norities. Initially, there is the attempt at peaceful engagement and separation or grad-
ual, peaceful assimilation to the ruling nation . . . The other method is quicker and 
more violent. It is the elimination of the strange (fremden) component through sup-
pression or exile of the heterogeneous population and other radical means.’409 
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So, the first strategy to neutralize a security threat is undoing it of its strange character so that 
it fits within normal order. The second method is to exile the strange. Whereas assimilation 
implies integrating the strange into the own, expulsion implies the opposite, excluding it.  
The third strategy to neutralize existential threats is a radicalized version of expulsion. 
Schmitt discusses this third strategy in the context of his distinction between friend and enemy 
as war. 
 
‘The friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because 
they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity because 
the latter is the existential negation of another being (eines anderen Seins)’.410 
 
This is to say that the third security strategy is to destroy the strange. This is an even more 
radical way to deal with security threats than expulsion, as it does not simply mean exclusion 
but the negation of that which negates the existential unity of a collective. The ultimate re-
sponse to an existential threat is to destroy it.  
 
2.5.4 Sovereignty 
The elaboration of Schmitt’s reference to Spinoza’s concept of self-preservation stages his 
‘legal’ treatment of security. The legal determination of what Schmitt ontologically defines as 
the moment in which a collective engages in collective self-preservation is public order. Es-
sential to Schmitt is that the problem of sovereignty comes into view in a situation in which 
the notion of public order is invoked. Sovereignty, in Schmitt’s interpretation, is a response to 
the strange, the abnormal. We could say that what Schmitt renders as sovereignty at the level 
of legal order is what Spinoza defines as conatus at the ontological level. Schmitt’s analysis of 
sovereignty marks the culmination of his polemic with the normativist conception of security 
in the sense that security in the final analysis demands a sovereign decision about public order, 
that is, an existential decision about the boundary between the own and the strange, the normal 
and the abnormal.  
Schmitt distinguishes sovereignty from legally founded police authority. According 
to Schmitt, sovereignty is not really at issue in the case of legally regulated police authority. To 
the extent that police interventions are bounded by law, these interventions are embedded in 
normal order. That is, the legal definition of police interventions turns them into regulated 
and normal interventions. Legal regulation makes police interventions ‘calculable and defina-
ble and provides a controllable normal content (einen kontrollierbaren, normalen Inhalt) to the con-
cepts “maintenance” of “public security” and “order,” etc., thereby facilitating court supervi-
sion’.411 Therefore, in Schmitt’s interpretation, legally regulated police interventions such as 
the intrusion of fundamental rights that are routinely performed cannot be qualified as excep-
tional. Consequently, Schmitt’s analysis of the legal foundation of police authority implies that 
the concept of public order partly has a ‘normal’ content. The problem of sovereignty becomes 
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visible when ‘the normal presuppositions’412 of police interventions are not given and first 
need to be established. 
Famously, Schmitt defines sovereignty as the decision on the exception, i.e. an ab-
normal situation or abnormal behavior that is not codified in the legal order. If Schmitt dis-
cusses the enemy as the legal manifestation of the abnormal, he analyses the exception 
(Ausnahme) as its legal manifestation. Schmitt defines the exception as the situation or behavior 
that is ‘not codified’ in the existing legal order.413 This means, in Schmitt’s view, that ‘the 
exception is that which cannot be subsumed; it defies general codification’.414 Therefore, the 
exception ‘can at best be characterized as a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of 
the state or the like; but it cannot be factually circumscribed’.415 What is crucial about the 
exception is, in Schmitt’s view, that it ‘defies’ the legal order, that is, it defies the distinction 
between legality and illegality as drawn by the legal order. This means that the exception inti-
mates a suspension and in that sense challenges the normativity of the distinction between 
legality and illegality as set by a legal order. In this respect, the exception is a more radical 
manifestation of abnormality than illegality. Whereas the exception ‘defies’ the validity of the 
distinction between legality and illegality, illegality affirms it, albeit ex negativo. That is, by vio-
lating an individual legal norm, illegal behavior also affirms it and by implication the validity 
of the legal order as a whole. The exception on the other hand calls into question the ground 
of the legal order, drawing attention to the collective subject underlying legal order. Indeed, to 
the extent that, in Schmitt’s interpretation, legal order is merely the objective, formal codifica-
tion of normal order, the exception discloses the underlying concrete order for the sake of 
which the legal norms have been established and for which legal norms are vehicles for its 
continuity over time.416 
The sovereign decision is twofold as it both establishes if the situation or behavior is 
abnormal and what interventions are issued in response. ‘He [i.e. the sovereign, MB] decides 
whether there is an extreme emergency as well as what must be done to eliminate it’.417 For 
Schmitt, this is an important point as it means that the decision on public order implies a gap 
concerning jurisdictional competence. The ‘precondition’ and ‘content’ of the sovereign’s 
competence to proclaim public order is necessarily indeterminate.418 That is, the sovereign is, 
paradoxically, bound by law not to be bound by law. In this respect, Schmitt submits, the 
sovereign stands both inside and outside the legal order. ‘Although he stands outside the nor-
mally valid legal system, he nevertheless belongs to it, for it is he who must decide whether 
the constitution needs to be suspended in its entirety’.419 This is the sense in which Schmitt 
defines sovereignty as a ‘boundary concept’ (Grenzbegriff).420 Actually, to the extent that what 
                                                             
412 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 2008, p. 214. 
413 Schmitt, Political Theology, 1985, p. 6. 
414 Schmitt, Political Theology, 1985, p. 13. 
415 Schmitt, Political Theology, 1985, p. 6. 
416 Hauriou’s discussion with Kelsen is instructive in understanding the relation between institution and legal order. 
See in this respect Waline’s lucid article on Hauriou (Waline, ‘Maurice Hauriou’, 1970). 
417 Schmitt, Political Theology, 1985, p. 7. 
418 Schmitt, Political Theology, 1985, p. 7. 
419 Schmitt, Political Theology, 1985, p. 7. 
420 Schmitt, Political Theology, 1985, p. 6, translation altered. 
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is at stake in public order refers to the existential unity of a collective subject, we could read 
Schmitt’s definition of sovereignty also in a more concrete sense. Indeed, if Schmitt defines 
the exception as a ‘boundary case’421 (Grenzfall) that threatens the boundaries of a collective’s 
existential unity, then enacting measures in the framework of public order is about regaining 
the ‘own boundary’ (eigene Grenze).422 The sovereign decision is about the boundary between 
inside/outside, normal/abnormal and own/strange, more particularly, about regaining the 
own boundary, enforcing the spatial closure of the collective subject that constitutes it as an 
inside over and against an outside.  
The sovereign decision on public order discloses the political nature of security. In 
Schmitt’s view, the issue of public order illustrates that ‘the state is not merely a judicial or-
ganization; it is also something other than a merely neutral umpire (Scheidsrichter) or arbitrator 
(Schlichter). Its essence lies in the fact that it reaches the political decision’.423 The fact that a threat 
to public order is an exception and thus cannot simply be qualified as an instance of illegality 
demonstrates once again that the normativist concept of security is reductive, Schmitt claims. 
Indeed, an abnormal situation defies rather than affirms the distinction between legality and 
illegality. This is to say that the situation or behavior that is defined as a threat to public order 
and hence is defined as abnormal cannot be resolved on the basis of the legal norms enshrined 
in the legal order. It is here that Schmitt’s distinction resurfaces between laws (Gesetz) in the 
proper sense of the word, i.e. norms that have general validity, and measures (Maβnahme), 
whose validity is bound by the concrete situation for which they are issued. According to 
Schmitt, the intervention that follows from the sovereign decision on the exception has the 
legal status of a measure, and not a proper law. In so far that a legal order lacks an ‘automatic 
answer’ to threats to public order, it is up to the sovereign to make a manual decision and issue 
a measure.424 Consequently, the abnormal situation or behavior cannot simply be understood 
as a Tatbestand, that is, a legal condition to which a legal consequence (a sanction) is imputed. 
Rather, in a case of public order it is up to the sovereign to take a measure, which is actually 
the literal meaning of Maβ-nahme.  
In sum, the definition of security as collective self-preservation means that insecurity 
is the experience of a collective’s contingency, which Schmitt interprets in a Spinozist way as 
a problem of existence/non-existence. The experience of contingency is what Schmitt renders 
as the experience of the abnormal, the strange and the heterogeneous. Security, on the other 
hand, relates to the issue of dealing with insecurity. Following from Schmitt’s reductive un-
derstanding of contingency, he understands security as boundary enforcement, a sovereign 
decision to regain the own boundary, reaffirming the boundary between the own and the 
strange, normality and abnormality, the homogeneous and the heterogeneous, inside and out-
side and friend and enemy. This is, in Schmitt’s view, what the legal notion of public order is 
about: a decision on boundary between the own and the strange. 
                                                             
421 Schmitt, Political Theology, 1985, p. 6, translation altered. 
422 Carl Schmitt, Theorie des Partisanen. Zwischenbemerkung zum Begriff des Politischen, Duncker & Humblot: Berlin, 1975 
[1962], p. 88, my translation, MB. 
423 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, 2007, p. 176, italics in original. 




In this Chapter I have argued that Schmitt defines security as collective self-preservation. The 
notion of public order is the legal determination of the moment in which a collective subject 
engages in an act of collective self-preservation. The linchpin of Schmitt’s existential concep-
tion of security is the notion of concrete order. I have sought to (re)construct it in such a way 
that it casts light on the concept of security, a concept which, although fundamental to 
Schmitt’s political and legal philosophy, is not prominent in his writings. First of all, the con-
cept of concrete order allows Schmitt to introduce the idea of collective subjectivity, that is, a 
collective subject as the ground of legal order. Essential in this respect is the notion of the 
directing idea. The directing idea allows of conceiving a collective as an acting unity to the 
extent that its members are engaged in its realization. Furthermore, the notion of concrete 
order permits Schmitt to define it as normal order, as homogeneity and as a nomos. Tracing 
Schmitt’s reference back to Spinoza, I argued that security as collective self-preservation means 
safeguarding the own inside by neutralizing the strange that comes from without. That is, 
security is about enforcing the original boundary between the normal and the abnormal, inside 
and outside, the own and the strange, the homogeneous and the heterogeneous, and friend 
and enemy. 
Let me indicate what I take to be strong features of Schmitt’s contribution to a theory 
of security, carefully disengaging those features from what I take to be the highly problematic 
and untenable aspects thereof. First and foremost, I endorse Schmitt’s claim that security is 
an ontological concept, i.e. that the focus of a theory of collective security is the contingent 
existence of a collective subject, hence that contingent existence is the mode of being proper 
to collective subjectivity. The strength of Schmitt’s definition of security as collective self-
preservation is that it starts from the suprapersonal perspective of a collective. Only when 
taking this perspective into account it is possible to provide an alternative to the normativist 
conception of security, which reduces security and insecurity to the distinction between legality 
and illegality. While this need not entail jettisoning a strongly normative dimension of security, 
as Schmitt thought, it does suggest that Kelsen’s move to factor out the concept of collective 
subjectivity from a theory of law and state systematically blocks access to the concept of col-
lective security.  
I endorse Schmitt’s thesis that political and legal philosophy must account for the 
security of a collective, i.e. that it is meaningful and important to speak about collective secu-
rity. I am not prepared, however, to take on board Schmitt’s further assumption that individual 
security has a merely derivative character with respect to collective security. Schmitt conven-
iently brackets the fact that the concept of self-preservation, as introduced by Hobbes and 
brought to its metaphysically definitive formulation in Spinoza’s conatus, has its focus in indi-
vidual subjectivity. I revisit this decisive point in due course. 
I also believe that Schmitt is on the right track when arguing that security and inse-
curity refer to concrete forms of order and disorder. The existential unity of a collective subject 
can be challenged by forms of abnormality that are not covered by the notion of illegality. In 
order to deal with (rather than simply neutralize, as Schmitt would have it) this strong form of 
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abnormality a political decision is required. And it is here that Schmitt’s analysis of the excep-
tion has its place. 
However, Schmitt’s concept of security also suffers from a number of weaknesses, 
which can be related to his reified interpretation of the existential unity of collective subjectiv-
ity, an interpretation that stems from a reductive understanding of Hauriou’s notion of insti-
tution. The problem with Schmitt’s interpretation of existential unity is that he turns it into a 
static unity with a fixed substance. This reification of the existential unity of collective subjec-
tivity has four implications that need to be critically examined and redressed if one wishes to 
make a plausible case for the existential concept of collective security. The first implication 
concerns the idea that a collective subject is in a condition of security, a condition that can be 
threatened and maintained. Notwithstanding the fact that Schmitt argues that a condition of 
complete security is an ‘endeavor’, that is, both factual and ideal, he nonetheless assumes nor-
mal order to be precisely that, a state of absolute security. The second implication is that the 
contrasts between normal/abnormal, inside/outside, own/strange, homogenous/heterogene-
ous and friend/enemy are original and hence clear-cut, at least in principle. Security means 
enforcing pre-existing boundaries. The third implication is, as illustrated by Schmitt’s interpre-
tation of Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, that the collective has at all times primacy 
over the individual in matters of security. Schmitt has no qualms about sacrificing the individ-
ual and her fundamental rights for the sake of the security of the collective. As we have seen, 
if Kelsen reduces collective (in)security to individual (in)security, Schmitt engages in the in-
verse reduction. Fourth and lastly, Schmitt’s reified interpretation of institution leads him to 
understand contingency in a Spinozist sense of the experience of existence/non-existence, 
indeed an experience that comes from without. Security as collective self-preservation means 
maintaining the actual state of a collective’s existential unity, and thus discards the relation 
















This Chapter offers a critical reappropriation of the existential concept of security developed 
in Chapter 2, continuing our search for a critical conception of collective security. In the pre-
vious Chapter I have argued that Schmitt defines security as collective self-preservation. In 
Schmitt’s interpretation, security means enforcing the original unity of collective subjectivity. 
Developing an alternative understanding of existential unity, in this Chapter I will redefine 
collective security as collective self-assertion. Collective self-assertion concerns the capacity of a 
collective to take account of and deal with challenges to its existence by transforming its unity. 
Key to my definition of security as collective self-assertion is the reflexive mode of being of a 
collective, an issue that Schmitt fails to conceptualize in an adequate way. A collective has a 
reflexive mode of being as a unity not simply a unity because its members are the same but 
also, and more fundamentally, that its members view themselves as a unity. This reflexive mode 
suggests that collective existence is intrinsically temporal and spatial and hence inherently 
transformable although finitely so. Indeed, to the extent that collective existence has a reflexive 
structure, it is irreducibly contingent in that it exists as a unity and what it is as a unity. In this 
sense, a collective fundamentally has an insecure existence as a unity. Crucially, the reflexive 
mode of being of collective subjectivity is not only the root of its insecure existence but also 
opens up possibilities to deal with that which challenges its existence and, in the process, to 
transform itself. To the extent that collective existence is contingent in a twofold sense of its 
that-ness and its what-ness, the response to challenges can range between boundary enforce-
ment and boundary constitution. Security is about a collective asserting its existence every time 
anew, both enforcing and reconstituting its unity in response to that which challenges it. 
The argument of this Chapter unfolds in five steps. In section 3.2, I will develop the 
notion of existence pertaining to collective subjectivity, drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s definition 
of identity in terms of the interrelated notions of sameness and selfhood. Next, in section 3.3, 
deconstructing Schmitt’s account of the distinction between the principles of identity and rep-
resentation, I will analyze representation as the temporal mode of being of the existential unity 
of collective subjectivity. In section 3.4 I will discuss the two ways in which the existential 
insecurity of a collective manifests itself at the institutional level. This will also allow me to 
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demonstrate the internal correlation between individual security and collective security. Sub-
sequently, in section 3.5, I will deal with the legal manifestations of collective insecurity that 
feed into the notion of public order, which, as we will see, revolves around the problem of 
anarchy. Having analyzed insecurity as the mode of being of a collective at the ontological, 
institutional and legal level, in section 3.6 I will discuss the notion of security available to a 
collective subject, to wit boundary setting. Because I develop my existential definition of se-
curity as collective self-assertion in a critical discussion with Schmitt, in section 3.7 I will ex-
amine the fundamental continuities and discontinuities between Schmitt’s definition of collec-
tive security and mine. 
 
3.2 Existential Unity 
The aim of this Chapter is to make a transition from a static to a dynamic concept of existential 
security. The key to this transition is the notion of existential unity. Indeed, as I have argued 
in Chapter 2, there is an internal connection between the way in which collective subjectivity 
is conceptualized and the concept of security. In this section, I will argue that the existential 
unity of collective subjectivity should be read in a reflexive sense, and thus cannot be reduced 
to the ‘sameness’ of substantial similarity, as Schmitt claims. In order to develop a reflexive 
notion of existential unity, I will draw on Paul Ricoeur’s distinction between identity as same-
ness and as selfhood, a distinction which, I claim, is the presupposition of an existential con-
cept of security, that is, a concept of security that takes its cue from the first-person perspective 
of a collective. The members of a collective cannot simply be conceived as a unity to the extent 
that they are the same but also and primarily to extent that they view themselves as a unity. Im-
portantly, the reflexive mode of being of collective subjectivity suggests that it exists as a dy-
namic process of collective self-identification, and not as static self-identity, as Schmitt argues.     
 
3.2.1 Collective Sameness and Selfhood 
The problem of existential unity concerns what we could call the spatio-temporal unity of a 
collective subject. Schmitt deals with the aspect of spatial unity at length in The Nomos of the 
Earth. According to Schmitt, an act of land-taking brings about the emplacement (Ortung) of a 
collective, establishing a spatial closure that constitutes a collective as an inside over against an 
outside. Hence, a collective exists as a spatially bounded unity. Besides its spatiality, a collective 
also exists as a temporal unity. The problem of temporal unity is a rather neglected element in 
Schmitt’s analysis of collective subjectivity. The reason for this is that, as we will see, Schmitt 
starts from the assumption that a collective subject exists in the mode of immediate self-pres-
ence. Despite Schmitt’s neglect of the aspect of temporal unity, we could say that it refers to 
what he calls the ‘commonality of historical life’.425 The temporal commonality intimates that 
a collective subject exists as a temporal arc spanning past, present and future, that is, as a 
temporally bounded unity. This is however but a first definition of what it means to speak of 
the existential unity of a collective subject, and which we will have to develop in more detail.  
                                                             
425 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 2008, p. 262 
79 
 
Interestingly, the problem of existential unity is also central to Karl Löwith’s re-
nowned critique of Schmitt.426 Drawing a comparison between Schmitt’s analysis of the polit-
ical and Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein, Löwith argues that Schmitt defines existential unity 
ambiguously both in a substantialist and an occasionalist sense, i.e. as a substantial unity and 
as a unity whose ‘content is merely a product of the accidental occasio of the political situation 
which happens to prevail at the moment’.427 Although I will also draw on the phenomenolog-
ical tradition to elaborate the notion of existence implied by collective subjectivity, I will adopt 
a different approach to that of Löwith. For whereas Löwith uses Heidegger’s analysis of ex-
istence to diagnose Schmitt’s understanding of political unity, I will draw on phenomenological 
theories to further develop Schmitt’s notion of existential unity. In this sense, my approach is 
constructive rather than diagnostic.428  
In order to analyze the problem of the existential unity of a collective subject, I will 
approach it as a question of collective identity. More particularly, I will argue that the existential 
unity of collective subject presupposes a reflexive notion of identity. This is to say that collective 
existence consists of a mode of being in which two interrelated poles of identity are at stake: 
sameness and selfhood. In other words, a collective subject exists by way of having to contin-
uously relate to itself (selfhood) by determining what defines it as a unity (sameness). Self-iden-
tity will prove to be pivotal in that it introduces the aspect of a self-relation: the members of a 
collective view themselves (object) as a subject that acts, as Bert van Roermund puts it. This 
aspect remains underdeveloped in Schmitt’s analysis of collective subjectivity. In fact, as we 
will see, although the notion of an institution and its directing idea enable us to understand a 
collective as a self, Schmitt has a reductive understanding of collective identity in that he tends 
to reify collective existence by viewing it predominantly as sameness, that is, the pole of iden-
tity which a collective subject shares with other kinds of being, with things, in a general sense 
of the term.429 In order to develop the reflexive identity of collective subjectivity, I will draw 
on Paul Ricoeur’s analysis of personal identity as discussed in Oneself as Another430, and not, or 
at least not primarily, on Schmitt’s account of collective identity. For although Schmitt deals 
with the notion of collective identity explicitly in Constitutional Theory, which he contrasts to 
representation, this notion of identity is only part of the broader picture of identity, in so far 
as his treatment of identity in those passages relies on the notion of identity as sameness. I will 
                                                             
426 ‘But what is the meaning here [in Schmitt’s analysis of the political, MB] of a strange (fremde) and own (eigene) “way 
of being”, and of “ontological” in general, if indeed political being is not one kind of being among others but instead 
is the protection of the own being and the complete negation of strange ( fremden) being as such, i.e. if it is political 
“existence”?’ (Karl Löwith, ‘The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt’, in: Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, 
trans. Gary Steiner, Columbia University Press: New York, 1995 [1935], pp. 137-159, especially p. 147, translation 
altered, MB.  Löwith published this article initially under a pen-name: Hugo Fiala, ‘Politischer Dezisionismus’, Revue 
International de la Theorie du Droit, vol. 9, 1935, pp. 101-123)   
427 Löwith, ‘The Occasional Decisionism of Carl Schmitt’, 1995, p. 144. 
428 In this respect, my approach to Schmitt is akin to Michael Marder’s, with the difference that Marder attempts to 
demonstrate the general kinship between Schmitt and phenomenology. See Michael Marder, Groundless Existence. The 
Political Ontology of Carl Schmitt, Continuum: New York/London, 2010. 
429 Interesting in this regard is that Schmitt underpins his definition of identity as ‘substantial similarity’ or sameness 
in Constitutional Theory with a reference to a book of Edmund Husserl, the founding father of phenomenology (Schmitt, 
Constitutional Theory, 2008, p. 265). 
430 Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, trans. Kathleen Blamey, The University of Chicago Press: Chicago/London, 1994.  
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return to Schmitt’s contrast between identity and representation in section 3.3, when discuss-
ing the temporal mode of being of collective subjectivity.  
According to Ricoeur, personal identity consists of two interrelated poles of identity: 
identity as sameness (idem-identity) and as selfhood (ipse-identity). Let me start with Ricoeur’s 
definition of idem-identity. Ricoeur identifies three components of the notion of idem-identity. 
The first component is numerical identity.431 Sameness in the sense of numerical identity sug-
gests that distinct occurrences can be considered the same to the extent that they are occur-
rences of one and the same thing. If numerical identity denotes sameness in the sense of one-
ness, plurality is its contrasting term. Secondly, sameness signifies qualitative identity.432 Two 
things can be considered the same, and in that sense are identical, to the extent that they have 
the same quality in common. The contrasting term of qualitative identity is difference. The 
third component of identity as sameness concerns its form of permanence in time. To the 
extent that something can be identified as the same through time, it exists in the mode of an 
‘uninterrupted continuity’.433 The contrasting term of uninterrupted continuity is change.  
So far Ricoeur’s definition of identity as sameness. Although idem-identity is the dom-
inant conception of identity, Ricoeur argues that personal identity cannot be reduced to same-
ness. In fact, he claims that identity as sameness stands in contrast to identity as selfhood. Ipse-
identity signifies identity in terms of reflexivity, that is to say, a relation to self. Selfhood is at 
stake in the capacity of a person to view her or himself (hence as an object) as the subject 
which acts, intends, believes etc. This ‘reflexive’ relation is an identity relation to the extent 
that object and subject are the same, identical.434 The contrasting term of selfhood is otherness. 
The self stands in contradistinction to what is other than self, i.e. the other, whether things or 
other selves. The last element of identity as selfhood is that it has a different mode of perma-
nence in time than identity as sameness. If the temporal mode of being of sameness is unin-
terrupted continuity, Ricoeur defines the temporal permanence of selfhood as ‘self-constancy’ 
(maintien de soi).435 ‘Self-constancy is for each person that manner of conducting himself or 
herself so that others can count on that person. Because someone is counting on me, I am 
accountable for my actions before another’.436 Self-constancy is reflexive in that it refers to the 
capacity of a person to view itself as a unity through time, and to act accordingly. Importantly, 
it is with respect to the question of temporal permanence that the contrast between sameness 
and selfhood becomes acute. I will return to this in a minute when discussing character and 
promise as two models of temporal permanence.  
Let me first clarify the significance of the distinction between the interrelated poles 
of idem- and ipse-identity. To be sure, the above is but a brief overview of Ricoeur’s analysis of 
the structure of identity and its contrasting terms. Nevertheless, the distinction between iden-
tity as sameness and as selfhood demonstrates a crucial difference between the mode of being 
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of a thing or an object and that of a person or subject, that is, between thing-hood and person-
hood. In this regard, Ricoeur builds on Martin Heidegger’s insight on the distinct ontological 
status of things and subjects. To put it in Heidegger’s terminology, whereas a thing factually 
is, a subject on the other hand ‘factically’ exists.437 In other words, the distinction between the 
poles of identity as sameness and as selfhood accounts for an essential difference between 
thing-identity and personal-identity. Indeed, whereas persons share idem-identity with things, 
the sense of ownership involved in both cases is different: whereas things have their ‘own’ 
properties or qualities, there is no reflexive relationship involved here, as in the case of persons. 
The sense of ownership involved in the case of personal identity involves a reflexive relation 
such that a person can take up a (critical) stance with respect to features as being its own—or 
not. Personal identity is reflexive in that it denotes the capacity of a subject to refer to herself 
or himself by using first-person indexicals such as ‘I’, ‘me’, and ‘mine’ and therefore implies a 
certain distance and detachment with respect to oneself. This entails that the question ‘Who 
am I?’ is irreducible to the question ‘What am I?’ 
Notice that whereas Ricoeur speaks of personal identity, I wish to draw on his anal-
ysis of identity to gain insight into collective identity.438 In fact, focusing on the question of 
personal identity, Ricoeur refers in Oneself as Another only in passing to the problem of collec-
tive identity.439 Nevertheless, Ricoeur’s analysis can be applied to the notion of collective sub-
jectivity, which I have developed hitherto solely on the basis of Schmitt’s political and legal 
philosophy, to the extent that collective subjectivity also implies a first-person perspective, 
albeit in the plural. Indeed, to the extent that the concept of concrete order builds on Hauriou’s 
notion of institution, Schmitt can be construed as defining collective subjectivity from the 
perspective of a collective as an acting unity. Similar to the individual subject in Ricoeur’s 
analysis of personal identity, from a first-person perspective a manifold of individuals can be 
considered to exist as a collective to the extent that they view themselves (hence as an object) 
qua acting unity (hence as a subject).440 The reflexivity entailed by collective selfhood implies 
                                                             
437 Martin Heidegger introduces the notions of factuality (Tatsächlichkeit) and facticity (Faktizität) in Sein und Zeit to 
distinguish between the mode of being of, respectively, things and subjects (or, more accurately, Dasein) (Martin 
Heidegger, Being and Time. A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh, State University of New York Press: 
Albany, 1996 [1927]). For a Heideggerian analysis of collective selfhood and the crucial distinction between ‘that’ and 
‘what’ a collective is, a distinction which she correctly argues has been absent from both Waldenfels’ and Lindahl’s 
discussions of the strange, see Nanda Oudejans, Asylum. A Philosophical Inquiry into the International Protection of Refugees, 
BOXPress BV: Oisterwijk, 2011 (dissertation). Although there is a strong affinity between Oudejans’ analysis of col-
lective selfhood and mine, not least because we draw our inspiration to a considerable degree from the same body of 
literature, I will take it into another direction. Whereas Oudejans analyzes the problem of collective selfhood in the 
context of asylum, I will develop it in terms of the problem of collective security. As we will see, this will allow me to 
formulate a critique of Oudejans’ analysis of existential insecurity. 
438 My analysis of collective identity is indebted to Bert van Roermund and Hans Lindahl. See in particular Bert van 
Roermund, ‘First-Person Plural Legislature: Political Reflexivity and Representation’, Philosophical Explorations, vol. 6, 
no. 3, 2003, pp. 235-252; ‘The Law and ‘We’’, Ethical Perspectives: Journal of the European Ethics Network, vol. 13, no. 3, 
2006, pp. 525-553; Legal Thought and Philosophy. What Legal Scholarship is About, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham/Northamp-
ton, 2013; Hans Lindahl, ‘Constituent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of Collective Selfhood’, 
in: Martin Loughlin and Neil Walker (eds.), The Paradox of Constitutionalism. Constituent Power and Constitutional Form, 
Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007, pp. 9-24; Fault Lines of Globalization. Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality, 
Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2013. 
439 See Ricoeur, Oneself as Another, 1994, p. 121 and p. 123. 
440 Van Roermund, ‘First-Person Plural Legislature: Political Reflexivity and Representation’, 2003, p. 239. 
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that collective existence is irreducible to but at the same time not independent from the indi-
viduals who constitute it. To the extent that Schmitt invokes the notion of an institution and 
its directing idea, his account of collective subjectivity involves a reflexive form of ownership 
with respect to its distinctive features, even if only implicitly, such that a collective subject can 
take up a relation to them, either by affirming them as its own or by disowning them. In turn, 
the avowal and disavowal of ownership is related to how the collective subject interprets its 
directing idea, about which Hauriou notes that it cannot be reduced to a function or an end 
which is fixed in advance. 
 
3.2.2 Temporal Permanence: Character and Promise 
Now, let me turn to the polarity between identity as sameness and as selfhood as manifest in 
their respective modes of temporal permanence. According to Ricoeur, the model of temporal 
permanence emblematic for identity as sameness is character.441 Character refers to temporal 
permanence as uninterrupted continuity. Ricoeur defines character as a set of acquired dispo-
sitions by which a subject, individual or plural, can be recognized as that subject. As such, 
character can be parsed into two notions: habits and acquired identifications. Peculiar to the 
model of character is the strong overlap between idem- and ipse-identity. To the extent that the 
poles of idem- and ipse-identity tend to coincide, the stability or temporal permanence of a 
subject’s identity relies on those features that define it as the same through time.  
The way in which Ricoeur defines character allows me to draw a parallel with 
Schmitt’s notion of normal order.442 To recall, Schmitt defines normal order along two lines, 
to wit the normal situation and the normal type of man. The normal situation denotes joint 
action in the sense of patterns of behavioral regularities. This concerns what Ricoeur would 
call habits. The normal type of man, on the other hand, denotes the political substance of a 
collective, something that Ricoeur captures with the notion of acquired identifications. So, 
what Ricoeur defines as character, habit and identification is defined by Schmitt as, respec-
tively, normal order, the normal situation and the normal type of man. Ricoeur’s analysis of 
character enables us to critically reassess Schmitt’s account of normal order in that normal order 
is the outcome of a reflexive self-relation. In this sense, normal order should be understood as a 
process of normalization. Importantly, to the extent that normal order represents a stabilized 
condition of collective existence, the members of a collective experience their unity as rela-
tively unproblematic. It is for this reason that Schmitt speaks of existential unity in the sense 
of the immediate self-identity of a collective subject in Constitutional Theory. Immediate self-
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identity, on his account, means that the questions as to what a collective subject is and that it 
exists are deemed unproblematic, and in this sense, ‘secure’. 
The second model of permanence in time outlined by Ricoeur is that of making a 
promise.443 According to Ricoeur, whereas character is emblematic for idem-identity, a promise 
is the privileged manifestation of ipse-identity. A promise differs from the temporal perma-
nence of uninterrupted continuity that a subject shares with things in that it implies self-con-
stancy. In Ricoeur’s view, a promise entails a notion of identity that stands as ‘a challenge to 
time’.444 Self-constancy implies a certain determination on the side of the subject, a determi-
nation to keep its promise: ‘even if my desire were to change, even if I were to change my 
opinion or my inclination, “I will hold firm”’.445 Importantly, whereas in the case of character, 
idem- and ipse-identity tend to overlap almost completely, the model of a promise reveals a gap 
between the two respective poles of identity. In the case of a promise, Ricoeur notes, ‘the ipse 
poses the question of identity without the aid and support of the idem’.446 That is, the temporal 
permanence of a promise is relatively independent from the temporal permanence of charac-
ter. 
While Ricoeur develops the notion of keeping a promise in the context of personal 
identity there is a revealing passage in The Human Condition where Hannah Arendt elaborates 
the notion of a promise in the context of politics, i.e. the occasion when a manifold of indi-
viduals ‘gather together and “act in concert”’.447 According to Arendt, it is the force of mutual 
promise that binds the manifold of individuals together when they do not manifest themselves 
as an acting unity in an immediate sense. The mutual promise allows the manifold of individ-
uals to understand themselves as a unity through time, and precisely when unity is called into 
question. Arendt is keen to emphasize the boundedness of a mutual promise. According to 
her, the mutual promise of a manifold of individuals establishes ‘a certain limited reality’ in 
that it evokes ‘an agreed purpose for which the promises are valid and binding’.448 This political 
notion of promise allows for further specifying the normative foundation of an institution. 
For what the notion of a promise indicates is that the commitment to realize the directing idea 
is premised on reciprocity. Reciprocity means that individuals engage in the ‘joint activity’ of 
realizing the directing idea of an institution in so far that they acknowledge ‘the rules which 
define it and which determine their respective shares in its benefits and burdens’.449 That is to 
say, reciprocity is the normative principle of individuals to ‘act in concert’, as Arendt puts it; it 
explains the self-binding of a manifold of individuals to ‘an agreed purpose’. Reciprocity 
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grounds the mutual expectations of a group and is the cause of disappointment if these expec-
tations are not met. 
If the model of character represents the temporal unity of a collective subject as an 
uninterrupted continuity, the model of a mutual promise suggests a different understanding 
of the temporal unity of a collective subject. To the extent that the reflexive self-relation im-
plies a certain distance to oneself, a promise enables the members of a collective to view them-
selves as a unity across time in the sense of a group the members of which are committed to 
realizing the directing idea. That is, a collective self-constancy in the sense of a mutual promise 
between the members of a collective to persevere in realizing the directing idea through time, 
regardless of the vicissitudes that they may encounter along the way, and even if, in dealing 
with these vicissitudes, they need to critically reconsider the directing idea that orients their 
action as a collective. As a consequence, the reflexive self-relation implies a certain flexibility 
of a collective’s temporal unity in the sense that this temporal unity—their history—can be 
the subject of reconsideration. Importantly, the model of a mutual promise discloses that the 
temporal unity of a collective subject is not a matter of an immediately self-present identity, 
but implies a recursive process of identification or self-relating. The process of collective self-
identification implies the irreducible openness of both the questions concerning who view 
themselves as the members of the collective and what it is that binds them together.  
Essential to the process of self-identification or self-relating is, as mentioned, the 
directing idea or what Arendt calls the ‘agreed purpose’ of a collective. For the directing idea 
enables the members of a collective to view themselves, on the one hand, as a continuous 
temporal unity and, on the other, as the unity whose continuity is at stake. That is, the actions 
by the members of a collective can be viewed as joint action to the extent that they are directed 
towards realizing the directing idea, and thus meet the mutual expectations of the individual 
members. This is decisive for the problem of security because it shows that collective security 
cannot be detached from individual security, beginning with the security of those who partici-
pate in the collective. In this sense, the directing idea is the normative point of joint action, i.e. 
that which joint action is about. It is the criterion to determine if an action is in place or 
misplaced, timely or untimely. In the case of normal order, the normativity of the directing 
idea is experienced as rather unproblematic and straightforward. The unproblematic nature of 
collective existence can no longer be taken for granted when normal order is interrupted. This 
interruption can take the shape of an misplaced or an untimely behavior, challenging what the 
collective is as a unity and that it is a unity, thereby illuminating the collective as an ordered 
whole, as a spatio-temporal unity. Behavior that interrupts normal order is qualified as abnor-
mal. I will turn to discuss the issue of abnormal behavior in section 3.4. 
 
3.2.3 Collective Self-Identification 
The question that follows from Ricoeur’s analysis of identity is of course in what sense a re-
flexively structured collective subject can be considered to exist? Considering that the mode of 
being of a collective subject is irreducible to the mode of being of a thing, i.e. identity as 
sameness, what is the mode of being of collective selfhood? What does it mean to speak of 
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existence qua mode of being of a collective subject as a self? Central to the mode of being of 
collective selfhood is, as noted above, the directing idea. According to Hauriou, the directing 
idea should not be confused with the notion of an end or a function in that it is not fixed in 
advance and thus contains ‘an undetermined and unrealized part’.450 This means that a collec-
tive does not simply exist as a fully realized being. Rather, to the extent that the directing idea 
contains an undetermined part, a collective exists as possibility. As Jean-Luc Nancy formulates 
it eloquently, the mode of being of selfhood signifies ‘a relation to the “self” wherein the “self” 
is the “possible”.451 In fact, to the extent that taking up a stance to the directing idea is the 
core of a collective self-relation, we could say that the directing idea ‘possibilitizes’ collective 
existence.452 To the extent that Schmitt draws his notion of concrete order from Hauriou’s 
notion of an institution, the notion of selfhood is not completely absent in his analysis of 
collective identity.453 Instead, the problem seems to be that Schmitt fails to adequately con-
ceptualize and hence differentiate between identity as selfhood and as sameness. 
This definition of the mode of existence of collective selfhood allows for specifying 
the process of collective self-identification. In the ongoing process of collective self-identifi-
cation or self-relation, a collective engages in a process of identifying which possible spatio-
temporal unities it can view as its own and, by implication, which not. In this sense, we could 
say that the recursive process of collective self-identification amounts to a decision by the 
collective on its existence as possibility.454 This is to say that the ‘reality’ of a collective subject 
is that of ‘a functional actualization’ of its status as possibility, to borrow a felicitous formula-
tion of Rudolf Smend, a contemporary and critic of Schmitt.455 The process of collective self-
identification amounts to the actualization of a possible unity by those who view themselves 
as a collective, thereby establishing, for the time being, what it is that binds them. As a conse-
quence, what a collective calls its own is the outcome of a process of self-identification in the 
sense of the actualization of its existence as possibility. This, in contrast to Schmitt, yields a 
notion of ownness that is irreducible to the reified sense of ownership proper to things. 
Now, in so far that the spatio-temporal unity a collective deems to be its own is 
necessarily a limited actualization of its existence as possibility, it assumes a closure, even if 
provisional, demarcating self from other than self, more particularly, a self-closure. This closure 
is both spatial and temporal.  As to the spatial closure, we could say that a collective subject 
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not merely ‘has’ a place, the way a stone has a place, but rather emplaces itself, that is, occupies 
a place as its own. Indeed, the members of a collective in whose name the spatial closure is 
effectuated view this spatial unity as their own place, i.e. the place where they belong. As to 
the feature of temporality, the mutual promise between the members of a collective has the 
power to ‘stabilize’ time by means of effectuating a temporal closure.456 The temporal closure 
is constitutive of a collective subject’s temporal unity in that it enables a collective subject to 
view itself as a temporal arc spanning past, present and future, retrojecting itself into the past 
and projecting itself into the future; in a word, to speak of a history (qua temporal unity) as its 
own collective history. So, the actualization of a collective subject’s existence as possibility 
concerns the spatial and temporal closure that allows the members of a collective to view a 
spatio-temporal unity as their own. On the one hand, every stance by the collective about what 
constitutes it as a spatio-temporal unity is an actualization of its existence as possibility. Con-
versely, to speak of collective existence as possibility is to argue that a collective exists in the 
mode of a variable range of spatio-temporal unities that it can call its own. Notice though that 
although I deal here with the problem of spatial and temporal unity separately for the sake of 
analytical clarity, they are of course intrinsically related: a collective constitutes itself as a spatial 
unity across time and as an emplaced temporal unity. 
An important implication of the mode of being of the collective as a self is that the 
closure establishes a ‘preferential distinction’ between self and other than self.457 For what is 
preferred is the collective self that is constituted by the closure, and not that from which the 
collective distinguishes itself, i.e. that which is other than self. Schmitt’s account of spatial 
closure is a case in point. Schmitt emphasizes the exclusionary function of the closure, that is, 
‘to separate a pacified order from a quarrelsome disorder, a cosmos from chaos, a house from 
a non-house, an enclosure from the wilderness’.458 In other words, the spatial closure estab-
lishes an asymmetry between inside and outside, between self and other than self.459 In fact, the 
strong point of Schmitt’s analysis of nomos, despite its problematic features, is the reestablish-
ment of the link between collective self-identification and collective self-emplacement. The 
members of a collective view themselves as a unity to the extent that they identify the place 
that they occupy as their own, that is, by viewing themselves as an emplaced unity. And con-
versely, they can only identify themselves as a collective to the extent that they can identify a 
place as their own. The same holds for the temporal closure of a collective self. The mutual 
promise between the members of the collective manifests itself as the principle of self-con-
stancy to the extent that it has the power to unify the plurality of individual acts into a collective 
history, distinguishing from that which is beyond.  
The definition of collective as a self has a second implication. To the extent that the 
spatio-temporal unity of a collective forms the actualization of its existence as possibility, a 
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collective is in a certain sense always ‘more’ than its reality, i.e. its actual spatio-temporal unity.  
Put differently, the actual spatio-temporal unity of a collective is but one possible actualization 
of this unity. Moreover, the fact that a collective exists in each case as ‘more is possible than 
actual’ suggests that this ‘more’ accompanies the collective as its shadow.460 I will develop this 
insight as regards the excess of the possible over the actual existence of a collective in more 
detail in section 3.3, focusing on the problem of contingency. Let me note here that the mode 
of being of selfhood suggests that a collective exists as a transformable spatio-temporal unity. It 
is in this sense that Waldenfels would understand the existence of a collective as spatio-tem-
poral unity to be ‘radically contingent’.461 However, as we will see, the contingency of collective 
existence as a spatio-temporal unity does not only concern the question as to what a collective 
is as a spatio-temporal unity but also that it exists as such a unity.462 This distinction between 
the what-ness and the that-ness of the existence of a collective subject intimates that the notion 
of radical contingency hinted at by Waldenfels needs to be reconsidered, as collective selfhood 
does not merely imply the possibility of being otherwise but also the possibility of non-exist-
ence, possibilities which are both part and parcel of the collective’s relation to self, that is, 
possibilities with respect to which a collective must take a stance and in fact always already has 
taken up a stance, even if only to turn away from them. 
A third implication of Ricoeur’s analysis of ipse-identity is that the closure constitutive 
of the spatio-temporal unity of a collective is not exhausted by the pole of idem-identity and its 
contrasts. This is to say that the closure does not simply imply a delimitation of a collective in 
the sense of numerical identity and qualitative identity in contrast to, respectively, plurality and 
difference. For such an understanding of the closure of a collective’s spatio-temporal unity 
would amount to a reductive understanding of its identity, disregarding its mode of being as a 
self. Instead, the closure constituting the spatio-temporal unity of a collective brings into play 
selfhood and its contrasting term, otherness. Indeed, the closure effectuates the establishment 
of a collective as a sphere of ownness delineating it from what is other than self. This suggests 
that the closure constitutive of the spatio-temporal unity of a collective is not a unilateral 
achievement as Schmitt portrays it, i.e. a decision on the ‘own’ form of existence that a collec-
tive reaches for itself and by itself. To the extent that the spatial and temporal closure of a 
collective subject amounts to a self-closure, that from which a collective subject secludes itself, 
i.e. what is other than self, is implicated in that which is achieved by the closure, namely, the 
sphere of ownness. In other words, the closure of collective subject shows that it has to reckon 
with that from which it separates itself, from what is other than self. It is in this context that 
Waldenfels speaks of the ‘paradox of self-relatedness’: the relation to what is other than self is 
implicated in a self-relation.463 The paradox of self-relatedness intimates that a self is irreduc-
ibly other.    
Ricoeur’s notion of otherness is however reductive. Indeed, as Bernhard Waldenfels 
points out, while Ricoeur develops the notion of otherness as the contrasting term of selfhood 
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in Soi-même comme un autre, he only rarely refers to strangeness.464 Waldenfels argues that while 
Ricoeur parses the notion of identity into sameness and selfhood he does not do so with 
respect to the notion of alterity. Complementing Ricoeur’s analysis of selfhood, Waldenfels 
defines the strange not simply as other than self but as the ‘extra-ordinary’ (auβer-ordentlich). By 
defining the strange as the extra-ordinary Waldenfels emphasizes both its spatial and excessive 
character. Excessive, in that the strange represents possibilities that surpass the possibilities 
available to a self and thus point to a mode of being irreducible to that of the former.465 And 
spatial, in that the strange refers to that which is elsewhere, i.e. a non-place in relation to the 
self’s own place.466 In other words, the strange is that mode of the other which calls the self 
into question, which challenges its existence. The difference between otherness and strange-
ness suggests that the paradox of self-relatedness should be extended to include strangeness 
as the radical manifestation of otherness. That is, a self-relation does not merely implicate 
otherness but also strangeness. This means that the self is not simply irreducibly other but also 
irreducibly strange. I will return to this insight when discussing the notion of enmity. For 
whereas Ricoeur disregards otherness as strangeness, Schmitt tends to collapse otherness into 
strangeness. 
Thus far our initial exploration of what it means to speak of a collective subject as an 
existential unity. To summarize, a collective exists in the interrelated modes of sameness and 
selfhood. A collective exists as the same to the extent that its members and others can view 
the collective as having more or less the same ‘character’ over time. And a collective exists as 
a self to the extent that its members have the capacity to, and effectively do, view themselves as 
the same collective over time. Crucially, the reflexive mode of being of a collective implies that 
it does not simply exist as an identity but as a recursive process of identification. This process-
like character of collective existence implies that it can call something its own in a sense reserved 
to the mode of being of personhood. That is, the spatio-temporal unity of a collective subject 
is not a static unity as in the case of thing-hood, but needs to be understood in terms of 
possibilities: the actual spatio-temporal unity is a realization of a collective subject’s existence 
as possibility. The insight that a collective subject does not have an identity but exists as a 
process of identification has also an important implication with respect to the notion of exis-
tential unity. For to the extent that a collective exists as process of identification it does not 
exist as a unity in a static sense but as a process of unification. Moreover, since the process of 
identification implicates the contrasting terms of identity as sameness and as selfhood, the 
process of existential unification is accompanied by a process of fragmentation or disintegration. 
The challenge confronting a collective, and which makes its existence a risky endeavor, is that 
its spatio-temporal unity is constantly exposed to fragmentation. Unification and disintegra-
tion of collective existence are the two sides of the same coin. 
The reflexive understanding of collective identity suggests that security cannot be thought 
in terms of a static condition to be achieved or maintained. This is the way in which Schmitt defines 
                                                             
464 Bernhard Waldenfels, ‘The other and the foreign’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, vol. 21, no. 5/6, 1995, pp. 111-124. 
465 Bernhard Waldenfels, Topographie des Fremden. Studien zur Phänomenologie des Fremden 1, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 
1997, p. 37 and Vielstimmigkeit der Rede, 1999, p. 114 and p. 181. 
466 Waldenfels, Topographie des Fremden, 1997, p. 26 and Vielstimmigkeit der Rede, 1999, p. 111  
89 
 
collective self-preservation. Reducing the mode of being of a collective subject to a reified 
notion of identity, security, in Schmitt’s interpretation, amounts to the preservation of a col-
lective subject as an original unity. The insight following from the foregoing analysis is that we 
need a change in perspective from security as a condition to security as a process in which 
unification and fragmentation are at play. In constituting itself as a unity, a collective is in a 
continuous negotiation with what is other than self. This idea of a continuous negotiation 
entails that a collective does not only anticipate the possibility of being otherwise (contingency 
as what-ness) but also the possibility of non-existence (contingency as that-ness). 
 
3.3 Representation 
In the previous section I have defined the notion of existence pertaining to a collective subject 
on the basis of the interrelated notions of sameness and selfhood. The reflexive mode of being 
of collective subjectivity implies that it is engaged in an ongoing process of actualizing its 
existence as possibility. Yet, this analysis is still somewhat abstract and static in that it does not 
deal with the question how the process of collective self-identification concretely takes shape 
through time. In what sense does a collective subject exist as the same and as a self through 
time? The answer to this question is representation; a collective exists through time as repre-
sentation. That is, representation is a possible actualization of collective existence. Interestingly, 
although all ingredients are present in Schmitt’s analysis of collective subjectivity, he does not 
come to the same conclusion. The reason for this is that, as we will see, assuming a reified 
understanding of collective identity by interpreting it in terms of sameness, Schmitt posits the 
collective as an original unity, hence making representation a derivative concept. In Schmitt’s 
interpretation, representation basically means re-presentation or substitution. The representa-
tional structure of collective subjectivity marks a decisive step with respect to our reinterpre-
tation of the existential concept of security. For the representational structure of collective 
subjectivity implies that it lacks an original on which it can rely and therefore has an irredeem-
ably insecure existence both as concerns that it is a unity and what it is as a unity. 
 
3.3.1 Collective Self-Reidentification 
If I focused in section 3.2 on the issue of collective self-identification, in this section I will be 
concerned with collective self-identification through time, that is, collective self-reidenfication. 
In order to elaborate the temporal and spatial structure of collective self-reidentification, I will 
examine the emergence of a collective subject, something that is conceptualized in legal doc-
trine as the problem of constituent power.467 More particularly, in order to elaborate the struc-
ture of collective self-reidentification, I will draw on Schmitt’s analysis of the principles of 
political form as developed in Constitutional Theory.468 Schmitt distinguishes between what he 
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considers to be two related but oppositional principles: identity and representation. I will ex-
ploit the oppositional character of these two principles by juxtaposing them, carving out two 
understandings of collective self-reidentification: collective self-reidentification in an originalist 
sense and a reflexive sense. The first one, collective self-reidentification understood in an 
originalist way, is the one defended by Schmitt and is based on the principle of identity. In 
Schmitt’s interpretation, the act of constitution-making presupposes the existence of a collec-
tive subject, which he defines in a reified way as substantial similarity, i.e. sameness.469 Accord-
ing to Schmitt, in the act of constitution-making, a collective subject merely determines the 
‘form and type of the political unity, the existence of which is presupposed’.470 The second 
one, reflexive collective self-(re)identification, is the one I wish to defend, and is based on the 
principle of representation, albeit in a different reading than that of Schmitt. Representation, 
in my interpretation, is a performative act that calls into being a collective subject and hence 
lacks an original to rely on. 
Let me begin by analyzing the structure of the originalist understanding of collective 
self-reidentification on the basis of Schmitt’s definition of the principle of identity, which he 
associates with the democratic state form. According to Schmitt, essential to the democratic 
state form is that a collective subject is immediately present as a unity ‘capable of political 
action’.471 That is, in a democracy the members of a collective are immediately self-present as 
a unity in the moment and place of assembly. In the moment of the assembly a collective 
subject exists in the mode of ‘immediate self-identity’.472 Therefore, in Schmitt’s view, democ-
racy in the true sense of the word is a direct democracy. ‘In a fully implemented direct democ-
racy where the “entire people”, all active state citizens, are actually assembled in one place, 
perhaps the impression arises that the people acts in its immediate presence and identity as the 
people . . .’473 The caveat in this passage stems from Schmitt’s awareness that there is, as he 
puts it, a dialectical relation between identity and representation, such that pure identity is 
never given. It is significant, however, that elsewhere in the Constitutional Theory, Schmitt does 
seem to embrace the principle of identity without reservations. Be it as it may, it is helpful, for 
our purpose, to reconstruct the principle of identity as sketched out by Schmitt. Indeed, he 
suggests that a manifold of individuals would exist as an acting unity in an immediate sense at 
the ‘moment’ (Augenblick) and ‘place’ (Platz) of assembly.474 As we will see, the notion of the 
Augenblick is fateful in that it suggests the original self-presence of a collective subject. The 
notion of the Augenblick refers to what Jacques Derrida would call a ‘source point’ of a collec-
tive subject’s original self-presence, that is, an absolute here and now in which a manifold of 
individuals is immediately present as a unity.475 
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To the extent that a collective manifests itself as an immediate unity in the moment 
of assembly, self-reidentification requires a collective subject to recover the closure that is 
constitutive of its original spatio-temporal unity. This means that with regard to its temporal 
unity a collective subject demonstrates self-constancy when questions such as whether we are 
a collective and what we are as a collective are answered by referring back to the way in which 
the members of a collective interpreted the directing idea at the moment of their inaugural 
assembly. This model of a collective self-reidentification exemplifies what Jean-Luc Nancy 
defines as the paradigm of the ‘lost community’: who we are today is defined on the basis of 
who we were at our founding moment.476  This would imply that self-constancy boils down 
to self-reiteration. The same structure applies to the spatial unity of a collective subject. Spatial 
self-reidenfication amounts to the reiteration of the original spatial closure. Actually, Schmitt’s 
analysis of nomos reflects the structure of spatial self-reidentification as self-reiteration. Whereas 
the act of land-taking effectuates the spatial closure of a collective subject, the subsequent acts 
of distribution (teilen) and exploitation (weiden) reiterate the inaugural spatial closure. The mem-
bers of a collective can re-identify themselves spatially by referring back to the way in which 
they viewed themselves as a spatial unity at their founding moment. 
  Key to Schmitt’s analysis of the temporal structure of collective self-reidentification 
as outlined on the basis of the principle of identity is, as mentioned, the notion of the moment 
(Augenblick) of the assembly. Moreover, as the source point of a collective subject’s original 
unity, the moment of assembly implies an opposition between an original act of self-identifi-
cation, on the one hand, and the reiteration of this original unity in acts of collective self-
reidentification, on the other. In Speech and Phenomena, Jacques Derrida develops a critique of 
the notion of the Augenblick in the context of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology which is 
instructive with regard to Schmitt’s understanding of the temporal structure of collective self-
identification. For although Derrida’s analysis of the notion of the Augenblick focuses on the 
individual subject in the act of speaking, it can be read as a deconstruction of the opposition 
between self-identification and self-reidentification. What is, in Derrida’s view, so problematic 
about the notion of the Augenblick? 
On the basis of Schmitt’s definition of the principle of identity, the moment of the 
assembly suggests the immediacy of an absolute now in which a collective exists as a unity and 
in that sense implies ‘the privilege of the present-now’, as Derrida puts it.477 The moment of 
the assembly marks the point in time in which a collective subject manifests itself as an acting 
unity in the mode of absolute ‘certitude’.478 What is so problematic about the definition of the 
moment of the assembly as the immediate self-presence of a collective as a unity is, in Derrida’s 
view, that it disregards the ‘duration’ of the Augenblick.479 For the existential unity of a collective 
subject is not immediately given but ‘must be produced in the present taken as a now’.480 This 
                                                             
476 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 1991, 
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is to say that a collective cannot be found to exist as an immediate unity in the pure instant of 
the moment of assembly. Instead, it is constituted as a unity in this very moment. 
Schmitt conceptualizes the moment of assembly on the basis of the activity particular 
to a popular assembly, to wit acclamation, an element that Hauriou discusses as a manifestation 
of communion. ‘The natural form of direct expression of a people’s will is the assembled 
multitude’s declaration of their consent or disapproval, the acclamation’.481 To the extent that a 
manifold of individuals express their will by acclaiming, that is, by ‘a simple calling out’, they 
seem to act as an immediate unity.482 The snag is however that while manifesting itself as a 
unity in acclamation the collective remains effectively an aggregation of individuals. That is, to 
the extent that all individuals call out their consent or disapproval at the same time, they can 
be understood to exist only as a sum of individuals. To call out at the same time is not, of itself, 
to call out together. In fact, as Schmitt admits, to the extent that an assembled set of individuals 
do not call out together, the immediate self-presence of a collective as unity is a ‘fictitious’ 
(fingiert) condition.483 Indeed, as Schmitt notes, ‘at no time or place is there thorough, absolute 
self-identity of the then present people as a political unity’.484 Even in the absolute now of the 
moment of assembly there remains a difference between the collective as a manifold and as a 
unity. 
The core of Derrida’s argument is that the difference between the collective as a 
manifold and as a unity has a temporal structure. We cannot say that a collective is a unity in 
an immediate sense in the moment of the assembly and that this unity can be reconstituted 
again in collective self-reidentification. Instead, the moment of collective self-identification ‘has 
never been nor will ever be present’ as a past and ‘will never be produced or reproduced in 
the form of presence’ in the future.485 That is, the moment of immediate collective self-iden-
tification ‘has not taken place’486 in some point in time, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it. Instead, 
collective self-identification takes place through time. Self-identification does not refer to the 
immediacy of an absolute now, but occurs as a process through time. In fact, to the extent 
that collective self-identification manifests itself as collective self-emplacement, collective self-
identification can be defined as the process of the ‘spacing of time’.487 Consequently, the clo-
sure that gives rise to the distinction between self and other than self is not an original but a 
provisional closure. But the crucial question then is in what sense the spatio-temporal unity of 
a collective subject can still be considered to exist when lacking the firm mode of being of an 
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original unity in a point in time and at a certain place?488 How can a collective subject re-
identify itself through time when lacking immediate self-presence as a unity? 
 
3.3.2 Reflexive Collective Self-(Re)identification 
In order to develop the structure of collective self-(re)identification in a reflexive sense, I will 
draw on Schmitt’s analysis of the principle of representation, which he distinguishes as the 
second principle of political form besides the principle of identity. This will require radicalizing 
Schmitt’s definition of the principle of representation and ‘deconstructing’489 the opposition 
between the principles of identity and representation. In a sense, my Derridian interpretation 
of the principle of representation is an attempt to come to terms with the ambiguity in 
Schmitt’s definition of the principles of identity and representation in that he views them as 
‘oppositional’ but not ‘mutually exclusive’ principles of political form.490 In fact, while Schmitt 
has much to say about the temporality of a collective subject in the context of the principle of 
identity, he has remarkably little to say about it in the context of the principle of representation. 
In Constitutional Theory Schmitt defines representation as the ‘presentation’ (Darstel-
lung) of a collective as a unity.491 To the extent that representation also has an integrating func-
tion, it can be defined to a greater or a lesser degree as the ‘production’ (Herstellung) of the 
unity of a collective.492 This means that representation does not concern the collective as a 
manifold of individuals as this would amount to interest advocacy. Instead, representation 
concerns the unity of a collective as a whole.493 And because representation concerns the col-
lective as a whole, it has an existential meaning. Schmitt defines the existential meaning of 
representation as follows. Representation makes ‘an invisible being visible and present through 
a publicly visible one’.494 What Schmitt calls here ‘invisible being’ refers to the collective as a 
unity. The representative substitutes for the ‘invisible’ existence of a collective as a whole. As 
Schmitt specifies, the representative ‘presents and renders concrete the spiritual principle of 
political existence’.495 To a certain extent Schmitt is close here to Hauriou if we take the notion 
                                                             
488 This is the central question underlying Nancy’s analysis of a political community as an inoperative community. 
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of a ‘spiritual principle’ to refer to the notion of the directing idea.496 Recall that Hauriou 
argues that a representative regime is a constitutive element of an institution and a condition 
of the realization of the directing idea. According to Hauriou, ‘the governmental power of a 
corporate institution must act in the name of the body; its decisions must be considered as those 
of the body itself. A body is nothing without its organs, and it wills only through them . . .’497 
The definition of representation outlined by Schmitt presupposes the represented as 
‘something already present’,498 namely a collective in the sense of ‘the natural existence of a 
human group living together’.499 And notwithstanding the fact that Hauriou defines the foun-
dation of an institution in a more open sense than Schmitt, speaking of ‘the continuing foun-
dation’500 of an institution, that is, a foundation that is open to future transformations, he also 
presupposes the original self-presence of the interested group as the ‘cause’ of an institution.501 
Accordingly, Schmitt and Hauriou both define representation in the sense of re-presentation; 
the representation is the substitute of an original. In this respect, Schmitt’s definition of repre-
sentation still presupposes a collective to exist as a unity prior to representation. In Schmitt’s 
view, ‘political being preceded constitution making. What is not present politically also cannot 
consciously decide’.502 The definition of representation as substitution risks, however, reifying 
a collective subject in that it tends to posit collective existence as a ‘datum’ (Datum), a thing, 
and not as ‘acts of individuals’ (Handlungen von Personen), to borrow Erich Voegelin’s wording.503 
Therefore, a first-person plural perspective requires a more radical understanding of represen-
tation than substitution.  
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Indeed, representation does not simply ‘assure’,504 as Hauriou puts it, the existence 
of a collective as a unity but is rather constitutive thereof. As Waldenfels notes, representation 
is essential to the existential unity of a collective subject because of the simple fact that a 
collective cannot say ‘we’; a collective cannot speak in first-person plural without some form 
of representation.505 ‘A political group finds its voice only in spokesmen, who speak in its 
name and represent it as a whole’.506 This intimates that we should read what Schmitt describes 
as the ‘dialectic’ of representation in a more radical way than he does himself. If, according to 
Schmitt, the dialectic of representation entails that ‘the invisible is presupposed as absent and 
nevertheless is simultaneously made present’,507 the representational structure of collective 
subjectivity implies that a collective is ‘ever absent as a unity in action’.508 This is to say that 
the unity of a collective only exists as a represented unity.509 Moreover, to the extent that a 
representative acts ‘in the name of’ the collective as a whole, he or she determines what the 
collective is as a unity and who is a member thereof. That is, when acting in the name of a 
collective the representative establishes, on the one hand, what interests bind the manifold of 
individuals and therefore can be viewed as a realization of the directing idea and, on the other, 
who belongs to the interested group bearing the directing idea. 
To the extent that a collective does not exist as a unity in an immediate sense but 
comes into existence through representation, a manifold of individuals can view themselves 
as a unity only through the mediating role of representation. In this sense, we could say that 
everything begins with representation, to paraphrase Derrida.510 The act of a representative 
enables a manifold of individuals to relate to themselves as a unity. Accordingly, representation 
is the corner stone of a reflexive self-relation of a collective.511 Crucially, the fact that a collective 
has access to itself only in an indirect way through its representation means that the members 
of a collective can view themselves as a unity only retroactively.512 This retroactivity means that 
the existential unity of a collective subject is marked by a delay that cannot be overcome. That 
is, to the extent that a collective subject exists as a represented unity its temporal mode of 
being is that of a ‘deferred presence’.513 This means that a manifold of individuals can view 
themselves as a unity only in a provisional sense. Indeed, the representation needs to be backed 
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up by the individuals in whose name the representative claims to act.514 Accordingly, the col-
lective only exists as a virtual unity; the temporal and spatial closure established by the repre-
sentation is but a ‘virtual closure’,515 i.e. a possible actualization of collective existence. 
The retroactive structure of representation requires reconsidering Schmitt’s and 
Hauriou’s opposition between an original act of collective self-identification and subsequent 
acts of collective self-reidentification. Whereas the opposition between collective self-identifi-
cation and collective self-reidentification presupposes the direct access of a collective to itself 
as an original unity in its founding moment, the representational structure of collective sub-
jectivity suggests that the original unity can only be accessed indirectly, through its represen-
tations. As a consequence, the inaugural act of collective self-identification always takes places 
as an act of collective self-reidentification. The retroactive structure of collective self-identifi-
cation intimates that what is considered to come second effectively comes first. Collective self-
(re)identification through time means identifying oneself anew rather than identifying oneself 
again. Collective self-identification always takes place as a collective self-(re)identification, and 
in such a way that the re of reidentification is not merely the recovery of an original spatio-
temporal unity but rather a new presentation, and in that sense the creation of an original unity 
to which there is no direct access.  
The representational structure of collective subjectivity requires us to revisit its exist-
ence as a spatio-temporal unity. As concerns temporal unity, collective existence is marked by 
an irreducible openness. Indeed, as Nancy argues, the temporal mode of being of a collective 
subject has the form of ‘the announcement of a ‘we’’,516 implying an irreducible openness to 
reconsider how we viewed ourselves as a collective in the past. According to him, a collective 
does not exist as an immediate unity here and now but ‘comes always from the future’.517 The 
fact that a collective subject is representationally structured means that whether we are a unity 
and what we are as unity is established in the course of a reflexive process of self-(re)identifi-
cation. In this respect, the radical openness of collective existence intimates the ever present 
possibility of ‘another articulation’, both in the sense of who is a member of the collective and 
what it is that binds them.518 Moreover, the openness that is characteristic of the temporal 
structure of collective existence also precludes the possibility of evolving into full self-presence 
in the future.519 To the extent that a collective exists as a virtual unity that needs to be renewed 
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at every turn, it excludes a projected source point in the future in the same sense that it lacks 
such a source point in the past. Collective self-(re)identification does not simply mean pre-
serving the past in the future but rather taking up the past in the light of the future. To the 
extent that a collective subject exists as a process of self-(re)identification, the question how it 
used to view itself in the past is open to the future, and the closure constitutive of the temporal 
unity of a collective can be redefined accordingly. 
As concerns the spatial unity, the reflexive reading of collective self-(re)identification 
implies a deconstruction of Schmitt’s analysis of nomos. In Schmitt’s interpretation, the act of 
land-taking establishes the spatial unity of a collective as an original unity, which is reiterated 
by the subsequent acts of distribution and exploitation. The act of land-taking represents the 
original act of collective self-identification and the subsequent acts of distribution and exploi-
tation are acts of collective self-reindentification. Put differently, if the act of land-taking is an 
act of boundary constitution, the acts of distribution and exploitation are acts of boundary 
enforcement. But in so far that collective existence has a representational structure, the place 
that a collective occupies can be viewed as its own only retroactively. What a collective views 
as its own place, that is, the place where it belongs, needs to be determined each time anew. 
In this respect, to take the land means to retake it. Accordingly, rather than reiterating the 
original spatial unity of a collective, spatial collective self-(re)identification implies constituting 
its spatial unity anew.  As a consequence, what appears as boundary enforcement is to a greater 
or a lesser degree always also boundary constitution, and vice versa. 
Crucially, the temporal and spatial structure implied by collective self-(re)identifica-
tion means that collective existence suffers from irredeemable groundlessness. This ground-
lessness bespeaks the twofold contingency of collective existence, both that it exists as a unity 
and what it is as a unity. In a general sense, contingency concerns the experience that the spatio-
temporal unity of a collective always remains a possible actualization that need not necessarily 
exist as such.520 This insight followed from the analysis of collective subjectivity in the inter-
related modes of identity as sameness and as selfhood but its implications become acute when 
reflecting on the representational structure of collective subjectivity, that is, the mode of being 
of collective subjectivity as the same and as a self through time. Contingency implies that a col-
lective does not carry within itself the necessity to exist as a spatio-temporal unity, and as the 
particular spatio-temporal unity with which it exists. In fact, this is the way in which Waldenfels 
defines contingency. In Waldenfels’ interpretation, contingency relates to the transformability 
of collective existence, that is, the possibility of being otherwise.521 According to Waldenfels, 
to the extent that a collective exists as possibility and is therefore always more possible than 
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actual, it has the potential of becoming ‘different from itself’.522 Yet, contingency does not 
only relate to the problem what a collective is as a unity, but also to the problem that it exists. 
Indeed, in the process of collective self-(re)identification, a collective always faces the latent 
possibility that it exists as a unity rather than not.523 That is, collective existence does not only 
lack the necessity within itself for existing in the way it does but also for the fact that it exist 
as such, which implies that it could just as well not exist.524 Indeed, without representation 
collective subjectivity has no existence through time, meaning that representation is not only 
constitutive of what it is as a unity but also that it exists as a unity. Importantly, in so far that 
contingency concerns the lack of necessity of collective existence, both to its what-ness and 
its that-ness, it relates to the experience of irreducible groundlessness, that is, the experience 
of lacking an indubitable ground that secures collective existence as a unity. The twofold con-
tingency of collective existence provides a fundamental insight with respect to the concept of 
security, namely that the ontological condition of a collective is one of insecurity rather than 
one of security. A collective is existentially insecure both as concerns that it is a unity and what 
it is as a unity. 
Let us take stock. In this section I have analyzed the structure of collective self-iden-
tification through time, which I defined as collective self(re)-identification. In my view, a col-
lective subject exists as the same and as a self through time as representation. To the extent 
that collective existence has a representational structure, it exists as a virtual spatio-temporal 
unity that needs to be established at every turn, and not as an original unity that merely needs 
to be reaffirmed, as Schmitt assumes. This means that representation is constitutive of the 
collective’s existence as possibility. Qua temporality, the existential unity of a collective subject 
has a retroactive structure. It is not the case that a manifold of individuals first exist as a unity 
and subsequently act as unity. Instead, representation enables the members of a collective to 
identify themselves as a unity, although only retroactively. And qua spatiality, the own place 
of a collective subject is not constituted first in an original act and enforced in subsequent acts. 
A collective occupies a place and comes to view this place as its own retroactively: occupation 
is always an alleged re-occupation. This analysis of the notion of existence pertaining to col-
lective subjectivity implies that it is contingent in the twofold sense of its that-ness and its 
what-ness. The representational structure demonstrates that a collective is always facing the 
double challenge of the possibility of non-existence and the possibility of being otherwise. 
This complexity of contingency escapes Schmitt. Indeed, Schmitt’s reductive understanding 
of collective subjectivity leads him to posit it as an original unity and hence to reduce contin-
gency to contingency as that-ness. Interestingly, the reflexive structure of representation is not 
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only the root of the existential insecurity of collective subjectivity, i.e. of the irreducible 
groundlessness of collective subjectivity both in the sense of its that-ness and its what-ness, 
but also entails the possibility of transforming its unity by providing a new representation. 
Indeed, as we will see, the reflexive, representational structure of collective subjectivity pro-
vides it with broader range of possibilities to deal with that which challenges its existence than 
Schmitt’s definition of collective self-preservation as boundary enforcement, since collective 
self-assertion also includes the possibility of boundary transformation. 
 
3.4 Collective Insecurity 
Thus far I have analyzed the insecurity of collective existence on an ontological level. In this 
section I will turn to discuss how the existential insecurity of a collective manifests itself at the 
institutional level, i.e. the level of social order. This brings us back to the notion of normal 
order, indeed, a notion that is central to Schmitt’s interpretation of Hauriou’s concept of in-
stitution. Collective insecurity is induced by abnormality, i.e. abnormal behavior. However, in 
order to analyze collective insecurity at the institutional level, we will have to redefine Schmitt’s 
notion of normal order. For Schmitt has reified normal order and for that reason supports a 
reductive understanding of abnormality. Although I will also argue that collective insecurity is 
rendered visible by abnormality, thus recovering its ambiguous nature in that it comprises both 
a factual and a normative dimension, abnormality is interpreted by Schmitt as the experience 
of contingency as that-ness. However, considering that normal order has a reflexive structure 
and abnormality is the index of both contingency as that-ness and as what-ness, we will have 
to differentiate the notion of abnormality accordingly. To this end I will distinguish between 
two manifestations abnormality. Firstly, behavior can be qualified as abnormal to the extent 
that it violates a rule of normal order. And secondly, behavior can be conceived as abnormal in 
that it contests a rule of normal order. These two manifestations of abnormality demonstrate 
the groundlessness of collective existence, both factually and normatively. 
 
3.4.1 Normal Order 
Previously I have compared Schmitt’s notion of normal order to Ricoeur’s notion of character, 
i.e. the temporal model of identity as sameness. Recall that Schmitt defines normal order re-
ductively in a reified sense, distinguishing between the normal situation and the normal type 
of man. Normal order, in Schmitt’s interpretation, means that the members of a collective do 
the same and are the same. However, if understood in a reflexive sense, in the sense of what 
Ricoeur defines as character, normal order merely indicates the way in which collective exist-
ence has become defined in the past. Normal order, in other words, reflects the condition in 
which the mutual expectations by the members who are engaged in joint action can be as-
sumed to be satisfied by and large. It reflects how a collective has configured itself up until 
now, a configuration that has satisfied the mutual expectations of the individual members but 
which is at the same time open to reconsideration. This means that normal order has an an-
ticipatory structure. Indeed, essential to a reflexive understanding is that it is about anticipating 
the spatio-temporal unity of collective existence as it has been defined over time, and which 
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includes possible spatio-temporal unities that are excluded there from. To the extent that nor-
mal order is the default setting of collective existence, it not only reflects what possibilities a 
collective has come to view as its own but also how it has taken a stance towards possibilities 
that it doesn’t view as its own, possibilities that are excluded from a collective’s actual spatio-
temporal unity. In this respect, the anticipatory structure makes clear that even in the case of 
normal order the members of a collective are concerned with their existence as a unity, albeit 
implicitly. This self-relational aspect of the collective as a unity is captured by Ricoeur with the 
notion of ‘self-concern’,525 building on Heidegger’s notion of Sorge, concern or care.526 
Self-concern becomes explicit in the case of behavior that is at odds with normal 
order and hence causes an interruption thereof: abnormal behavior. Abnormal behavior rep-
resents an experience of strangeness in that it does not fit within that which the members of 
a collective view as their own and hence disrupts normal order.527 Indeed, if behavior can be 
qualified as normal to the extent that it forms a realization of a collective’s own possibilities, 
then those that deviate from it can be labelled as abnormal. It is important to note that the 
possibility of abnormality inheres in normal order. In fact, the actualization of collective exist-
ence comes at the price of excluding other possible behavior, it carries the excluded possibili-
ties with it as its own shadow, as Waldenfels would put it. In this sense, abnormality is what 
we could call the dependent effect of the process of collective self-(re)identification, as that 
which can turn itself against this very process by interrupting it. This means that the possibility 
of an interruption is intrinsic to the process of collective self-(re)identification. Moreover, the 
latent possibility of being interrupted suggests that a collective has to take a stance towards 
abnormality if it wants to foreclose the possibility that the process of collective self-(re)identi-
fication is interrupted incessantly or even stopped. So, the distinction between normality and 
abnormality demonstrates that the possibility of insecurity is intrinsic to the possibility of con-
tinued existence. 
Notice moreover that to the extent that normal order is the situation of collective 
existence in which the mutual expectations of the members are satisfied by and large, the 
experience of individual insecurity is internally correlated to the experience of collective inse-
curity. Collective insecurity concerns the experience that the joint action of a manifold of in-
dividuals is halted.  And, to the extent that collective insecurity presupposes joint action of 
individuals it is irreducible to individual insecurity. However, a situation of collective insecu-
rity, that is, a situation in which the mutual expectations of the members are not being satisfied 
in its turn also affects the individuals that are engaged in joint action and thus impinges on 
individual insecurity. Collective insecurity takes away, what Loader and Walker call, the ‘tacit 
confidence’528 individuals have in pursuing their lives. When individuals lose this tacit confi-
dence this may induce an experience of contingency at the level of their individual existence 
in similar sense as the one that I have been discussing with regard to collective existence. That 
                                                             
525 Ricoeur, Onseself as Another, 1994, p. 137 
526 Heidegger, Being and Time, 1996, pp. 178-183. 
527 Waldenfels, Hyperphänomene, 2012, p. 100. 
528 Loader & Walker, Civilizing Security, 2007, p. 169. 
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is, collective insecurity can lead to individual insecurity, confronting the individual with exis-
tential questions such as ‘Who and what am I?’, questions that it normally takes for granted. 
From a psychological point of view, we could say that collective insecurity can lead to a situa-
tion in which the individual members don’t feel at ease anymore.529 So, while individual and 
collective (in)security are distinct phenomena they are not independent from one another; 
rather, individual and collective (in)security are interlaced phenomena. 
 
3.4.2 Abnormality 
Analytically speaking, it is possible to distinguish between two manifestations of abnormality. 
Behavior can be qualified as abnormal to the extent that it violates a rule, the following of which 
is constitutive of normal order. And behavior can be qualified as abnormal in that it contests a 
rule of normal order. The distinction between the two manifestations of abnormality is, as 
mentioned, analytical. That is, from a conceptual point of view it is possible to distinguish 
between two forms of abnormality, i.e. two ways in which the interruption of normal order 
can manifest itself. Yet, to the extent that the qualification of abnormality stems from the 
interpretation of this behavior from the perspective of the collective in question, abnormality 
in either of its two manifestations will never appear in its pure form. Moreover, since the 
qualification of behavior as abnormal presupposes the first-person perspective of a collective, 
it is marked by an irreducible indeterminacy. The same behavior that was first perceived as a 
manifestation of one of two forms of abnormality may in the course of a series of events 
comes to be perceived as a manifestation of the other form of abnormality. I will return to the 
irreducible indeterminacy of abnormality in the next section when discussing its legal qualifi-
cations. 
Let me start with the manifestation of abnormality in the sense of behavior that vio-
lates a rule of normal order. Indeed, if behavior can be qualified as normal because it is in 
conformity with the rules of normal order, then a first manifestation of abnormality concerns 
the case in which these rules are not followed, that is, violated. Distinctive about this form of 
abnormality is that it affects the factuality of normal order and not, at least not primarily, its 
normativity. Behavior that violates a rule that is constitutive of normal order first and foremost 
tends to jeopardize the effectivity of these rules. Indeed, it affirms rather than negates the nor-
mativity of the distinction between normality and abnormality that stems from the directing 
idea of an institution. In this sense, the violation of a rule seems to represent a moderate form 
of abnormality. However, in the case that behavior that violates the rules of normal order 
becomes a regular phenomenon and abnormality thus becomes the effective normal situation, 
normal order can come to reach the critical point of disintegration or ‘decomposition’,530 a 
                                                             
529 For a psychological definition of insecurity, see Abraham Maslow, ‘The Dynamics of Psychological Security-Inse-
curity’, Journal of Personality, vol. 10, no. 4, 1942, pp. 331-344, especially p. 335: ‘The insecure person, then, perceives 
the world as a threatening jungle and most human beings as dangerous and selfish; feels rejected and isolated, anxious 
and hostile; is generally pessimistic and unhappy; shows signs of tension and conflict; tends to turn inward; is troubled 
by guilt-feelings; has one or another disturbance of self-esteem; tends to be or actually is neurotic; and is generally 
egocentric or selfish’. 
530 Ralf Dahrendorf, Law and Order. Stevens & Sons: London, 1985, p. 5. 
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critical point that cannot be defined in advance. In such situation the distinction between nor-
mality and abnormality becomes obsolete; it is then no longer possible to effectively draw this 
distinction, causing the factual breakdown of collective existence. If the rules that are consti-
tutive of normal order become ineffective, collective existence degenerates into what we could 
define as a situation of ‘anomy’ or factual normlessness, that is, ‘a state of extreme uncertainty 
in which no one knows what behavior to expect from others in given situations’.531 As I will 
argue in the next section, this condition of anomy can be defined legally as anarchy. 
In order to come grips with this first manifestation of abnormality, let me provide an 
example. Let me start by saying that I am well aware that an example is never neutral as it 
always entails a certain framing of the conceptual issue. However, this should not trouble us 
too much here as I intend to use the example only as a heuristic device. The example concerns 
a group of tourists who are making a city walk in Antwerp organized by a guide. The idea 
behind the city walk is to make the tourists familiar with the social geography of Antwerp, 
particularly with regard to the Russian and the Jewish quarters of the city. All tourists gather 
at Antwerp Central station for the start of the city walk. Before taking off to the Russian and 
Jewish quarters of the city, the guide first walks a bit with the group of tourists in the direction 
of the Meir, the main shopping street in the city center. When the group reaches the Meir one 
of the tourists decides to leave the group, intending to pay a visit to a shop where they sell an 
exclusive brand of clothing. The guide chases the person, persuading her not to go shopping 
and join the others again. However, when the guide returns to the group he finds out that 
another tourist has disappeared in the meantime, apparently buying some books in a shop at 
the far side of the street. The guide sighs and mumbles to himself ‘in this way we’re getting 
nowhere’. 
To begin with, the example of the city walk in Antwerp can be interpreted as an 
institution in a basic sense in that it includes an interested group that pursues a directing idea 
(i.e. a city walk with the aim of getting acquainted with the social geography of Antwerp) and 
somebody who is in charge of the organization (the guide). In order to realize the directing 
idea, it is essential that the group of tourists stays together following their guide on his way. In 
this respect, leaving the group in order to go shopping forms an interruption of the city walk 
and violates the mutual expectations of the group members. In fact, the tourist who is intend-
ing to visit the shop of the exclusive brand of clothing discloses ex negativo what the group 
views as the normal order when making a city walk. The rule is to stay together, and not leave 
the group, if they are to visit the Jewish and Russian quarters together. If staying together as a 
group is normal, the behavior of the colleagues who leave the group in order to go shopping 
can be defined as abnormal. The reaction by the guide (‘in this way we’re getting nowhere’) is 
telling in this regard. For if all the tourists would leave the group and not stay together with 
the others, then the group would fall apart. In that case it would not make sense to speak of a 
group and a group activity any longer as each tourist would do whatever he or she wants by 
him- or herself (shopping, having a drink etc.). 
                                                             
531 Dahrendorf, Law and Order, 1985, p. 24. 
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A second manifestation of abnormality concerns behavior that contests a rule. What 
is challenged in this manifestation of abnormality is primarily the normativity of the rule, and 
not its effectiveness. Abnormal behavior that implicitly or explicitly contests a rule raise the 
question as concerns the reason to follow the rule: whence does the rule derive its normativity? 
In this sense, abnormal behavior calls into question what counts as normal order and hence 
the distinction between normality and abnormality. Moreover, to the extent that the contested 
rule is part of normal order and in that sense is part of realizing the directing idea, abnormal 
behavior challenges the directing idea, that is, the normative principle underlying the distinc-
tion between normality and abnormality. More precisely, by challenging the way in which the 
institution draws the distinction between normality and abnormality, the behavior suggests 
other possible ways of drawing this distinction on the basis of the directing idea. The contes-
tation of a rule can be experienced as being so severe that it amounts to a negation of the 
directing idea. In case the contestation of a rule leads to the failure of the directing idea, the 
upshot of the second manifestation of abnormality can be the same as the first one. For if the 
directing idea of the institution fails, a collective loses its constitutive principle. And in the 
absence of its constitutive principle, collective existence collapses into a condition of anomy, 
i.e. a situation in which the ‘social effectiveness’ of rules ‘tends towards zero’ as these rules 
have lost their normativity.532 
To illustrate the second manifestation of abnormality, let me turn to another exam-
ple. Take the (fictive) case of a European company in renewable energy such as windmills and 
biogas that takes over an oil company in the Middle East in order to increase its market share 
in that part of the world. Some shareholders of the company express their disagreement with 
the company’s strategy in a newspaper, arguing that oil production does not fit within the 
company’s business in renewable energy. Actually, one of them proposes in an interview 
broadcasted on television to reformulate the company’s  mission statement into ‘making filthy 
money with energy’ and to get rid of all of the company’s environmental aspirations, such as 
financing an endowed chair on the technological possibilities of renewable energy at a high 
ranked university. Interestingly, the decision to purchase the oil company was not taken unan-
imously by the management. The management was divided whether a business in renewable 
energy could include business in oil. However, although the company so far only did business 
in the area of renewable energy the mission statement of the company speaks of ‘making profit 
with energy’ in a non-exclusive sense. The management meeting resulted in a heated debate 
about the company’s mission statement. The CEO took the decision that oil production fits 
the corporate profile as it not only increases profits on a short and middle term but also pro-
vides the possibility to gain foot on the ground in Middle East with renewable energy. At the 
next shareholders meeting the CEO has to explain why the management didn’t decide other-
wise. 
This example draws already on a more refined notion of an institution than in the 
case of group of sightseeing colleagues. In fact, Hauriou mentions the commercial corporation 
                                                             
532 Dahrendorf, Law and Order, 1985, p. 26. 
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as example of an institution.533  First of all, the company entails an interested group, including 
the shareholders, management and employees, who are engaged in realizing the directing idea, 
namely, making money with energy. Secondly, the management, with the CEO at the top, is 
in charge of the company’s organization and acts as the company’s representative. And thirdly, 
the shareholders demonstrate what Hauriou would call a ‘manifestation of communion’ as 
they suggest discontentedly that the company’s mission statement should be redefined as mak-
ing ‘filthy’ money. The rule that is contested by the purchase of the oil company is that of 
generating profit with renewable energy. In this regard, central to the example is the interpre-
tation of the directing idea. For whereas the purchase of an oil company can be considered 
normal from the perspective of a company that seeks to make money with energy production, 
preferably though not exclusively renewable, it can also be defined as abnormal if the com-
pany’s core business is renewable energy and thus consists in making money in an ecologically 
sustainable way. Interestingly, the CEO’s decision to include oil in the company’s portfolio 
and thus to consider it as a normal business activity remains contestable as demonstrated by 
the statement of some shareholders. In case the directing idea comes to be defined differently 
as a result of the shareholders meeting, putting the ecological sustainability of energy produc-
tion first and profit second, it could be the case that the company decides to split itself up in 
accordance with the types of energy production (renewable and oil) and thus ceases to exist as 
the company that it was. 
Abnormality functions as the index of contingency. While the two forms of abnor-
mality both disclose the contingency of collective existence, they do so in a different way. To 
the extent that behavior violates a rule of normal order it cannot be viewed as being part of 
the institution. That is, abnormal behavior that violates a rule cannot be grounded in the insti-
tution. In the case of a singular occurrence of such abnormal behavior normal order is affirmed 
rather than radically challenged. However, in case of multiple instances of behavior that violate 
the rules of normal order, a critical point can be reached where the effectiveness of normal 
order breaks down. If this critical point is reached then the institution ceases to exist in a 
factual sense and the distinction between normality and abnormality as drawn by the institu-
tion becomes obsolete. And in so far that the distinction between normality and abnormality 
loses its effectiveness, it becomes groundless. The groundlessness of the distinction between 
normality and abnormality demonstrates the contingency of collective existence in that it inti-
mates the possibility that a collective can effectively cease to exist. If violating the rule becomes 
normality, it is no longer possible to speak of a collective that is engaged in realizing its direct-
ing idea. So, the first manifestation of abnormality predominantly relates to contingency in the 
sense of the that-ness of collective existence; or rather, contingency as that-ness and what-
ness remain indistinct here, since contingency as what-ness is reduced to contingency as that-
ness. To the extent that the violation of a rule negates what a collective is, it poses a challenge 
to the collective’s existence/non-existence. 
The problem of contingency surfaces in a different way in the case of abnormal be-
havior that contests a rule. Behavior that contests a rule can be considered to call into question 
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what ought to count as normal order. To the extent that abnormal behavior suspends the 
definition of normal order, it intimates a suspension of the normativity of the distinction be-
tween normality and abnormality. Therefore, in contrast to the other form of abnormality, it 
is not simply the case that behavior cannot be grounded in the institution. Rather, behavior 
challenges both what ought to and what ought not to be grounded in the institution. By chal-
lenging the distinction between normality and abnormality, behavior reveals that normal order 
is without indubitable ground and therefore open to contestation and reconsideration. In this 
sense, abnormality in the sense of the contestation of a rule discloses the contingency of col-
lective existence in that it intimates the irreducible incapacity of a collective to definitively 
establish what ought to count as normal order, leaving open the possibility to transform itself 
in such a way that it accommodates that which challenges it. This suggests that the contestation 
of a rule relates predominantly to contingency in the sense of the what-ness of collective ex-
istence. But to the extent that behavior that contest a rule intimates a possible spatio-temporal 
unity of collective existence, it is not certain whether the collective can view this spatio-tem-
poral unity as its own, that is, if the intimated spatio-temporal unity represents a possibility or 
an impossibility of collective existence. In the ultimate case, when the spatio-temporal unity 
intimated by abnormal behavior represents an impossible possibility, i.e. a possibility that a col-
lective cannot actualize as its own other than by ceasing to exist as a unity, it forms a negation 
of collective existence. This implies that the contestation of a rule does not only concern con-
tingency as what-ness but also as contingency as that-ness. There are, in other words, limits to 
the transformability of collective existence. 
The above discussion of abnormality takes further the analysis of existential insecu-
rity outlined in sections 3.2 and 3.3 in that it shows how the twofold contingency of collective 
existence manifests itself at the level of an institution. Drawing on a reflexive understanding 
of normal order, I have sought to demonstrate that abnormality always challenges a collective 
both as to what it is as a unity and that it is a unity; abnormality always entails contingency as 
what-ness and as that-ness. My analysis of abnormality reveals that Schmitt’s account thereof 
is reductive. To the extent that Schmitt has a reified understanding of normal order, he does 
not differentiate between intensities of abnormality, defining it exclusively as threat to the that-
ness of collective existence, i.e. as an existential threat. Indeed, by defining abnormality in 
terms of contingency as that-ness, for Schmitt abnormality is perforce a threat to collective 
existence. But abnormality can also challenge a collective to transform what it is as a unity. In 
fact, it is for this reason that I prefer to speak of challenges rather than threats. For to the 
extent that abnormality can challenge a collective to change it unity, a collective has more op-
tions to respond than mere boundary enforcement as Schmitt claims. Indeed, a collective can 
also respond to abnormality by means of boundary constitution. Abnormality, as the source of 
insecurity, both threatens and opens up new opportunities, new possibilities for collective existence. 
 
3.5 Public Order 
Now that we have analyzed the existential insecurity of a collective at the ontological and 
institutional levels the time is ripe to discuss the legal manifestations of collective insecurity 
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that feed into the notion of public order. To the extent that public order is the legal manifes-
tation of the contingency of collective existence, i.e. a collective’s irreducible groundlessness, 
I will argue that it revolves around the problem of anarchy.534 In fact, I will distinguish between 
two forms of anarchy, namely in a factual and a normative sense. The distinction between 
factual and normative anarchy relates to the two manifestations of abnormal behavior analyzed 
in the previous section, respectively, the violation and contestation of a rule and their legal 
qualifications. The legal qualification of abnormal behavior that violates a rule and that antic-
ipates the possibility of factual anarchy is illegality. The legal qualification of abnormal behavior 
that contests a rule and entails the possibility of normative anarchy is the exception. Moreover, 
later on in this section we will have to make a distinction between to two definitions of the 
exception, a weak and a strong one. The weak form of the exception concerns behavior that 
is conceived as a case of illegality but claims to represent a case of legality. The strong form of 
the exception on the other hand concerns behavior that is taken to qualify as a case of illegality 
but definitively resists the legal-illegal distinction as posited by a legal order. 
Relating it to the problem of anarchy, my discussion of public order shows that 
Schmitt has a reductive interpretation thereof on the basis of his notion of the exception. 
Recall that, in Schmitt’s interpretation, public order comprises behavior that is not circum-
scribed in legal order and hence can be considered to defy the distinction between legality and 
illegality. For this reason Schmitt defines the exception as the legal qualification of public or-
der, and not illegality. Whereas, in Schmitt’s view, illegality affirms the legal order ex negativo 
and thus presupposes a condition of factual normality, the exception on the other hand calls 
this factual normality into question, deviating from it. Now, I will identify a broader range of 
legal manifestations that feed into the notion of public order than Schmitt. But this broadened 
understanding of public order relates to what was said earlier about the twofold contingency 
of collective existence entailed in abnormality. Whereas Schmitt assumes public order to con-
cern threats, i.e. contingency as that-ness, that calls forth boundary enforcement, I will argue 
that public order comprises challenges to collective existence, entailing contingency both as that-
ness and as what-ness, that can be responded to by acts ranging between boundary enforce-
ment and boundary constitution.  
 
3.5.1 Factual Anarchy 
Before turning to discuss the legal manifestations of collective insecurity, let me start with the 
legal qualification of normal order: legality. To the extent that, in Schmitt’s interpretation, legal 
order is a formal codification of the rules that constitute ‘social normality’,535 we could say that 
legality consists of the default settings of joint action. That is, legality refers to the whole of 
possible behavior available under the directing idea of an institution, i.e. to the collective’s own 
                                                             
534 The concept of anarchy, in its modern interpretation, relates to the metaphysical notion of chaos. See Marina 
Kurdzialek, Ulrich Dierse & Rainer Kuhlen, ‘Chaos’, in: Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer & Gottfried Gabriel (eds.), 
Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. I, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt, 1971, pp. 980-984, especi-
ally p. 983. For an extensive discussion of the notions of anarchy and anarchism, see Ulrich Dierse, ‘Anarchie, Anar-
chismus’, in Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer & Gottfried Gabriel (eds.), Historische Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. I, 
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft: Darmstadt, 1971, pp. 267-294. 
535 Croce & Salvatore, The Legal Theory of Carl Schmitt, 2013, p. 60. 
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possibilities, as instituted in the legal order.  Behavior that qualifies as legal is enabled by legal 
norms and hence included in a collective’s ‘program of action’ (plan d’action), as Hauriou puts 
it felicitously.536 In so far that normal order integrates a factual and a normative dimension, 
legality is the situation in which the legal order is both effective and valid. Of course, it can be 
the case that a member of a collective is not sure in a certain situation how to behave in 
conformity with legal norms. This need not concern a case of abnormality. Rather, in such a 
situation the individual simply does not know what legal norm applies and how he or she is 
expected to behave in order to satisfy the mutual expectations stemming from the directing 
idea. 
The legal qualification of abnormal behavior that violates a legal norm is illegality. A 
simple example of illegal behavior is theft. We could say, first of all, that in the sense that theft 
violates a legal norm, i.e. property rights, it reveals the normal condition of legal order ex 
negative, affirming the distinction between legality and illegality set by legal order, that is, the 
distinction between the collective’s own possibilities and those that are excluded therefrom.537 
In other words, theft represents an instance of disorder in that it implies a breach of the factual 
normality codified by the legal norm. To the extent that the conceptual pair of legality and 
illegality forms a binary opposition, illegality, qua disorder, represents a possibility of legal 
order. In effect, the fact that illegality is a structural possibility of legal order implies that legal 
disorder is embedded in legal order. In this respect, we could define illegality as ‘the privative 
manifestation of legal order’.538  
Yet, this definition of illegality only focuses on its normative dimension, leaving aside 
the implications with regard to the effectiveness of legal order. For despite the fact that theft 
reaffirms the validity of the distinction between legality and illegality as drawn by a legal order, 
it can, at least potentially, pose a severe challenge to the effectiveness of legal order. In fact, if 
theft is committed on a large scale by a substantial part of the population and deteriorates into 
prolonged and uncontrollable looting, then the very distinction between legal and illegal ac-
quisition of goods tends to fall apart. More precisely, legal order can reach a critical point when 
the correspondence between the validity and the effectiveness of legal order drops below what 
Kelsen calls ‘a specified minimum’, meaning that in the case of a sufficient number of instances 
of theft the distinction between legality and illegality may lose its grip on the behavior of indi-
viduals and hence ceases to be effective.539 Although in a general sense ‘the inefficacious norm 
remains valid because and in so far as it is part of . . . a valid legal system’,540 the legal order 
may collapse if the number of inefficacious norms becomes too big. If illegality would become 
the normal condition, legal order can reach the critical point in which the distinction between 
                                                             
536 Hauriou, ‘The Theory of the Institution’, p. 101. 
537 Lindahl, ‘Border Crossings by Immigrants’, 2008, p. 127, Fault Lines of Globalization, 2013, p. 28; Oudejans, Asylum, 
2011, p. 159. 
538 Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization, 2013, p. 28. 
539 ‘The validity of a legal system governing the behaviour of particular human beings depends in a certain way, then, 
on the fact that their real behaviour corresponds to the legal system – depends in a certain way, as one also puts it, on 
the efficacy of the system. This relation of dependence . . . can only be defined in terms of an upper and a lower limit. 
The possibility of correspondence may neither exceed a specified maximum nor fall below a specified minimum’ 
(Kelsen, Introduction, 1992, p. 60).   
540 Kelsen, Introduction, 1992, p. 62. 
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legality and illegality ceases to be effective and hence is emptied of normativity. The upshot of 
such a factual retrogression of legal order is a situation of ‘anarchistic insecurity’.541 Of course, 
this does not mean that a singular instance of theft will necessarily result in factual anarchy. 
What the gliding scale between theft and looting suggests is that illegality entails the latent 
possibility of factual anarchy, i.e. anarchy in the sense of factual lawlessness. It is in this sense 
that illegality can lead to an experience of contingency. Abnormal behavior that qualifies as 
illegal is groundless in that it violates the mutual expectations of the members of a collective 
and in that sense is can be experienced as a challenge to collective existence. Later on I will 
show that the relation between illegality and anarchy explains and to a certain extent also jus-
tifies boundary enforcement. 
The link between illegality and factual anarchy allows me to draw attention to an issue 
that is clearly neglected by Hans Lindahl in his analysis of legal order and the distinction be-
tween illegality and a-legality.542 Whereas normal order includes both the dimension of factu-
ality and validity,543 Lindahl focuses mainly on the latter, relating the problem of chaos or 
anarchy to the normativity of legal order, not developing this point with respect to the effec-
tiveness of legal order. That is, Lindahl discusses anarchy predominantly as a normative prob-
lem, i.e. what I shall define as normative anarchy. My discussion of the link between illegality 
and factual anarchy on the basis of a radicalized reading of Schmitt fills the lacuna in Lindahl’s 
analysis. In Political Theology, Schmitt notes that ‘the exception is different from anarchy and 
chaos’;544 ‘the exception is distinguishable from a juristic chaos, from any kind of anarchy’.545 
Schmitt suggests that the problem of anarchy precedes the problem of the exception. Schmitt’s 
distinction between anarchy, in the sense of factual lawlessness, and the exception suggests 
that illegality poses a challenge to legal order as severe as or even more fundamental than the 
exception, albeit potentially. For whereas the exception can cause an experience of normative 
anarchy, illegality comprises the latent possibility of factual anarchy. Indeed, if factual anarchy 
concerns the situation in which the effectiveness of legal order drops below a critical mini-
mum, the exception still presumes what Schmitt calls a situation of ‘factual normality’546 (fak-
tische Normalität) as that from which it deviates. My distinction between factual and normative 
anarchy implies that Lindahl’s hierarchization between secondary challenges, i.e. illegal behavior 
that call forth boundary enforcement, and primary challenges, i.e. a-legal behavior that call forth 
                                                             
541 Schmitt, On the Three Types, 2004, p. 62 
542 Lindahl, Fault Lines of Globalization, 2013, especially pp. 13-43 and pp. 156-186. 
543 ‘Every general norm demands a normal, everyday frame of life to which it can be factually applied and which is 
subjected to its regulations. The norm requires a homogeneous medium. This effective normal situation is not a mere 
“superficial presupposition” that a jurist can ignore; that situation belongs precisely to its immanent validity. There 
exists no norm that is applicable to chaos’ (Schmitt, Political Theology, p. 13). 
544 Schmitt, Political Theology, 1985, p. 12. 
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boundary constitution, is erroneous. For what Lindahl calls ‘secondary’ challenges have the 
same status, at least potentially, as ‘primary’ challenges. 
 
3.5.2 Normative Anarchy 
Illegality is however but a first legal qualification of abnormality, indeed, the qualification of 
abnormal behavior that violates a rule of normal order. In order to develop the legal qualifi-
cation of behavior that contests legal norms, I will critically redefine Schmitt’s notion of the 
exception. Reconsidering Schmitt’s analysis I will argue that he takes together two possible 
definitions of the exception. In Schmitt’s interpretation, the exception concerns behavior that 
resists subsumption under the norms of the legal order. In Schmitt’s view, the exception is 
‘that which cannot be subsumed’ in the legal order in that it ‘defies general codification’;547 
‘the exception, which is not codified in the existing legal order, can at best be characterized as 
a case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state, or the like. But it cannot be 
circumscribed factually and made to conform to a preformed law’.548 Schmitt’s notion of the 
exception covers two definitions that he leaves undifferentiated. Firstly, behavior that is not 
but possibly can be included in the legal order. This would concern behavior that initially 
qualifies as illegal but is claimed to represent a case of legality. This first definition refers to 
what I will denote as the weak form of the exception. Secondly, the exception can refer to 
behavior that fundamentally resists inclusion in the legal order. Whilst such behavior is taken 
as a case of illegality, it actually resists qualification in terms of the legal-illegal distinction, 
intimating another legality altogether. This second definition concerns the strong form of the 
exception. This differentiation between the two definitions of the exception is crucial in that 
in its weak form the exception challenges a collective to transform its actual spatio-temporal 
unity. That is, the weak manifestation of the exception implies a notion of security that can 
accommodate boundary constitution, besides boundary enforcement. 
Let me start with the weak form of the exception, in fact an understanding of the 
exception that Schmitt doesn’t deal with. Initially, behavior that cannot be qualified as legal 
represents a case of illegality. However, such an analysis is reductive in the case of behavior 
that can neither be subsumed under a legal norm nor as simply breaching a legal norm. Rather, 
such behavior seems to imply a suspension of the distinction between legality and illegality as 
drawn by the legal order. Indeed, behavior can be viewed as suspending the distinction be-
tween legal and illegal to the extent that it contests this distinction. Insofar as behavior cannot 
be folded into the register of legality or illegality, it can be viewed as a contestation of the legal-
illegal distinction drawn by legal order. In fact, in the case of the contestation of a legal norm, 
behavior can be interpreted as intimating a form of legality that is excluded from legal order, 
i.e. a possible spatio-temporal configuration of collective existence that is different from the 
default setting instituted by legal order. In this respect, the ‘unsubsumable’ character of behav-
ior implies a normative challenge to collective existence in that it induces the collective to 
redefine the distinction between legality and illegality. Simply dismissing behavior that contest 
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the distinction between legal and illegal as illegal would imply ignoring the normative claim 
that it entails.  
The weak form of the exception can be exemplified with the phenomenon of animal 
rights activism. Albeit animal activism is a differentiated phenomenon that can be driven by a 
range of different reasons, characteristic of animal rights activism is that it aims at improving 
the well-being and living conditions of animals.549 Although animal rights activism often makes 
use of violence, the violence committed is generally directed at a well-defined target, such as 
breeding farms or industries that make use of animal testing when developing of their prod-
ucts. Whereas the behavior of (groups of) animal rights activists can be considered as a viola-
tion of legal order and for that reason should be qualified as a case of illegality, it can also be 
viewed as a contestation of the distinction between legality and illegality as set by legal order. 
Simply qualifying animal rights activism as illegal would fail to register the normative challenge 
that it presents to legal order, to wit the inclusion of animal rights in legal order. In this sense, 
animal rights activism challenges the normative ground of legal order. Animal rights activists 
intimate that the distinction between legality and illegality could and should be drawn other-
wise, accommodating an improved legal protection of animals. 
To the extent that behavior qualifies as a weak manifestation of the exception, we 
could say that it negates legal order in so far that it questions what possibilities are included in 
legal order. Now, the figure of the negation reappears in a more radical form in the case of a 
strong manifestation of the exception. Whereas in its weak form the exception concerns be-
havior that contests how an institution draws the distinction between legality and illegality, the 
strong form of the exception concerns behavior that contests the directing idea of the institu-
tion itself, intimating another directing idea. In fact, distinctive of behavior that qualifies as a 
strong form of the exception is that it contests the distinction between legal and illegal by 
definitively resisting inclusion in either one of the two sides of the distinction. That is, behavior 
intimates a spatio-temporal unity of collective existence whose realization is irreconcilable with 
the collective’s directing idea altogether. In the most radical case, the realization of such be-
havior would lead to the extinction of the collective’s  existence, as no possible spatio-temporal 
unity is availed by the directing idea can accommodate it. This is what we could define as ‘a 
case of extreme peril, a danger to the existence of the state’, as Schmitt puts it. Paradoxically, 
to the extent that behavior definitively eludes the distinction between legality and illegality as 
posited by legal order, it cannot but be qualified as the definitive affirmation thereof and hence 
as a case of illegality.550 Therefore, as we will see, behavior that is qualified as a strong form of 
the exception cannot but be responded to by boundary enforcement. 
For Schmitt, behavior that qualifies as a strong form of the exception falls under the 
political category of enmity. For essential to enmity is the problem of an ‘existential nega-
tion’,551 that is, a negation both of what we are as a collective and that we are a collective. 
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Indeed, to the extent that inimical behavior intimates another directing idea, it implies an ‘in-
tense and extreme antagonism’,552 as Schmitt would have it, between the directing idea of an 
institution and the one intimated by the hostile behavior. Therefore, in Schmitt’s interpreta-
tion, characteristic of the enemy is that s/he is so radically different from collective existence 
that her or his behavior requires the negation of ‘the [collective’s, MB] own form of exist-
ence’.553 Moreover, if inimical behavior entails the use of violence as an ‘intended means’, it 
can be defined as terrorism.554 Schmitt definition of the enemy is based on the idea that it is not 
simply a manifestation of otherness but rather of strangeness, i.e. otherness as strangeness. As 
he notes in Constitutional Theory, ‘in conceptual terms, the enemy is something existentially other 
(Anderes) and strange (Fremdes), the most extreme escalation of otherness (Anders-Seins) . . .’555 
In this regard, Schmitt’s definition of the enemy illustrates something that we have also ob-
served with respect to his understanding of abnormality. Schmitt does not differentiate be-
tween levels of intensity in which otherness may manifest itself but reduces it to its most radical 
manifestation, i.e. otherness as strangeness. As I have been at pains to argue, from this reduc-
tive understanding of otherness follows his reductive interpretation of contingency, which he 
understands in the sense of contingency as that-ness. 
Importantly, the political qualification of enmity presupposes the first-person plural 
perspective of an interested group of people ‘who run a personal risk in the success or failure 
of the enterprise’, as Hauriou formulates it. This means that the notion of enmity presupposes 
the perspective of the collective as a whole, and therefore involves a different form of victimi-
zation from, say, an act of murder in which an offender kills an individual. The second impli-
cation of the fact that enmity presupposes a first-person plural perspective is that it is a both 
an absolute and a relative concept. Absolute, in that inimical behavior negates the ground of 
collective existence, aiming at the destruction of collective existence. Relative, in that the qual-
ification of behavior as inimical presupposes a decision to be qualified as such by the sover-
eign. Notice that the relational character of enmity also holds for all other political and legal 
qualifications by a collective and marks the irreducible indeterminacy of behavior. I will return 
to discuss this problem in Chapter 4 when exploring the implications of my concept of security 
in relation to the securitization theory. 
Bearing in mind the irreducible indeterminacy of political and legal qualifications, an 
example of the strong form of the exception might be the attacks by Muslim fighters in West-
ern countries to the extent that they are proclaimed by Jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda and 
Islamic State. Take for example the attack on the Curtis Culwell Center in Garland, Texas on 
May 3, 2015.556 The attack on the Curtis Culwell Center was directed against an exhibition of 
cartoon images of Muhammed organized by Stop Islamization of America, also known as the 
American Freedom Defense Initiative, an organization that describes itself as ‘a human rights 
organization dedicated to free speech, religious liberty and individual rights’ but is widely 
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known for its Islamophobia.557 The attack on the Curtis Culwell Center was carried out by two 
men but was proclaimed by Islamic State as their first attack on the mainland of the United 
States, even though it’s unclear at this moment of time whether this link really exists. To the 
extent that the groups involved in jihadism like Islamic State base their ‘struggle to maintain 
the religion’558 on a radical interpretation of Islamic faith and sharia law, they can be perceived 
as an existential negation of Western liberal democratic societies. In this sense, the attack on 
the Curtis Culwell Center can be interpreted – but, considering the irreducible indeterminacy 
of political and legal qualifications, need not be interpreted – as an attack on the existence of 
Western liberal democracies as such to which the freedom of expression is quintessential, and 
not merely as an attack on the right to free speech. Put differently, in a certain interpretation 
the view of collective existence propagated by jihadist groups arguably can only be accommo-
dated by Western liberal democracy on the condition that the Westerners could no longer 
recognize it as their own. In this sense, the view of collective existence propagated by jihadists 
can be viewed as incompatible with Western liberal democracy. Moreover, when jihadist 
groups make use of violence in their quest to reform non-believers, the authorities in a West-
ern liberal democracy may be prepared to qualify their behavior as a terrorist act.559  
Crucially, to the extent that the exception, in both its weak and its strong forms, 
concerns behavior that negates the distinction between legality and illegality, it challenges the 
normative ground of this distinction. That is, the exception, in either of its two manifestations, 
calls into question ‘the beginning (in the sense of Arche)’560 of legal order: the directing idea, 
the constitutive principle of collective existence. Behavior that qualifies as an exception ne-
gates, in its weak form, the arche of the distinction between legality and illegality by intimating 
other possible ways to draw it, or else, in its strong form, requires the destruction of the arche 
in order to clear the way for a new one. As I have argued, the weak manifestation of the 
exception completely escapes Schmitt’s attention as he defines the notion of the exception as 
the legal manifestation of the most radical form of otherness, otherness as strangeness. On 
the basis of my broadened interpretation of the exception we could say that it demonstrates, 
both in its weak and its strong manifestation, the ‘an-archic’561 existence of a collective, that 
is, the irreducible groundlessness of collective existence in a normative sense. The experience 
of normative groundlessness relates to what we have defined as contingency in its twofold of 
sense of the that-ness and what-ness of collective existence. In terms of the weak form of the 
exception abnormal behavior is primarily viewed as a challenge to the what-ness of collective 
existence intimating another actualization thereof and in that sense also challenges the that-
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ness of the collective existence. In terms of the strong form of the exception abnormal behav-
ior appears primarily as a threat to the that-ness of collective existence as it excludes that any 
possible actualization of collective existence can accommodate it. 
Anarchy as the normative groundlessness of the distinction between legality and ille-
gality is different from anarchy as factual lawlessness. Whereas factual anarchy concerns the 
retrogression of an effective and valid legal order into factual lawlessness, the exception boils 
down to suspending the normative ground of legal order. This suspension may also come to 
affect the legal order’s factual normality, implying that normative an-archy can result effec-
tively in the collapse of legal order and deteriorate into a situation of factual anarchy. At bot-
tom, both illegality and the exception hinge upon the possibility of legal order degenerating 
into a situation of factual lawlessness, i.e. the possibility of retrogressing from the ‘stately con-
dition of peace, security and order’ into ‘the anarchistic condition of total disorder and inse-
curity’, to borrow Schmitt’s Hobbesian phrasing.562 
In sum, complementing the analysis of collective insecurity at the ontological and 
institutional level, in this section I have identified the legal manifestations of abnormality that 
feed into the notion of public order, to wit illegality and the exception. What this analysis 
suggests is that the way in which a collective approaches abnormal behavior is variable and 
dependent on how a collective interprets this behavior, either primarily as a challenge to the 
that-ness or the what-ness of its existence. This differentiated account means, first of all, a 
broadening of the notion of public order, relating it to the problem of anarchy both in its 
factual and its normative meaning. But, secondly, the fact that the interpretation of behavior 
is variable also means that public order includes challenges to collective existence that may 
induce a transformation of its spatio-temporal unity. That is, public order gives way to bound-
ary constitution, and not merely to boundary enforcement. Consequently, the differentiated 
interpretation of public order suggests that the range of possibilities of collective to respond 
to it is also variable or at least broader than the way in which Schmitt understands it, namely, 
as boundary enforcement. 
 
3.6 Security 
The previous sections have been devoted to collective insecurity from ontological, institutional 
and legal perspectives. The central idea that I have developed at these different levels is that a 
collective is existentially insecure in the twofold sense that a collective cannot guarantee that it 
exists as a unity and what it is as a unity. Bearing in mind this characterization of the insecure 
existence of a collective, in this section I will define security as collective self-assertion, revisiting 
Schmitt’s concept of security as collective self-preservation. Whereas Schmitt defines security 
as boundary enforcement, that is, the enforcement of a collective’s original unity, I will argue 
that boundary setting, in response to challenges to the collective’s spatio-temporal unity, in-
cludes boundary constitution and boundary enforcement. In order to safeguard itself, a col-
lective has to assert its existence every time anew, both in the sense of its that-ness and its 
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what-ness, in response to that which challenges it. Collective self-assertion concerns the ca-
pacity of a collective to take account of and deal with challenges by reconfiguring its unity, 
rather than preserving what it deems to be its original unity. 
 
3.6.1 Collective Self-Assertion 
In Chapter 2 I have defined Schmitt’s concept of security as collective self-preservation point-
ing to its roots in Spinoza’s thinking. In Schmitt’s view, a collective is endowed with an inner 
force to continue its existence, that is, it is a self-caused being whose existence can only be 
challenged by external causes. As a consequence, Schmitt understands contingency exclusively 
in the sense of the that-ness of collective existence. Either a collective exists in that it carries 
the cause of its existence within itself or it does not exist, lacking an inner cause. Now, on the 
basis of Hans Blumenberg’s analysis of self-preservation as the principle of modern rationality, 
we could say that Schmitt’s Spinozist interpretation represents a static interpretation of self-
preservation, namely the conservation of an extant being.563 In order to reinterpret self-preser-
vation in a dynamic sense, Blumenberg redefines self-preservation as self-assertion. According 
to Blumenberg,  
 
‘[Self-assertion] means an existential program, according to which man posits his ex-
istence in a historical situation and indicates to himself how he is going to deal with 
the reality surrounding him and what use he will make of the possibilities that are 
open to him. In man’s understanding of the world, and in the expectations, assess-
ments, and significations that are bound up with that understanding, a fundamental 
change takes place, which represents not a summation of facts of experience but 
rather a summary of things taken for granted in advance, which in their turn deter-
mine the horizon of possible experiences and their interpretation and embody the “a 
priori” of the world’s significance for man’.564   
 
In fact, complementing Blumenberg’s redefinition of self-preservation as self-assertion, Dieter 
Henrich highlights the reflexivity implied in self-preservation. ‘Self-preservation implies and 
presupposes the structure of the self. Self-familiarity is linked to the experience that it is nec-
essary to preserve one’s own existence’.565 Henrich comes to a similar interpretation of self-
preservation as Blumenberg. 
 
‘Self-conscious man finds himself in the paradoxical situation that he knows within 
his own existence certain conditions which necessarily escape his kind of cosmic 
knowledge. The result is that he can affirm his actuality only in the open arena of 
exploration and experiment of life. His aim is to create ever new situations for himself 
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and to try out all possible modes of existence. And in so doing he is not as much 
concerned with expanding his sense of power, but simultaneously, if not primarily, 
to validate his unintelligible existence over and over again. Since he does not know 
whence he came, he must consider everything he can do as also belonging to him in 
an intimate sense. Whenever he leaves something uninvestigated, he must think or 
fear to have that much less being’.566   
 
So, whereas self-preservation defined in a static sense means maintaining the original condition 
of collective existence over time, self-assertion means safeguarding the continued existence of 
a collective by exploring the possibilities available to it for continuing its existence as the same 
and as a self. An important implication of the redefinition of collective self-preservation as 
collective self-assertion is that security should not only be considered in relation to the that-
ness of collective existence, as Schmitt does, but also to its what-ness. In other words, collec-
tive self-assertion implies the possibility of a collective to respond to that which challenges its 
existence by exploring other possibilities which might be available to it and thereby transform-
ing what it is as unity. I return to this insight in a moment. 
Key to the definition of security as collective self-assertion is the reflexive and there-
fore representational structure of collective subjectivity. For the representational structure of 
collective existence suggests that a collective exists as possibility; a representation is an actual-
ization of its existence as a unity. The mode of being as possibility intimates that a collective 
has what Ricoeur would call a ‘responsive’ structure that relates to self-constancy, i.e. the mode 
of temporal permanence of identity as selfhood.567 The responsive structure of collective ex-
istence means that it has to establish each time anew what it is as a unity and whether it is a 
unity in response to that which questions its existence. Crucially, this responsive structure implies 
that a collective should take account of that which calls its existence into question. In fact, the 
need to take account of that which questions collective existence requires ‘receptivity’ from 
the side of the collective, to borrow Jean-Luc Nancy’s felicitous expression.568 The notion of 
receptivity refers to the openness of a collective to its existence as possibility. That is, in order 
to safeguard its continued existence, a collective needs to be receptive to possible spatio-tem-
poral unities that it can realize in the course of dealing with challenges to its existence. In order 
to safeguard its existence, a collective might consider a new representation, a new actualization 
of its existence as a spatio-temporal unity in response to what challenges it as a collective and 
what it is as a collective. 
 
3.6.2 Boundary Setting 
In a general sense, a collective can respond to that which challenges its existence by means of 
boundary setting, i.e. by setting the distinction between self and other than self, normal and ab-
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normal and legal and illegal. Now, security as collective self-preservation boils down to bound-
ary setting in the sense of mere boundary enforcement. Indeed, if collective existence is de-
fined as an original whole of possibilities, then responding to abnormal behavior means reaf-
firming its original spatial and temporal closure. In other words, boundary setting as boundary 
enforcement means a reiteration of the distinction between the own and the strange, normal 
and abnormal and legality and illegality. In so far that the definition of collective security as 
collective self-assertion takes its cue from the representational structure of collective existence, 
boundary setting should however be parsed into boundary enforcement and boundary constitution.569 
On the one hand, boundary setting cannot be reduced to boundary enforcement, as a collec-
tive lacks immediate access to the whole of possibilities that it comprises, possibilities that it 
includes and excludes. Yet, at the same time, boundary setting also cannot be reduced to 
boundary constitution. Despite the fact that boundary setting concerns the actualization of 
possibilities of collective existence that lie ahead of it, it always takes up again, to a greater or 
a lesser degree, the established distinction between the own and the strange, normal and ab-
normal and legality and illegality. So, the definition of collective security as collective self-
assertion implies that boundary setting is always to a greater or a lesser degree both boundary 
enforcement and boundary constitution. In order to outline the definition of collective security 
as collective self-assertion, let me elaborate on the two modes of boundary setting.  
Let me start with boundary setting as boundary enforcement. We could say that, to 
begin with, boundary enforcement is a response to abnormal behavior in that it affirms the 
collective as the ground of the distinction between legality and illegality. This means that to 
the extent that behavior intimates a spatio-temporal unity of collective existence that is not 
made available by the directing idea of an institution, the collective enforces its spatial and 
temporal boundaries in order to safeguard its continued existence. Boundary setting as bound-
ary enforcement is generally understood as law enforcement, that is, the discovery, deterrence 
and punishment of behavior that forms a violation of legal order. The manifestation of bound-
ary setting as boundary enforcement demonstrates receptivity in that it reaffirms the distinc-
tion between possibilities and impossibilities available by legal order. That is, boundary en-
forcement reaffirms the spatio-temporal unity of collective existence in the face of spatio-
temporal unities intimated by abnormal acts or behavior, spatio-temporal unities that are 
deemed to be unavailable to the directing idea of an institution.  
Boundary enforcement represents however a weak form of receptivity. If boundary 
enforcement is a response to behavior that is not available by the directing idea of an institu-
tion, boundary constitution is a response to behavior that challenges the spatio-temporal unity 
of collective existence, intimating a different actualization of the directing idea. This means 
that abnormal behavior that calls forth boundary constitution does not simply form a breach 
of legal order but challenges the distinction between the own and the strange, normal and 
abnormal and legal and illegal in an indirect way, calling into question the very ground of this 
distinction. In fact, we can distinguish between boundary constitution as a response to abnor-
mal behavior that intimates a possible spatio-temporal configuration of collective existence that 
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is availed by the directing idea of an institution, and to those that intimate another directing idea 
and in that sense confronts the collective with an impossible possibility, i.e. a possibility whose 
actualization would amount to the destruction of collective existence. 
In so far that boundary constitution is a response to behavior that intimates a possible 
spatio-temporal configuration of collective existence, it can be accommodated by collective 
existence by means of transforming its actual spatio-temporal unity. As a consequence, behavior 
that first seems to qualify as strange, abnormal or illegal is then included, hence appearing as 
a possibility enabled by legal order. By transforming the spatio-temporal unity of collective 
existence, boundary constitution is concerned with restoring the collective as the ground of 
legal order. That is, by transforming the distinction between legality and illegality, the collective 
authorizes the act as its own. This first form of boundary constitution demonstrates the re-
ceptiveness of a collective to its existence as possibility in that it demands a collective to be 
open to the possibility of being otherwise. Indeed, a collective can safeguard its continued 
existence by means of transforming what it is as a unity, dealing with what challenges its exist-
ence, i.e. the source of insecurity. The notion of ‘dealing’ with insecurity has two aspects. On 
the one hand, abnormal behavior loses its abnormal character since it is included as possibility, 
that is, it is actualized as a possibility available to collective existence. On the other hand, 
dealing with the source of insecurity also requires the collective to adapt itself to that which 
challenges its existence. 
Boundary constitution can however take a more radical form than transformation. 
This concerns responses to abnormal behavior that intimate an impossible spatio-temporal 
unity of collective existence and in that sense another directing idea. To the extent that behav-
ior intimates the negation of the directing idea of an institution, it cannot be dealt with by 
transforming the spatial and temporal boundaries of collective existence. For this would re-
quire the negation of the directing idea itself. In the face of abnormal behavior that intimates 
another directing idea, the collective cannot but respond by persevering in a possible actualization of 
its spatio-temporal unity in order to safeguard its existence (as possibility) as such.570 That is, to the extent 
that the inclusion of such abnormal behavior would boil down to the destruction of collective 
existence, it needs to be definitively excluded therefrom. Importantly, in such a situation the 
receptivity of a collective to its existence as possibility breaks down as the collective cannot 
authorize the abnormal behavior as its own possibilities in a definitive sense of the word. 
Indeed, strong manifestations of abnormality leave the collective no other option than to re-
store itself as the ground of legal order and hence to confirm the distinction between the own 
and the strange, normal and abnormal, legality and illegality. This means that an act or behavior 
that intimates another directing idea cannot but be qualified as strange, abnormal and illegal. 
As a consequence, in the case of strong abnormality, boundary constitution collapses into 
boundary enforcement. 
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A critical aspect of boundary setting is violence. In a general sense, we could say that, following 
Willem Schinkel’s definition, violence is ‘the reduction of being’ of that which challenges col-
lective existence.571 According to Schinkel, ‘violence is precisely that aspect of human interaction which 
consists of a reduction of being, of selection of ontological aspects and simultaneous non-selection of others. 
Precisely because . . . a being is potentially many things . . ., any way of being necessarily means 
a reduction of being. The question of violence now hinges on the potential to realize potential, 
that is, on the possibility of changing the aspect of the other’.572 Applying this definition of violence to 
collective existence, we have to discern between two aspects. First, violence targets and is 
hence primarily experienced by those who are deemed not to take up the first-person perspec-
tive of the collective in whose name it is exercised. Indeed, to the extent that these individuals, 
or groups, are deemed not to be taking part in the collective, the collective views them as a 
challenge to its existence. Second, to the extent that interpretation of challenges presupposes 
the first-person perspective of a collective, it is perforce reductive of the being of that which 
challenges it and in that sense irreducibly violent. Indeed, since a collective has a finite exist-
ence, it also has a finite and limited understanding of that which challenges its existence. 
Normally, boundary setting appears as legitimate coercion and is considered as relatively 
unproblematic by the members of a collective. To the extent that boundary setting concerns 
the affirmation of the collective as the ground of legal order, it is held to have been authorized 
by the members of a collective. This authorization then presupposes that the reduction of 
being of that which challenges collective existence can be viewed as following from its direct-
ing idea. If boundary setting appears as legitimate coercion, it represents a case of what is 
generally called law enforcement. The snag is however that since collective existence has a 
retroactive structure, the authorization of an act of boundary setting by the members of a 
collective can only be ascertained retroactively. Therefore, even in the case of boundary en-
forcement, i.e. the default mode of responding to challenges, the authorization of boundary 
settings as legitimate coercion is assumed rather than that it can be presupposed. The fact that 
the manifestation of boundary setting as legitimate coercion is pending on the retroactive au-
thorization by the members of a collective makes it a thorny issue. For it can never be estab-
lished beforehand that what, for example, law enforcement authorities assume to be a case of 
legitimate coercion turns out to be one of violence.  
It is here that the difference between Schmitt and me becomes manifest, again. For 
Schmitt the authorization of violence as legitimate coercion presupposes the existence of a col-
lective as a unity ‘that need not and cannot legitimate itself’ to which acts of boundary setting 
can be attributed.573 To the extent that the existence of the collective as a unity has to be 
presupposed, in Schmitt’s view, boundary setting always appears as legitimate coercion, and 
never as violence. In my view, however, an act of boundary setting has a performative struc-
ture; boundary setting is assumed or claimed to be in the name of a collective. This means that 
                                                             
571 This definition of violence derives from Schinkel, Aspects of Violence, 2010. 
572 Schinkel, Aspects of Violence, 2010, p. 49, italics in original.  
573 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 2008, p. 136. 
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in contrast to Schmitt boundary setting never stops needing legitimization. For the retroactive 
structure of collective existence leaves open the possibility that those who are subject to vio-
lence, i.e. whose being is reduced to how it is defined by the collective, represent a possible 
interpretation of the directing idea. It can never be foreclosed that boundary setting is effec-
tively an act of violence rather than legitimate coercion.  
To the extent that boundary setting implies a retroactive process of authorization, we 
could say that it is always to a greater or a lesser degree a wager, even in the case of what is 
generally understood as law enforcement. Boundary setting is irreducibly violent in that it per-
force reduces the being of that which challenges collective existence, but also in that the vio-
lence is irreducibly groundless. There lurks the ever present possibility that boundary setting 
exercised to safeguard collective existence cannot be authorized by the collective as it views 
that which challenges its existence as a possible interpretation of the directing idea. This is to 
say that boundary setting can become itself a source of collective insecurity, triggering a collec-
tive to question its existence in the twofold sense of whether it exists as a unity and what it is 
as a unity. That is, boundary setting may cause the opposite of its intended effect, dislocating 
rather than safeguarding collective existence. For this reason it is necessary for a collective 
engaging in boundary setting to do so with a degree of self-restraint. Authorities can never 
take for granted that boundary setting is a form of legitimate coercion; they must always pon-
der the possibility that the opposite is the case. 
To summarize, the reinterpretation of collective self-preservation as collective self-
assertion implies that responses to insecurity can range between boundary enforcement and 
boundary constitution. It depends on the fact if a collective defines a challenge primarily in 
the sense of its that-ness or in the sense of its what-ness whether it engages in boundary setting 
as boundary enforcement or boundary constitution. This means that security has, conceptually 
speaking, two manifestations. It can take the shape of the enforcement and the transformation 
of the spatio-temporal unity of collective existence. To the extent that boundary setting is 
premised on the retroactive authorization process by a collective, boundary setting is always 
to a greater or a lesser degree a wager. In the case that the violence of boundary setting cannot 
be authorized retroactively by a collective, it loses its veil of legitimate coercion. In this respect, 
the aspect of violence suggests that boundary setting should be exercised prudently and with 
self-restraint. 
 
3.7 Assessment: Continuities and Discontinuities with Schmitt 
In this Chapter I have elaborated the concept of security as collective self-assertion. In so far 
that I have developed this concept of security in a critical encounter with Schmitt, it is inevi-
table that there is a certain continuity between his and mine. This continuity concerns the fact 
that collective security is an existential concept, i.e. a concept that relates to the existence of a 
collective. Indeed, I am on Schmitt’s side when defending the view that security and insecurity 
are modes of being proper to collective existence. It is for this reason that I develop my con-
cept of security as a critical redefinition of Schmitt’s concept of security as collective self-
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preservation. For what both the notions of collective self-preservation and collective self-as-
sertion indicate is that the concept of security presupposes a collective subject, i.e. a ‘self’, that 
can be secure or insecure. 
While I agree with Schmitt that security is an existential concept, and therefore can 
be predicated of collectives, my analysis of the contingency of collective existence argues that 
collective (in)security cannot be detached from individual (in)security. Whereas Schmitt has 
no difficulties in sacrificing individual security to collective security, the concept of collective 
action I have drawn on shows that while collective existence cannot be reduced to the aggre-
gation of the individuals that compose it, a collective exists in and through the acts of the 
individuals that compose it, and whose interests and security are very much what is at stake in 
the very notion of action as collective action. Moreover, insofar as the unity of a collective is a 
represented unity, which cannot include without also excluding, a collective takes charge of its 
contingent origins by granting individuals a series of fundamental rights against the collective. 
Against Schmitt’s reading of Article 48 of the Weimar constitution, I would say that measures 
oriented to securing the existence of the collective are only allowed to the extent that they 
protect a minimal core of fundamental rights. In other words, the interpretation of collective 
security in terms of self-assertion vigorously defends the liberal reading of Article 48 which 
Schmitt ruled out. This leads me to a position on the relation between collective and individual 
security that is different to those defended by Kelsen and Schmitt. Kelsen, as we saw earlier, 
collapses collective security into the security of an aggregate of individuals; Schmitt, to the 
contrary, sacrifices individual security to collective security. Security as collective self-assertion 
posits a strong correlation between collective and individual security.  
To the extent that my concept of security draws on Schmitt’s existential concept of 
security as collective self-preservation, I do so by adopting and critically reformulating the 
conceptual distinctions between ownness and strangeness, normality and abnormality, and 
friend and enemy. The understanding of collective identity in terms of the interrelated modes 
of sameness and selfhood implies that a collective exists as a process of collective self-(re)iden-
tification. Whether a collective is a unity and what it is as a unity is the outcome of a process 
of collective self-(re)identification, and not immediately clear in advance. As a consequence, 
there is no immediate and original criterion to distinguish between the own and the strange, 
the normal and the abnormal, and friend and enemy. These distinctions are subject to a recur-
sive process of collective self-(re)identification and therefore need to be established every time 
anew. This relates to what I discussed in terms of the irreducible indeterminacy of notions like 
strangeness, abnormality and enmity. 
There is yet another discontinuity between Schmitt’s concept of security and mine 
that relates to my analysis of collective identity in terms of the interrelated modes of sameness 
and selfhood. Whereas Schmitt understands collective identity merely in terms of sameness, 
the notion of collective selfhood is crucial, I argued, in that it suggests that a collective exists 
as possibility, which I have analyzed on the basis of the representational structure of collective 
existence. Crucially, existence as possibility bespeaks a twofold understanding of contingency. 
To the extent that a collective exists as possibility it is contingent both as to what it is and that 
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it is a unity. Whereas Schmitt’s reified understanding of collective identity leads him to inter-
pret contingency reductively in the sense of contingency as that-ness, the reflexive understand-
ing of collective identity that I have sought to develop entails that contingency as what-ness 
cannot be reduced to contingency as that-ness. That is, collective existence does not only have 
to take a stance, and in fact always already has taken a stance, to the possibility of non-existence 
but also to the possibility of being otherwise. Put differently, collective existence is not only 
finite but also transformable.  
In fact, it is for this reason that I dismissed the notion of an existential threat prefer-
ring instead to speak of challenges. For whereas the notion of an existential threat relates to 
the reductive understanding of contingency as that-ness, the notion of a challenge captures 
the idea that the experience of collective insecurity can induce a collective to transform its 
spatio-temporal unity besides enforcing it. Indeed, to the extent that a collective needs to de-
fine how it perceives that which challenges its existence the possibilities available to a collective 
to safeguard its existence should not be understood in the limited sense of boundary enforce-
ment but also includes boundary constitution. The response by a collective to that which chal-
lenges its existence can range from enforcing its actual spatio-temporal unity to transforming 
it, thereby seeking to safeguard its existence by accommodating the challenge. 
This understanding of existential insecurity and the broadened notion of collective 
security that follows from it culminates in a redefinition of the exception, a concept that 
Schmitt takes to cover the notion of public order. In Schmitt’s view, the exception requires a 
sovereign decision enforcing the distinction between legality and illegality as set by legal order, 
dismissing the behavior at stake as abnormal and hence illegal. In my interpretation, however, 
the exception should not necessarily lead to the enforcement of the distinction between legality 
and illegality but can also bring about a transformation of this distinction. For to the extent 
that the exception covers behavior that contests what counts as legal and illegal, it can lead a 
collective to reconsider how it has configured legal order. In this respect, cases of public order 
need not necessarily lead to a repressive response by way of boundary enforcement, but also 
includes the critical potential of boundary constitution, of being receptive to that which chal-
lenges collective existence. 
 
Conclusion 
The strong claim that I defend in this Chapter is that the concept of collective security is an 
existential notion, which means that security should be conceptualized from the first-person 
perspective of a collective. Collective existence has a reflexive structure to the extent that sub-
jectivity deploys two poles of identity: as sameness and as selfhood. Identity as sameness and 
selfhood over time is constituted through representation. The reflexive and hence representa-
tional structure of collective existence implies that it is irreducibly insecure both as to whether 
it exists as a unity and what it is as a unity. Accordingly, the representational structure of 
collective identity is the root of insecurity. Nevertheless, the representational structure of col-
lective subjectivity also functions as the principle of security in the sense that it leaves open the 
possibility of another actualization of collective existence in response to that which challenges 
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it. It is in this sense that the particular existential configuration of collective subjectivity results 
in the concept of security as collective self-assertion. To the extent that a collective has to 
assert its existence every turn anew in response to that which challenges it, security responses 
can range from boundary enforcement to boundary transformation, that is, between enforcing 
and transforming the distinction between ownness and strangeness, normality and abnormal-


























In Chapters 1, 2 and 3 I have sought to outline a critical conception of collective security. The 
central argument that I have pursued in my analysis of the conceptions of security as a tech-
nique of government, as collective self-preservation and collective self-assertion is that the 
concept of security presupposes the notion of collective subjectivity, for security and insecurity 
are predicated of subjects, both individual and collective, as part and parcel of their mode of 
being.  In this sense, my search for a critical conception of collective security has resulted in 
an analysis of its deep structure; the notion of collective subjectivity is a fundamental building 
block of collective security. In this Chapter I will recapitulate the insights yielded by the pre-
vious Chapters and integrate them in a systematic way. I will do so in two ways. I will provide 
an assessment of conceptual ramifications of the three notions of collective security as devel-
oped heretofore. And I will apply the three conceptions of collective security to a case study. 
As concerns the conceptual ramifications, I will show, contrasting the discursive and Schmitt’s 
existential conceptions, that they are both premised on a reductive understanding of collective 
subjectivity, which results in a reductive account of collective security. I will use the opposition 
between the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions to present my own existential 
conception of security as an alternative. I argue that my conception of security as collective 
self-assertion does not suffer from their deficiencies as it accounts for collective identity in 
terms of the interrelated notions of sameness and selfhood. Subsequently, I will apply the three 
conceptions of collective security to the case study of the border fences around the Spanish 
enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which are put in place to prevent illegal immigration. Whereas 
the conceptions of security as collective self-preservation and as a technique of government 
lead to, respectively, a politics of security and a politics of insecurity, my conception of security 
as collective self-assertion results in what I will call a politics of (in)security.574 
                                                             
574 This characterization of the three conceptions of security also allows me to make explicit that I engage with, albeit 
critically, Michael Dillon and Jef Huysmans as the titles of their books indicate, respectively, Politics of Security 
(Routledge: London, 1996) and The Politics of Insecurity (Routledge: London, 2007). Although I have much sympathy 
for both the projects of Dillon and Huysmans, I take a different direction. As concerns Dillon, my aim is less ambi-
tious than his as he aims to draw a political philosophy inspired by the continental, (post-)phenomenological tradition 
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This Chapter consists of five sections. In section 4.2, I compare the discursive and 
Schmitt’s existential conceptions of security, focusing on their shared assumption, to wit their 
understanding of the mode of being of collective subjectivity in terms of identity as sameness. 
Then, in section 4.3, I present my conception of security as collective self-assertion as an al-
ternative to both the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions. In section 4.4, I will 
return to my discussion of security studies in Chapter 1 to see in what sense my analysis casts 
new light on its ‘crisis’. Then, in section 4.5, I will turn to analyze the practical implications of 
the three conceptions of security, applying them to the border fences around Ceuta and Me-
lilla. 
 
4.2 Two Conceptions of Security: Discourse vs. Existence 
In this section I will compare the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions of security, 
focusing on their understanding of the referent of security, i.e. the notion of collective subjec-
tivity. As we will see, although these conceptions are different in many respects, at a deeper 
level they assume the same understanding of collective subjectivity in the sense of an original 
and static identity. Whereas Schmitt assumes that collective subjectivity has an original identity, 
thereby defending a reified account of collective identity as substantial similarity, the discursive 
conception takes issue with the understanding of collective identity as an original identity, 
analyzing it instead as a discursive unity. The problem with their respective definitions of col-
lective subjectivity is that they approach collective identity primarily in the sense of sameness, 
thereby endorsing a reductive understanding of the temporal mode of being of collective sub-
jectivity. As a consequence, both the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions of secu-
rity are incapable of accounting for collective subjectivity as a reflexive self-relation, which is, 
I have argued in Chapter 3, pivotal to a proper understanding of the concept of collective 
security. 
 
4.2.1 Existential Unity 
When comparing the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions of security, we can dis-
cern some striking differences between them. A first point that makes visible the difference 
between these conceptions is their respective definition of political power. Whereas Schmitt 
focuses on the problem of sovereignty as a form of power that is irreducible to legal power, 
Foucault on the other hand collapses sovereignty into legal power and then goes on to distin-
guish legal power from governmental power, i.e. governmentality. A second point relates to 
their respective understandings of the object of power and, related to this, the appreciation of 
the spatial nature of power. For Schmitt, sovereignty and, for that matter, law are spatial forms 
of power, conceiving concrete order as a spatial unity, that is, as an emplaced unity. Foucault 
on the other hand claims that governmentality concerns the exercise of power over a popula-
tion to which the notion of a territory, and in that sense a spatial closure, does not seem to be 
an essential feature. Another difference concerns the notion of normality. Whereas Schmitt 
                                                             
on the basis of which he critiques security studies. As concerns Huysmans, he focuses too unilaterally, in my opinion, 
on the problem of insecurity, therefore discounting the critical potential of security.  
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defines normality substantially as normal order, comprising the notion of the normal situation 
and the normal type of man, Foucault and the representatives of the Foucaultian approach 
understand normality as a construction. Furthermore, and specifically relating to the notion of 
security, whereas, in Schmitt’s view, sovereignty aims to preserve the subject/object of power, 
Foucault on the other hand suggests that security mechanisms are aimed at the expansion of 
governmental power.   
However, the most fundamental difference between these two conceptions relates, I 
believe, to the perspective that they adopt with regard to the referent of security. Whereas 
Schmitt provides an account of the security referent from the suprapersonal perspective of a 
collective, that is, from the perspective of a collective as an existential unity, Foucault and the 
representatives of the Foucaultian approach take their cue from what Deleuze calls the ‘third 
person’ perspective of the collective as a discursive unity.575 Indeed, this is, in my view, the most 
fundamental difference between the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions:  the per-
spectives of a collective in first-person and third-person. As we will see, despite their different 
accounts of collective subjectivity, both conceptions have the same deficiency. Because they 
define collective subjectivity predominantly in the sense of identity as sameness, and share a 
reductive understanding of its temporal mode of being; they collapse security into the problem 
of existence/non-existence of collective subjectivity, leaving little space for understanding se-
curity as the transformation of a collective in response to challenges to what it is as a unity. 
Let me start with the definition of collective subjectivity as an existential unity, i.e. 
the understanding of collective subjectivity presupposed by Schmitt’s existential conception 
of security. In Chapter 2 I have demonstrated that Schmitt’s originalism leads him to define 
collective subjectivity in the reified sense of substantial similarity. This means that, in Schmitt’s 
view, the notion of existence pertaining to collective subjectivity is identity as sameness. To 
the extent that Schmitt’s originalist understanding of collective subjectivity implies a reification 
of what a collective is as a unity, the problem of security is rendered as the problem of exist-
ence/non-existence of collective subjectivity. Indeed, following from his reductive under-
standing of the contingency of collective subjectivity, Schmitt collapses threats to what a col-
lective is as a unity (contingency as what-ness) into threats to that a collective exists as a unity 
(contingency as that-ness). In Schmitt’s interpretation, security is the response to an existential 
threat. In fact, if, as Ricoeur argues, identity as sameness implies the model of temporal per-
manence as uninterrupted continuity, then sources of insecurity, whether in the form of the 
abnormal, the heterogeneous or the strange, can be defined as threats to continued existence 
in the sense of uninterrupted continuity of collective homogeneity. According to Schmitt, the 
response to existential threats is boundary enforcement. Schmitt’s existential conception of 
security as collective self-preservation means enforcing the original unity of a collective sub-
ject. In other words, from Schmitt’s originalist and reified conception of collective subjectivity 
                                                             
575 ‘The subject is the product of phrases or dialectic and has the character of a first person with whom discourse 
begins, while the statement is an anonymous function which leaves a trace of subject only in the third person, as a 
derived function’ (Deleuze, Foucault, 2006, p. 14). 
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follows an originalist interpretation of collective self-preservation, reducing boundary setting 
to boundary enforcement. 
Although Schmitt defines collective subjectivity in an originalist and reified sense, 
thus disregarding its mode of being as selfhood, the latter does not completely escape his 
attention. Rather, as I argued in Chapter 3, the notion of selfhood remains implicit in Schmitt’s 
conception of collective subjectivity. I explained that this relates to Schmitt’s reductive inter-
pretation of the notion of an institution. For whereas, in my interpretation, the directing idea 
of an institution features as the principle of a representational self-relation of a collective, 
Schmitt’s originalist understanding of collective subjectivity leads him to interpret collective 
self-relation as an immediate self-relation. As a consequence, for Schmitt it is immediately and 
directly accessible to the members of a collective what they are as a unity. 
 
4.2.2 Discursive Unity 
Whereas Schmitt can be interpreted as assuming the notion of collective selfhood, albeit im-
plicitly, this seems to be completely lacking in the discursive conception. The discursive con-
ception completely disregards collective self-relation. Indeed, whereas Schmitt can conceptu-
alize collective subjectivity as an instance that can be secure or insecure, even though in a 
highly problematic way, Foucault and the representatives of the Foucaultian approach can at 
best postulate, without explaining, collective subjectivity as such an instance. 
The notion of collective subjectivity taken for granted by the discursive conception 
is polemically oriented against the understanding of identity as assumed by Schmitt. As I have 
argued in Chapter 1, the conception of security as a technique of government is essentially a 
critical conception in that it focuses on the performative dimension of security practices. Ac-
cording to the Foucaultian approach, practices of security produce and reiterate the insecurity 
of the security referent. This is to say that by proclaiming an issue to be a security problem, 
the security referent is constituted and reiterated as insecure. To be sure, the Foucaultian ap-
proach takes over the performative nature of security practices from the securitization theory, 
but the former also radicalizes the latter in that it focuses on the performative nature of the 
security referent. Interestingly, the Foucaultian approach develops this insight as concerns the 
performative nature of the security referent in discussion with Schmitt. To the extent that a 
collective is rendered as that which needs securing, the Foucaultian approach points out that 
security practices construe it as insecure; security practices construe collective identity as inse-
cure. According to the Foucaultian approach, this is the essence of the political game: dissem-
inating insecurity in view of establishing collective identity. 
Analyzing Foucault’s theory of governmentality, in Chapter 1 I further inquired into 
the ontological status of the collective, i.e. the population in Foucault’s terminology, as a dis-
cursive unity. In Foucault’s view, techniques of government construe a collective as an entity 
separate from the individuals who constitute it. Indeed, what Foucault attempts to show is 
that the construction of a collective is a prerequisite of political subjection of the individuals 
who are construed as a collective. In Foucault’s view, however, the manifold of individuals 
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represent a realm of faceless potentiality that is given a particular shape through its objectivi-
zation by a discourse. This means that discourse actualizes the pre-discursive potentiality of 
the manifold of individuals in a particular way; it represents a possible actualization among 
others. This implies, first of all, that the collective as a discursive unity does not have existence 
independent from discourse. The pre-discursive potentiality can only be known in the way 
that it is actualized by discourse, retrospectively. Discursive identity has no presence, no per-
manence outside of discourse. Indeed, this is the aim of Foucault’s discourse analysis: to un-
mask the reified existence of things, that is, to realize their ‘depresentification’,576 viewing ex-
istence merely as a changing face of faceless potentiality. The second implication is that Fou-
cault reduces identity to discursive identity, which he defines as sameness. Discourse renders 
a multitude of individuals as the same whereas they exist as mere potentiality; it renders the 
heterogeneous into a homogeneous whole. In sum, Foucault assumes a fundamental split be-
tween the actuality/homogeneity of discourse and the potentiality/heterogeneity of the pre-
discursive.577 
The stakes of Foucault’s analysis of collective subjectivity as discursive unity, hence 
of collective identity as discursive identity, are to show that identity is a hypostatization that 
seeks to obscure the difference that threatens the sameness of a discursive unity. In this re-
spect, Foucault’s model of discursive identity implies an opposition between identity, which 
he interprets in the sense of sameness, and difference. That is, discursive identity has perma-
nence in time only within discourse, permanence in the sense of a construed uninterrupted 
continuity. Outside of discourse it is meaningless to speak of identity. Outside of discourse 
there is only non-identity, i.e. difference. Foucault’s account of identity as discursive identity, 
and of the opposition between identity and difference, is quite radical in that it posits some-
thing either to exist as a discursive unity, and therefore as having an identity, or not to exist as 
a discursive unity, and thus as unidentifiable potentiality. In this respect, Foucault’s account 
of identity suggests that either something exists as a dependent effect of discourse or else it 
does not exist as an identity.  
This is interesting but in some ways problematic insight. For in so far that the notion 
of identity as discursive identity forms an alternative to the hypostatization of identity as same-
ness, it seems to embrace the reductive understanding of contingency. Indeed, to the extent 
that discourse analysis is concerned with showing how something is considered to exist as an 
identity in the mode of sameness, it tends to focus only on contingency as that-ness, and not 
on contingency as what-ness. If discourse makes something exist as an (insecure) identity, then 
outside of discourse it cannot be said to exist as such. This point can be demonstrated with 
the notion of an existential threat. The Foucaultian approach adopts the notion of an existen-
tial threat from the traditional approach of security studies. But by taking over the notion of 
existential threat it assumes the idea that security is about the question of existence/non-ex-
                                                             
576 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 1972, p. 47. 
577 ‘No sense of possibility or potentiality exists in the realm of statements. Everything in them is real and reality is 
manifestly present’ (Deleuze, Foucault, 2006, p. 4). 
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istence of a collective, and thus about the experience of contingency as that-ness. In this re-
gard, there is little difference between the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions of 
security. Of course, the difference with Schmitt’s existential conception of security concerns 
the critical idea that there is no such thing as an original identity that can be enforced, as this 
identity is a dependent effect of security framing. But this does not do away with the funda-
mental convergence between the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions in that they 
both understand security in terms of existence/non-existence. 
Now, what is problematic about the notion of discursive identity is that it does not 
account for the temporality of a collective self-relation or the self-reference of the security 
referent, something that is captured by the notion of identity as selfhood. To the extent that 
the discursive conception considers the collective merely as an object, i.e. the object of gov-
ernmental power, the understanding of identity as discursive identity does not allow of ac-
counting for the self-reference of the security referent. The interpretation of collective subjec-
tivity as an object, i.e. in the mode of identity as sameness, has far reaching implications with 
respect to the concept of security. For without the experience of collective temporality, the 
collective’s members cannot experience its continued existence. 578 And to this extent it be-
comes meaningless to speak of (in)security, that is, to speak of the members of a collective as 
concerned with its continued existence. The reduction of the existence of collective subjectivity 
to a discursive unity, means emptying the concept of security of its content. 
In sum, what my comparison between the discursive and Schmitt’s existential con-
ceptions of security reveals is that the way in which collective subjectivity is conceptualized is 
decisive for the notion of security. More particularly, I have attempted to show how the un-
derstanding of collective subjectivity as an existential unity and as a discursive unity informs 
the conceptions of security that follows from it. First, I established that both Schmitt’s notion 
of existential unity and Foucault’s understanding of discursive unity are premised on the same 
notion of identity, to wit identity as sameness. As a consequence, both conceptions of security 
are concerned with the problem of security in terms of the existence/non-existence of a col-
lective subject. Secondly, I argued that Schmitt’s and Foucault’s account of collective subjec-
tivity is reductive in that they disregard the notion of collective selfhood, which involves the 
experience of a collective’s own temporality. As concerns the notion of discursive unity, it only 
makes sense to speak of temporal continuity within discourse, as a construed temporal conti-
nuity; the realm outside of discourse, i.e. the pre-discursive, is the realm of difference, poten-
tiality and heterogeneity. Therefore, as a discursive unity, a collective cannot be considered to 
have a self-relation and hence an experience of its temporality. By emptying the concept of 
security of its content, it merely receives an instrumental meaning. As concerns Schmitt’s no-
tion of existential unity, he does address the issue of collective selfhood, albeit implicitly, as it 
posits the unity of collective subjectivity as an original and hence immediate unity. This means 
that the experience of the collective’s temporality evaporates in the immediacy of an absolute 
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now. Hence, security is understood as the enforcement of collective subjectivity as manifest 
in the original moment of self-presence. 
 
4.3 An Alternative Conception of Security  
The analysis of the notion of collective subjectivity underlying the discursive and Schmitt’s 
existential conceptions of security revealed that they both fail to adequately conceptualize the 
temporal mode of being of collective subjectivity, that is, collective subjectivity in the interre-
lated modes of identity as sameness and as selfhood over time. I dismissed the discursive 
conception as it completely reduces the mode of being of a collective to a construct, i.e. an 
object construed by governmental techniques. While Schmitt’s existential conception does 
take its cue from a collective in the first-person perspective, he defines collective subjectivity 
in a reified way. In order to escape from the deficiencies of both conceptions, in this section 
I will elaborate an alternative conception of security on the basis of an account of collective 
subjectivity which draws on elements from both the discursive and Schmitt’s existential con-
ceptions. Redefining the existential unity of collective subjectivity as a reflexive unity in terms 
of the interrelated notions of identity as sameness and as selfhood, I interpret security as col-
lective self-assertion.  To the extent that the reflexive interpretation of the existential unity 
implies that collective subjectivity is contingent both as to what it as a unity and that it is a 
unity, security responses are variable and receptive to that which challenges collective subjec-
tivity, ranging between boundary enforcement and boundary constitution. 
 
4.3.1 Collective Subjectivity and Self-Representation 
In order to present my conception of security as collective self-assertion as an alternative to 
both the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions, I will start by analyzing in what sense 
my interpretation of collective subjectivity is conceptually more adequate than the ones as-
sumed by Schmitt, Foucault and the representatives of the Foucaultian approach. Let me begin 
my alternative account with the main deficiency of Schmitt’s analysis of collective subjectivity. 
Indeed, as I argued in Chapter 3, my account of the reflexive structure of collective subjectivity 
entails a radical transformation of Schmitt. For whereas Schmitt claims that collective subjec-
tivity should be defined as an immediate self-relation, his account of the principle of represen-
tation opens up the possibility to conceptualize collective subjectivity as a reflexive self-rela-
tion. The interpretation of collective subjectivity as a reflexive self-relation permits us to dis-
tinguish between two experiences of contingency, namely, contingency as concerns what a 
collective is as a unity and that it exists as a unity. 
Interestingly, while Schmitt presupposes a collective to exist as immediate self-iden-
tity he also argues that this condition is fictitious.579 Fictitious in the sense that a collective can 
never actually be immediately self-present as a unity. In Schmitt’s view, even in the case of 
acclamation, i.e. the situation in which a multitude directly expresses its consent or disapproval, 
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a situation that seems to most closely resemble a collective’s immediate self-presence, the col-
lective does not act as a whole but as a multitude.580 The difficulty concerning the mode of 
being of a collective as a unity with which Schmitt struggles has been clearly formulated by 
Waldenfels: a we cannot say ‘we’.581 It is here that representation comes into the picture. A 
collective can exist as a unity only through representation. Actually, the notion of representa-
tion is also central to Hauriou’s definition of an institution. According to Hauriou, the realiza-
tion of the directing idea requires representation. A collective can be conceived as an acting 
unity to the extent that there is a representative who acts ‘in the name of’ the collective as a 
whole.582 In this sense we could say that the representative mediates the self-relation of a col-
lective. This is more or less similar to Schmitt’s understanding of the principle of representa-
tion. At bottom, however, Schmitt is negative about representation as a principle of political 
form because the mediation of a collective’s self-relation implies a distortion of the immediate 
self-identity of a collective. The danger of the radical implementation of the principle of rep-
resentation is, in Schmitt’s view, that ‘the subject of political unity, the people, is ignored and 
the state, which is never anything other than a people in the condition of political unity, loses 
its substance’.583 
In my view, the representational structure of collective subjectivity defines the col-
lective as deploying a reflexive self-relation, thus combining the idea of a mediated self-relation 
and a moderate version of an ontology of potentiality or possibility, as I define it, which un-
derlies Foucault’s analysis of discursive identity. First of all, we could say that representation 
allows understanding a collective as an acting unity in the sense that a representative claims to 
act in the name of the collective as a whole. Yet, this also means that representation makes the 
collective exist only as a claimed or putative unity. This claimed unity represents a possible 
actualization of collective existence. The reflexivity of the representational structure concerns 
the fact that the members of a collective can affirm or dismiss the representation as an actual-
ization of their existence. That is, the members can either affirm the representation as their 
own or disown it. It is in this sense that a collective exists as a process of self-identification, and 
not in the static sense of immediate self-identity, as Schmitt has it. Moreover, to the extent 
that the representational structure of collective subjectivity means that it exists in the form of 
a claimed unity, representation establishes collective existence as a radically contingent unity. 
Radically contingent in that the representation is always a defeasible claim about what it is that 
constitutes the collective as a unity and that the collective exists as unity. By affirming or de-
nouncing a representation of the collective, the members of a collective establish whether or 
not they exist as a unity and what it is that constitutes their unity. So, against Schmitt, repre-
sentation is constitutive of collective subjectivity, and not only undermining thereof. 
The reflexive, representational structure of collective subjectivity entails that contin-
gency amounts to the experience that the actual spatio-temporal unity of a collective is merely 
a possible realization of its existence. The two-layered contingency of collective subjectivity, 
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583 Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, 2008, p. 215. 
131 
 
both relating to its that-ness and its what-ness, can manifest itself fundamentally in two ways, 
namely in the sense of the possibilities of being otherwise and not-being. Therefore, firstly, 
the experience of contingency can disclose the possibility of being otherwise, yielding a trans-
formation of the spatio-temporal unity of collective existence. In this respect, the experience 
of being otherwise can result in a different actualization of collective existence. Then, secondly, 
contingency of collective subjectivity can be experienced as the possibility of not-being, i.e. 
the fact that the collective subject could also not exist. Importantly, the possibility of not-being 
makes clear to the members of a collective that they cannot exist as a group without embracing 
a possible actualization of its existence as a spatio-temporal unity, even though this actualiza-
tion is only one of many. For without some form of actuality the collective cannot be consid-
ered to exist at all. This means that whereas the experience of being otherwise points to the 
fact that a collective cannot be reduced to its actuality, hence is more than actuality, the expe-
rience of not-being relates to the idea that that collective existence cannot be abstracted from 
its actuality, hence is less than actuality.   
Besides developing my alternative account of collective subjectivity as a radical trans-
formation of Schmitt, I also take an important insight from Foucault. As Veyne notes, Fou-
cault’s analysis of discursive identity is based on an ontology of potentiality. According to 
Veyne, a discursive unity is the actualization of potentiality. Actually, Foucault’s ontology of 
potentiality is quite radical as he assumes a chasm between the realm of potentiality and its 
actualization in the form of a discursive identity. In Foucault’s interpretation, in the final anal-
ysis, the world exists as fluid potentiality. Discursive identity is but a temporary eruption, an 
instantaneous face that does not last and will be replaced with other actualizations. Im-
portantly, Foucault’s ontology of potentiality implies a particular temporality. To put it in terms 
of Foucault’s theory of governmentality, the techniques of government establish the existence 
of a collective retrospectively, in the sense of ‘a retrospective regrouping’.584 That is, prior to 
discourse it does not make sense to speak of identity at all. Before the appearance of discursive 
identity there was nothing but potentiality, i.e. difference or heterogeneity. This means that 
Foucault’s ontology entails a critical account of identity, pointing to the problem of difference 
or discontinuity. 
Notice however that Foucault’s critique targets the notion of identity as it is consti-
tuted by discourse. This notion of identity is defined by Foucault as sameness. As conse-
quence, Foucault fails to account for the interrelatedness of identity as sameness and as self-
hood. In the case of Foucault we could at best say that selfhood refers to the experience of 
difference, that is, the experience that the identity received from discourse is merely actualized 
potentiality, an instantaneous face. This is different from Ricoeur’s notion of selfhood. Ac-
cording to Ricoeur, if idem-identity enables to identify a collective as the same over time, ipse-
identity relates to the re-identification of the collective as a self and thus concerns a collective’s 
self-relation over time. Crucially, whereas identity as sameness excludes thinking discontinuity, 
identity as selfhood can accommodate this, at least to a certain extent. 
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Foucault’s understanding of selfhood as a mode of identity is rooted in his account 
of the distinction between potentiality and actuality. While I am close to Foucault’s ontology 
of potentiality, I think it is too radical. I deem it positive that the ontology of potentiality or 
possibility permits thinking the discontinuity of identity in the sense that a discursive unity is 
but an actualization that can be up to reconsideration. Nevertheless, with respect to the rela-
tion between potentiality and actuality Foucault overemphasizes, in my view, one side of this 
distinction, to wit potentiality. In Foucault’s interpretation, the fissure between actuality and 
potentiality seems to be conceived so radically that it almost appears that the latter can exist 
without the former; as if potentiality can be considered to exist completely on its own terms, 
without actualization, without a (determinate) form. In contrast to Foucault, I would rather 
say that potentiality and actuality have a representational structure. Potentiality can only be 
considered to exist to the extent that it has presence as actuality, i.e. to the extent that it is (in 
the process of) being actualized. This does not mean however that potentiality depends on the 
persistence of one particular actualization. On the contrary, the fact that potentiality requires 
actuality means only that it needs some form of actualization, i.e. some persistence as actual-
ization. Furthermore, the fact that potentiality only exists as a process of actualization does 
not mean that an actualization is exhaustive of potentiality. Actually, this seems to be the whole 
point of an ontology of potentiality: potentiality cannot be reduced to its actuality nor ab-
stracted from it.585 To relate this back to the distinction between identity as sameness and 
selfhood, we could say that potentiality implies that there is no original sameness and selfhood. 
Identification always takes shape as re-identification; an actualization of collective existence 
can only be perceived as such retroactively. That is, identity refers to a process of (re-)identi-
fication, a process that includes the possibility of difference. 
Now, the representational structure of collective subjectivity is an attempt to carry 
forward Foucault’s critical account of identity in another way, namely with regard to the spe-
cific temporality of collective existence. To the extent that collective subjectivity exists as a 
representation, that is, as a claim to unity, it has retroactive existence as a unity, rather than 
‘retrospective’ existence as Foucault would have it. The representational and therefore retro-
active structure of collective existence implies an indefinite deferral of self-presence. Repre-
sentation means a structural lack of complete and immediate self-presence that cannot be 
overcome. This is however something different than saying that a collective has no self-pres-
ence at all, as implied by Foucault’s analysis. Moreover, representation does not only rule out 
the immediate self-presence of a collective but also that the process of collective self-identifi-
cation can culminate in complete and full self-presence in the future. Now, the fact that the 
representational structure of collective subjectivity excludes all forms of originalism also means 
that representation is never merely a case of enforcing the unity of a collective, i.e. re-present-
ing or explicating what it potentially already is, but always also to a greater or a lesser degree 
the constitution thereof. 
The representational structure of collective subjectivity requires a transformation of 
the originalist account of a collective’s spatial unity. On an originalist reading we should make 
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a distinction between, first, the constitution of the spatial unity of a collective and, second, the 
enforcement of this unity. We can find such an originalist account of a collective’s spatiality in 
Schmitt’s analysis of nomos. In Schmitt’s interpretation, the constitutive act of land-taking, i.e. 
the original emplacement of a collective, precedes the subsequent acts of distribution and ex-
ploitation. The representational structure of collective existence upsets the clear-cut order be-
tween, first, the constitution and, second, the enforcement of the boundaries that demarcate 
the spatial unity of a collective. Rather, considering the retroactive existence of a collective, 
the order between boundary constitution and boundary enforcement is reversed. This means 
that boundary constitution cannot be collapsed into what we take to be a case of boundary 
enforcement. In other words, what appears to be a case of boundary enforcement is to a 
greater or lesser degree always also a matter of boundary constitution. Accordingly, the repre-
sentational structure of collective subjectivity strongly complicates the picture of boundary 
politics as implied by an originalist account of spatial unity. In doing so, the representational 
structure of collective existence does justice to the idea espoused by the Foucaultian approach 
of security studies that techniques of government are constitutive of collective identity. Nev-
ertheless, as I have previously noted, the problem of the Foucaultian approach is that it is too 
constructivist. For while the Foucaultian approach discloses the constitutive nature of identity 
we could say that it tends to reduce boundary setting to boundary constitution. 
On the basis of my analysis of the representational structure of collective subjectivity 
I concluded that a collective is existentially insecure. This relates to the problem that collective 
subjectivity is marked by a irreducible groundlessness. To the extent that a collective can only 
be considered to exist retroactively through the representation of a unity to which there is no 
direct access, it lacks an indubitable ground on which it can rely, as this ground is indefinitely 
postponed. Representation only establishes a provisional grounding of collective existence. It 
is in this sense that we can speak of what I termed the an-archical condition of collective 
existence. If the representation fails, the collective subject is without arche, i.e. groundless. 
Consequently, the members of a collective can no longer identify themselves as a unity, hence 
falling apart and ceasing to exist as a collective. This is also why the most radical manifestation 
of collective insecurity is factual anarchy. From the perspective of the members of a collective, 
in a situation of anarchy the binding character of laws is cancelled out; the rules of normal 
order are no longer viewed as collectively shared rules and the very distinction between nor-
mality and abnormality breaks down. So, from a first-person plural perspective, the most fun-
damental experience of collective insecurity is the disintegration of order, i.e. the disintegration 
of collective existence as a spatio-temporal unity. 
 
4.3.2 Boundary Enforcement and Boundary Constitution 
Now that I have discussed my alternative account of collective subjectivity in some detail, let 
me turn to the concept of security. In fact, the existential insecurity of a collective has funda-
mental implications with regard to the notion of security available to it. First of all, it implies 
that we need to resist the idea that security means preserving the original condition of collec-
tive existence. Indeed, in the sense that a collective has insecure existence as a unity, Schmitt’s 
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definition of security as collective self-preservation fails. Because there is no original unity, 
collective subjectivity cannot safeguard its existence by simply preserving this unity. Starting 
from the fundamental insecurity of collective existence I have developed a reinterpretation of 
collective self-preservation revolving around the receptivity of a collective to its existence as 
possibility. Following Blumenberg’s analysis, I have termed my conception of security collec-
tive self-assertion. Blumenberg elaborates the reinterpretation of self-preservation as self-as-
sertion on the level of an individual human being. In contrast to self-preservation, self-asser-
tion ‘means an existential program, according to which man posits his existence in a historical 
situation and indicates to himself how he is going to deal with the reality surrounding him and 
what use he will make of the possibilities that are open to him.’586 I have sought to apply 
Blumenberg’s reinterpretation of self-preservation as self-assertion to collective existence. If 
collective self-preservation relates to the idea of maintaining the original existence of a collec-
tive, collective self-assertion means that a collective has to assert its existence every time anew 
in the face of that which challenges it, thus exploring possibilities available to the collective 
for continuing its existence as the same and as a self. 
Key to the reinterpretation of collective self-preservation as collective self-assertion 
is the reflexivity of collective self-relation. This relates, first of all, to the basic idea that a 
reflexive self-relation is a precondition for the members of a collective to be concerned with 
their continued existence as a unity. This is at least the lesson that we can draw from the 
analysis of the notion of self-preservation by Dieter Henrich, which he has developed in dia-
logue with Blumenberg. ‘Self-preservation implies and presupposes the structure of the self. 
Self-familiarity is linked to the experience that it is necessary to preserve one’s own exist-
ence’.587 According to Henrich, the reflexivity implied in self-relation suggests that self-preser-
vation should not be interpreted statically, as Schmitt does, but dynamically. So, whereas self-
preservation statically defined means maintaining the original condition of collective existence 
over time, the dynamic definition of self-preservation or self-assertion relates to a being that 
seeks to safeguard its continued existence by affirming it over and over again, making use of 
all possibilities open to it including unexplored possibilities that lie hidden in its own being. 
The dynamic definition of self-preservation or the redefinition of self-preservation 
as self-assertion recalls Foucault’s distinction between self-preservation and self-assertion. Ac-
cording to Foucault, self-preservation as the maintenance of a pre-given order also includes 
the notion of self-assertion. In fact, Foucault emphasized that self-assertion related to the 
expansion of power, i.e. the increasing of the state’s forces: ‘if it is true that most of the theo-
rists lay stress on the fact that raison d’État is what makes it possible to preserve the state – the 
word “manutention,” preserving, maintaining, is used – they all add that as well as this . . . it is 
also necessary to increase or expand it’.588  Interestingly, this aspect of expansion is also present 
in Blumenberg’s and Henrich’s redefinition of self-preservation. Indeed, as Henrich states, a 
dynamic interpretation of self-preservation includes that man is ‘concerned with expanding his 
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sense of power’.589 Yet, while Foucault draws on the same concepts, he interprets self-assertion 
differently than Blumenberg and Henrich. Whereas Foucault argues that self-assertion should 
be understood merely in the instrumental sense of expansion of power,590 Blumenberg and 
Henrich claim that self-assertion has an existential meaning. 
Defined at the level of collective subjectivity, the reinterpretation of self-preservation 
as self-assertion implies that security has a responsive structure. Indeed, representation does not 
simply mean reiteration but also responsiveness. Responsiveness in the sense that a collective 
can be challenged to explore possible spatio-temporal unities available under its directing idea 
in dealing with abnormality, and which could safeguard its continued existence as the same 
and as a self. Yet, to the extent that a collective’s existence as possibility implies that it has a 
finite mode of being, its responsiveness is also finite. There are, in other words, limited possi-
bilities available to a collective subject to deal with that which challenges its existence. In this 
respect, security lays bare the limited capacity of a collective to deal with that which challenges 
its continued existence as the same and as a self. The responsive structure of security also 
means that it is always a wager. Security can be characterized as a wager in so far that the 
challenge to collective existence requires determining both what the collective is as a unity and 
that it is a unity, without there being any independent criteria that could ground the appropri-
ateness of the collective’s responses. This is an important finding as it suggests that security 
cannot be reduced to the all or nothing question of existence/non-existence. That is, security 
does not relate exclusively to contingency as that-ness but also to contingency as what-ness.591 
If we can define security as the response to that which forms a challenge to the con-
tinued existence of a collective, security takes place by way of boundary setting, both in the 
sense of enforcing and (re-)constituting the spatio-temporal unity of a collective. Indeed, the 
reflexive structure of collective subjectivity implies that boundary setting is always both bound-
ary enforcement and boundary constitution. If boundary enforcement is the reaffirmation of 
the collective’s spatio-temporal unity in the face of behavior that is not available to and thus 
impossible under the directing idea of an institution, boundary constitution is a response to 
behavior that actualizes a possible configuration of collective existence different from the col-
lective’s actual spatio-temporal unity. Hence, boundary constitution implies a transformation 
of a collective’s spatio-temporal unity. In short, security as boundary setting involves an as-
sessment of a range of responses that could safeguard the continued existence of a collective, 
ranging between pure boundary enforcement and pure boundary constitution. 
The upshot of this analysis of boundary setting is that security rules out definitive 
solutions to deal with that which questions collective existence. Because a collective is existen-
tially insecure, it always has to assess its chances in the struggle to continue its existence as the 
same and as a self. This means that security is never simply a matter of boundary enforcement 
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or boundary constitution. Crucially, the rejection of definitive solutions requires a certain de-
gree of self-restraint in dealing with insecurity. Since there is never a golden solution, a collec-
tive will always have to ponder all possibilities available to it prudently, every time anew. 
To summarize, in order to escape from the shortcomings of the discursive and 
Schmitt’s existential conceptions of security, in this section I have outlined an alternative con-
ception of security. Starting from the idea that the concept of collective security presupposes 
the notion of collective subjectivity, I first developed an alternative notion of collective sub-
jectivity on the basis of the principle of representation. Representation allows thinking collec-
tive identity in a reflexive way, thus mitigating the criticism that can be raised against both the 
discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions. I elaborated the reflexive structure of collec-
tive subjectivity combining a radicalized version of Schmitt’s account of representation and a 
moderate version of ontology of potentiality as advocated by Foucault. This redefinition of 
collective subjectivity results in the interpretation of security as collective self-assertion. To 
the extent that a collective is receptive to challenges to its existence, security has a responsive 
structure. And because a collective has a finite mode of being, the notion of security available 
to a collective is limited; limited in the sense that boundary setting may undermine or even 
counteract the continued existence of collective subjectivity.  
 
4.4 Back to Security Studies  
In the previous section, I have elaborated the conception of security as collective self-asser-
tion, starting from a reflexive interpretation of the existential unity of collective subjectivity. 
Collective self-assertion forms both an alternative to the too critical conception of security as 
a technique of government and the too static and hence conservative conception of security 
as collective self-preservation. Now, before I test the three concepts of security by applying 
them to a case study, let me first return to my discussion with security studies. For I do not 
only claim that the conception of security as collective self-assertion is an alternative to the 
discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions, I also claim that my analysis provides insight 
into the crisis of security studies. What are the implications of my analysis of security with 
respect the conceptual framework of security studies? In what sense does it cast new light on 
the crisis of security studies? 
 
4.4.1 Beyond Objectivism and Constructivism 
A first issue that attracts our attention is of methodological nature and concerns the prevalent 
theoretical approaches adopted by security scholars. In Chapter 1 I discussed basically three 
approaches of security studies, namely structural realism, the securitization theory and the 
Foucaultian approach. The theoretical roots of security studies are marked by structural real-
ism. I have summarized the structural realist conception of security in terms of the threat-
referent object matrix. After the unsuccessful attempt to settle the crisis of security studies by 
means of ‘widening’ the threat-referent object matrix, a new theoretical approach was pro-
posed taking its cue from a performative account of language: the securitization theory. The 
securitization theory analyses security as a speech act, i.e. a linguistic, self-referential reality. 
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Building on insights from critical security studies and radicalizing the securitization theory, a 
third theoretical approach was developed on the basis of Foucault’s theory of governmentality. 
The Foucaultian approach defines security as a technique of government, focusing on institu-
tional, technological and technocratic processes implied by security framing. What these three 
approaches reveal is that the conceptual framework of security studies is marked by the oppo-
sition between objectivism (structural realism) and constructivism (the securitization theory 
and the Foucaultian approach). In order to escape this dichotomy, I adopt a phenomenological 
approach. 
Conceptualizing security in terms of the threat-referent object matrix, the traditional 
approach of security studies reduces security to a causal relation between stimuli and response, 
thus perceiving the response to threats by political units more or less as a reflex.592 By studying 
the behavior of political units, it is possible to predict and thus anticipate their responses. This 
objectivist conception of security assumes the objective presence of threats, i.e. the fact that 
threats are objectively given. In this respect, the traditional approach takes up an external or 
observational point of view, and in that sense presupposes but does not explain the perspective 
of a collective ‘grasped from the inside’, that is, a perspective from which the behavior of a 
political unit ‘appears as directed and gifted with an intention and meaning’.593 The objectivism 
of the traditional approach is problematic for at least two reasons. Firstly, it lacks critical aware-
ness about the fact that threats are never simply pre-given in an objective way but are always, 
to a greater or a lesser degree, defined as threats from the perspective of a collective. This 
point, which I will turn to assess in a minute, has been well argued by critical security scholars. 
Secondly, there is no causal relation or one-to-one correspondence between threat and re-
sponse as assumed by a stimuli-response model. That is, the threat does not pre-determine the 
response. This implies that there is always a range of responses possible to deal with a threat, 
and not just one. 
Critiquing the objectivism of the traditional approach, security scholars have turned 
to constructivist theories. I have discussed two of these constructivist approaches, i.e. the Co-
penhagen School and the Foucaultian approach, both of which define security in terms of a 
process of securitization. These approaches draw attention to the performative dimension of 
security. The notion of securitization as it was first defined by the Copenhagen School con-
cerns security as a speech act. A security speech act is a self-referential practice that can lift an 
issue to the level of an existential threat. This means that security naming has the potential of 
creating something that didn’t exist before. Put differently, if understood in the sense of a 
linguistic practice, securitization refers basically to the production of insecurity, i.e. the pro-
duction of threats. Redefining the notion of securitization, the Foucaultian draws attention to 
the fact the production of insecurity means reproducing it. That is, acts of securitization do 
not only produce security but also reiterate the insecure condition of the instance that needs 
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to be secured. Securitization refers to technological, institutional and technocratic processes 
that constitute what Huysmans calls ‘domains of (in)security’. Importantly, the notion of se-
curitization, both in the way in which it is defined by the Copenhagen School and the Fou-
caultian approach, reduces insecurity to a construct lacking an objective basis. 
My definition of security as collective self-assertion supports the notion of securiti-
zation as it also points to the performative dimension of (in)security. At the same time, it views 
the latter as too constructivist. While it is certainly true that the definition of insecurity entails 
performativity, it would be reductive to analyze threats as mere constructs. Actually, such a 
reductive interpretation would disregard the particular temporal structure of performativity. 
For it is not so much the case that an issue can only be viewed as security threat retrospectively, 
as Foucault would have it; as if there first was nothing and then suddenly through the process 
of securitization there emerges a security threat. Instead, the performativity of (in)security 
means that it has a retroactive structure. This is to say that the act or behavior that is defined 
as a threat effectively precedes this qualification, but paradoxically can only be said to be a 
threat after being qualified as such. Indeed, this is, in my view, the fundamental problem of 
the notion of securitization: the fact that there is no objective criterion does not mean that a 
threat is reducible to a construction. In my view, behavior is qualified retroactively as a security 
threat by the response. This means that the response co-constructs behavior as a security threat, 
and that security threats are marked by irreducible indeterminacy. The fact that behavior is 
defined as security threat only retroactively means that this qualification remains open to in-
terpretation and hence contestation.  
The different appreciation of the performativity implied by the definition of (in)se-
curity between the notion of securitization and my conception of security can be traced back 
to a difference between Foucault’s analysis of the distinction between potentiality and actuality 
and mine. Recall that Foucault assumes a fissure between potentiality and actuality. In Fou-
cault’s view, a security practice construes faceless potentiality into a security threat. What ini-
tially didn’t exist, is, retrospectively, turned into something, i.e. a security threat. The fissure 
between potentiality and actuality as assumed by Foucault, however, disregards to a certain 
degree the relation between potentiality and actuality. It is not the case that there is first faceless 
potentiality that is perceived retrospectively as something.  Rather, it is only through the qual-
ification as a security threat that its existence as potentiality is being actualized. It is first 
through the response, through the actualization, that something can be perceived as a security 
threat; responses make it accessible to the collective subject. Indeed, this is the fundamental 
difference between the discursive and my existential conception of security: the retroactivity 
of responsiveness implies a temporal hiatus. It is not the case that there was first nothing 
which is then construed into something, retrospectively. Instead, the response anticipates that 
which demands qualification. This means, on the one hand, that that which precedes the re-
sponse is not nothing and, on the other, that response entails only a representation – and in 
that sense a construction – of that which demands qualification. In this respect, my existential 
account of collective security provides a more adequate understanding insecurity and its fram-




A general characteristic of structural realism is its military understanding of security. Dealing 
with security in the domain of international relations, structural realism reduces security to the 
realm of ‘high’ politics, i.e. military interventions. Notwithstanding the fact that successive 
attempts have sought to change this military core of security studies, this feature still seems to 
define the ‘intellectual coherence’ of the discipline of security studies, to borrow Walt’s for-
mulation.594 Indeed, the attempt to ‘widen’ the threat-referent object matrix, seeking to 
‘broaden’ the range of threats and ‘deepen’ the notion of the security referent, reiterates rather 
than breaks with the military core of structural realism. Interestingly, to the extent that the 
military focus implies an exceptionalist understanding of security, the same can be said about 
the securitization theory and the Foucaultian approach. For although the securitization theory 
and the Foucaultian approach shift the attention to the process of securitization, they remain 
tied to the notion of an existential threat, relating security to exceptional cases. The military 
bias of security studies has two important implications. The first implication is that the narrow 
focus on the exceptional obstructs analyzing what we could call the normal character of (in)se-
curity. The second implication relates to the notion of existential threat. By adopting the no-
tion of existential threat from the traditional approach, the securitization theory and the Fou-
caultian approach also take over its narrow understanding in terms of the existence/non-ex-
istence of collective subjectivity, thereby discounting the critical potential of security. 
Let me start with the first point, the one-sided focus of security scholars on the ex-
ceptional character of (in)security. In fact, the Foucaultian approach analyzes ‘the jargon of 
exception’595 in order to disclose the constructivist nature of that which is rendered as an 
exceptional security threat. This focus on security as a process of exceptionalization makes 
that the securitization theory and the Foucaultian approach reject security, proposing a nega-
tive agenda of de-securitization. This seems to suggest that (in)security is perforce an excep-
tional category, and does not apply to the normal state of affairs. Yet a remark by Jef Huys-
mans suggests the opposite, when he speaks of ‘normalizing insecurity’.596 Indeed, Huysman’s 
remark suggests that insecurity is not only a category of exceptional politics but also applies to 
normal or ‘everyday’ politics. While I support this insight I think that the Foucaultian approach 
does not provide a sufficient conceptual grounding for understanding security as an issue of 
normal politics. More particularly, the problem seems to be that the Foucaultian approach 
lacks the conceptual means to come to terms with the distinction between the normal and the 
abnormal, or what it renders as the distinction between the normal and the exceptional. In-
deed, taking a skeptical stance, the Foucaultian approach only develops a critique of the tradi-
tional understanding of security but does not elaborate the notion of normal insecurity. In this 
respect, I agree with the way in which Ian Loader and Neil Walker characterize the critical 
strands of security studies. According to Loader and Walker, these critical security scholars 
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form ‘a negative, oppositional force’.597 The exclusive focus on exceptional forms of (in)secu-
rity implies that the Foucaultian approach is only preoccupied with what Loader and Walker 
call the ‘uncivilizing’ dimension of security. 
The reason why the Foucaultian approach fails to come to terms, conceptually speak-
ing, with the distinction between normality and exceptionality follows from its strong con-
structivism. As Foucault argues, normality is merely an ‘interplay of differential normalities’598; 
it is a construct, a discursive formation brought about by techniques of government. As a 
consequence, in Foucault’s view, there is no original normative criterion to distinguish between 
the normal and the exceptional. Take for example the profiling function of databases used for 
border control like the Schengen Information System and Eurodac.599 Databases like the 
Schengen Information System and Eurodac ‘refine’ the profiling of who belongs and thus can 
be defined as normal and who not and hence is qualified as exceptional, that is, as a security 
threat.600 In this sense, we could say that profiling by databases is itself constitutive of the 
distinction between normality and exceptionality, between the normal and the abnormal. 
However, while true as far as it goes, by dismissing the distinction between normal and excep-
tional as an original distinction and understanding it as a construct, the Foucaultian approach 
tends to dismiss the distinction between normality and exceptionality altogether. Instead, what 
we should say is that databases co-constitute the distinction between normal and exceptional 
and they are therefore not neutral, normatively speaking.  
Telling in this regard is Huysman’s argument that the ‘idiom of exception’ implies a 
neutralization or marginalization of the plane of the societal: ‘the idiom of exception has been 
called a jargon precisely because it marginalizes, and in the more radical cases, erases the soci-
etal as a realm of multi-faceted, historically structured political mediations and mobilizations’. 
While I can agree with Huysmans that the exception marginalizes the societal, the crucial ques-
tion is of course in what sense ‘the plane of societal’ provides a notion of normality. But this 
question remains unresolved by Huysmans. It can be found, though, in the notion of an insti-
tution, which represents normal order.601 On the basis of the notion of an institution, I have 
sought to make explicit the relation between security and normal order, a relation that is as-
sumed but not made explicit by security studies. In fact, it is in this sense that my conception 
of security can be read as a further elaboration of the definition of security as a ‘thick public 
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good’ as developed by Loader and Walker. For what I have conceptualized as normal order 
concerns what the notion of a public good defines as ‘an axiomatic element of lived social 
relations’.602 Moreover, the notion of a public good expresses in a different way something 
that I have discussed under the heading of normal order, namely the internal correlation be-
tween individual and collective (in)security. Whereas the one-sided focus on the exception 
results in a juxtaposition of the individual and the collective level, implying that collective 
security necessarily means ‘illiberal security’,603 the notion of a public good aims to reestablish 
the relation between individual and collective security. The definition of security as a thick 
public good refers to  
 
‘the accomplishment of a stable condition grounded in the tacit confidence individ-
uals have that their diverse and common legitimate expectations and their diverse 
and common loyalties as members of a political community are acknowledged in 
ways that afford them the material and symbolic resources required to manage, and 
feel relatively at ease, with the threats that are or may be present in their environ-
ment’.604  
 
While Loader and Walker primarily account for security from the perspective of the individual, 
they argue that the collective dimension is irreducible to security. Indeed, they speak of ‘common 
legitimate expectations’ and ‘common loyalities’ that individuals have ‘as members of a political 
community’. In other words, the concept of security presupposes some form of commonality 
and hence collectivity. 
The reorientation of the conception of security, covering both normal and excep-
tional (in)security, shows that the understanding of security by security scholars is too narrow 
and covers only a part of its meaning. More problematic is however that security studies seem 
to lack a criterion to distinguish between normal and abnormal or exceptional (in)security. 
This lack turns (in)security into an indistinct and hence ubiquitous phenomenon and explains 
why security scholars have been incapable of providing an argument as to why some issues 
should be defined (for example, terrorism, societal distress, immigration) as security problems 
and others not (for example, environmental degradation). Moreover, without such a criterion 
it is impossible to distinguish between individual and collective security other than in a negative 
way; they appear as indistinct, and for that reason everything seems to be mixed up. While I 
agree with the discursive conception that there is no original distinction between the normal 
and the exceptional, the directing idea and the way it is represented in concrete cases nonethe-
less provides such a criterion, albeit in the sense of a virtual criterion. The notion of the di-
recting idea provides the criterion of normality and hence also of abnormality or exceptional-
ity. However, to the extent that the directing idea requires representation, we never have direct 
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access to it. The representational structure of collective subjectivity implies that drawing the 
distinction between normality and abnormality/exceptionality is always a matter of both en-
forcing and constituting it. 
The focus on exceptionalism by security studies has, as mentioned, yet another im-
plication that relates to the notion of an existential threat. For what is interesting is that all 
security scholars, whether they adopt the traditional or a critical approach, focus in their dis-
cussion of security on the notion of existential threat, whether affirmatively or negatively. Cru-
cially, the notion of existential threat suggests that security concerns the problem of exist-
ence/non-existence. That is, an existential threat refers to a reductive understanding of the 
contingency of collective subjectivity, namely contingency as that-ness. In this respect, the 
notion of insecurity advocated by critical security scholars is at bottom no different from the 
one defended by Schmitt. Both critical security scholars and Schmitt collapse (in)security into 
the problem of the existence/non-existence of collective subjectivity. Indeed, notwithstanding 
their plea to place security threats in the framework of normal politics and hence ‘de-excep-
tionalize’ them, by adhering to the traditional security discourse in a negative way, critical se-
curity scholars remain bound to it and are unable to express what it means to ‘normalize inse-
curity’ in a positive way. Critical security scholars do not account for insecurity in a way other 
than the negative understanding of the problem of existence/non-existence. 
By reducing the notion of an existential threat to the question whether or not the 
collective exists as a unity, the other meaning of contingency, i.e. contingency as what-ness, is 
neglected. If an existential threat is exclusively defined in relation to the that-ness of collective 
existence, we lose sight of the fact that an existential threat can also be experienced as a chal-
lenge to the what-ness of collective subject. Actually, it is for this reason that I prefer to speak 
of insecurity in terms of challenges rather than threats as the latter notion narrows down 
(in)security to the problem of existence/non-existence, hence to boundary enforcement. To 
the extent that there are two ways in which challenges can be perceived and qualified by a 
collective, i.e. as a challenge to the what-ness or that-ness of collective existence, the authorities 
always have to take a decision how to interpret them. It is this element that makes boundary-
setting a wager. Now, the fact that boundary-setting is a wager implies that security need not 
fill critical security scholars solely with ‘unease’.605 For security also includes the potential of 
transforming collective subjectivity. Indeed, to the extent that security comprises both bound-
ary enforcement and boundary constitution, it includes both the conservative dimension of 
preservation and the critical potential of transformation. 
The critical potential of security links to the reflexive mode of being of a collective. 
In this respect, my definition of security as collective self-assertion supports the central idea 
behind Loader’s and Walker’s definition of security as a thick public good. According to 
Loader and Walker, key to the definition of security as thick public good is the problem ‘how 
and why social collectivities, given the inextricability of collective purpose and social sense of 
self and the centrality of the idea of common security in the forging of that inextricable link, 
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come to think of themselves and sustain thinking of themselves as social collectivities . . .’606 Actually, it is 
for this reason that Loader and Walker define security as a ‘constitutive’ public good: 
 
‘This, then, is the sense in which we can talk of security . . . as a constitutive public good 
– one whose actualization or aspiration is so pivotal  to the very purpose of commu-
nity that at the level of self-identification it helps to construct and sustain our ‘we-
feeling’- our very felt sense of ‘common publicness’.607 
   
The conception of security as collective self-assertion takes its cue from the reflexivity of col-
lective existence which is also central to the conception of security as a thick public good, that 
is, from the idea that security needs to be thought in the sense of ‘an ongoing investment’ and 
can therefore lead to the transformation of collective subjectivity.608 Indeed, this is how I un-
derstand what Loader and Walker call the ‘civilizing potential’ of security. Security includes 
the possibility of transformation and emancipation. 
To summarize, my conception of security casts critical light on the crisis of security 
studies. First of all, it reveals that security studies are caught in a conceptual framework ranging 
between objectivism and strong constructivism. As a consequence, it is not possible on the 
basis of the conceptual framework of security studies to conceive security from the first-per-
son perspective of a collective subject. This means that security scholars therefore have per-
force a reductive analysis of security. Secondly, security studies still bear the stamp that it was 
given by the traditional approach in that it continues to have an exceptionalist bias. The mili-
tary understanding of security implies, first of all, a narrow focus on exceptional forms of 
(in)security, discounting the distinction between the normal and the exceptional. Secondly, it 
implies that security scholars necessarily understand security as a problem of existence/non-
existence, thus disregarding the critical potential that it can induce for the transformation of 
collective subjectivity. Nevertheless, to the extent that the Foucaultian approach introduces 
security as an existential concept against which it is polemically oriented, it provides the op-
portunity to support a great part of its analysis concerning the constructivism of security prob-
lems and the shift from exceptional to normal politics, giving it a more firm conceptual 
grounding. Indeed, this is what I have sought to accomplish with the conception of security 
as collective self-assertion, namely, adopt the critical aspects of the Foucaultian approach 
within an existential conception of collective security. 
 
4.5 Security and Immigration 
In Chapters 1, 2, and 3, we have analyzed three concepts of collective security. The first con-
cept is the one provided by security scholars who take their cue from Foucault’s theory of 
governmentality. They define security as a technique of government. The second concept is 
based on the political and legal theory of Carl Schmitt. Schmitt defines security as collective 
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self-preservation. The third concept is mine. I define security as collective self-assertion. I have 
developed this definition in a critical debate with Schmitt, aiming to incorporate the critical 
point put forward by the Foucaultian approach against Schmitt about the performative dimen-
sion of security. In this final section I wish to put the three concepts of security to the test 
applying them to the issue of immigration. The case on which I will focus concerns the border 
fences around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, fences build to prevent illegal border 
crossing into Spain and the EU. This is not a random choice. Immigration is central to the 
analysis of security by scholars associated with the Foucaultian approach and also plays role in 
Schmitt’s analysis of security when he discusses strategies to neutralize the strange. The central 
question of this section is the following. How to analyze the border crossing of illegal immi-
grants into the EU on the basis of the three conceptions of security (technique of government, 
collective self-preservation and collective self-assertion)?  
 
4.5.1 Illegal Immigration and the Border Fences around Ceuta and Melilla 
Before we can go over to discussing the question of the border fences as security measures, 
we first need to contextualize the issue of illegal immigration against the background of the 
EU as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(hereafter: AFSJ) is a fundamental policy objective of the EU that was adopted by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam. In Article 2 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, this objective is formulated as fol-
lows, a formulation that was retained in subsequent treaties in more or less the same words: 
 
‘[The Union shall set itself the objective] to maintain and develop the Union as an 
area of freedom, security and justice, in which the free movement of persons is as-
sured in  conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border con-
trols, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime’.609 
 
The significance of the adoption of the AFSJ as a fundamental policy objective can hardly be 
overstated as it has turned policies in the field of justice and home affairs into ‘a self-standing 
integration objective’610 next to the internal market. Accordingly, the policies covered by the 
AFSJ can no longer simply be characterized as a compensatory measure for the abolishment 
of the internal borders between the Member States, but have become an objective of European 
integration themselves. 
In Communication 459/98, the European Commission teases out an important im-
plication of the AFSJ as a fundamental policy objective. 
                                                             
609 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, 
C 325, 24 December 2002. There is a slight difference in the formulation of this fundamental policy objective since 
the Treaty of Lisbon: ‘The Union shall offers its citizens an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice without internal 
frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect 
to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime’ (Treaty on the Func-
tioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the European Union, C 115, 9 may 2008). For an analysis of the differ-
ences between previous and the current formulation, see Jörg Monar, ‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, in 
Armin von Bogdandy & Jürgen Bast (eds.), Principles of European Constitutional Law, Hart Publishing/Verlag CH Beck: 
Oxford/München, 2010, pp. 551-585, especially p. 554 ff.  




‘It is in the framework of the consolidation of an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice that the concept of public order appears as a common denominator in a so-
ciety based on democracy and the rule of law. With the entry into force of the Am-
sterdam Treaty, this concept which has hitherto been determined principally by each 
individual Member State will also have to be assessed in terms of the new European 
area. Independently of the responsibilities of Member States for maintaining public 
order, we will gradually have to shape a "European public order" based on an assess-
ment of shared fundamental interests.’611 
 
Indeed, if the EU is established as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, then this would 
imply the possibility of raising an issue of ‘European public order’.612 As stated in the cited 
passage, a European public order is shaped ‘independently of the responsibilities of Member 
States for maintaining public order’ and thus does not replace them. In fact, Article 72 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the EU states that the objective to constitute the EU as an Area 
of Freedom, Security and Justice ‘shall not affect the exercise of the responsibilities incumbent 
upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security’.613 Nevertheless, the problem remains the same either in the case of the EU 
or of the Member States, namely maintaining law and order. For example, as concerns the 
control of the EU’s external borders, the aim of border control concurs for both the Member 
State in question and the EU in the sense that the control of external borders is a primary 
means for ‘the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security’, to 
repeat Article 72 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
To the extent that the AFSJ demarcates the area in which citizens of Member States 
and legally resident third-country nationals enjoy the right to free movement, much emphasis 
is on the management of the external borders, including measures against what is called ‘illegal 
immigration’. The notion of illegal immigration refers to irregular forms of immigration that 
do not fulfill the legal conditions of entry and residence.614 As it is stated in Article 79 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, section 1, 
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‘1. The Union shall develop a common immigration policy aimed at ensuring, at all 
stages, the efficient management of migration flows, fair treatment of third-country 
nationals residing legally in Member States, and the prevention of, and enhanced 
measures to combat, illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings.’615 
 
In fact, a substantial part of the measures managing the migration flow relates to the issue of 
illegal immigration, as stated in Article 79, section 2.c: 
 
‘2. For the purposes of paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council, acting 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt measures in the 
following areas: 
  . . .  
  (c) illegal immigration and unauthorised residence, including removal and 
  repatriation of persons residing without authorisation; 
  . . .’616 
 
Consequently, measures against illegal immigration form an integral part of the emergence of 
the EU as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. In this sense, illegal immigration can be 
qualified as an issue of European public order. 
A case in point is the border fence around Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla. 
This is an interesting example because of its peculiar geography. Ceuta and Melilla are two 
cities that belong to a European country and are on the African mainland.617 This means that 
Ceuta and Melilla are the only territories part of the EU that provide a land border between 
the EU and Africa.618 Because of their particular geography Ceuta and Melilla form a ‘gateway’ 
for irregular immigrants, as Peter Gold notes.619 ‘Surrounded by Morocco and with the African 
continent behind them, it is scarcely surprising that they [i.e. Ceuta and Melilla, MB] are very 
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attractive as points of entry for would-be illegal immigrants to continental Europe’.620 Actually, 
according to Gold,  
  
‘there is well-established network organized from Morocco which facilitates the pas-
sage of illegal immigrants from several countries in west and central Africa via Cam-
eroon and Senegal to Morocco or Algeria and thence to the North African ports. 
Some try to cross to Europe from Tangiers, Oujda and Nador, while others try to do 
so from Ceuta and Melilla. Most of those who make it to the Spanish enclaves do 
not have the money to pay for a boat crossing and so they seek asylum’.621 
 
This means that a part of the irregular immigrants who try to reach Ceuta and Melilla originates 
from sub-Saharan African countries. It is well known that these immigrants, too poor to pur-
sue another route into Europe, hide in the forests on Moroccan territory near the borders of 
Ceuta and Melilla waiting for the moment to cross it, often in large groups in order to increase 
the chances of success. 
One of the measures to control the borders around Ceuta and Melilla is the erection 
of a border fence. Indeed, in order to keep the irregular immigrants out, the border between 
Morocco and the Spanish enclaves has been transformed from a ‘fairly permeable’622 border 
into a militarized zone with six meter high parallel fences with barbwire and all kinds of tech-
nologies to detect immigrants who attempt to climb them. As critics claim, the transformation 
from open and permeable borders into watertight frontiers reflects the general change in per-
ception of the function of the external borders, a change that is captured by the notion of 
‘Fortress Europe’.623 As Pietro Soddu argues, for example, at a certain moment  
 
‘the Spanish Government and the European Union decided to protect the cities’ bor-
ders with a modern and sophisticated system which would prevent immigrants from 
entering, delimiting those imaginary boundaries between Europe and Africa which 
were never definitely marked in Ceuta and Melilla. Those borders which only ap-
peared on military maps and tourist guides, that for various centuries had represented 
a place of interaction and exchange, those borders capable of coloring the social fab-
ric of both cities, are today the defiant symbol of the divide between two worlds, and 
are evidence of police supervision of immigration, as well as being the most expres-
sive demonstration of the concept of a Fortress Europe that only accepts capable, 
good and qualified immigrants into its territory.’624 
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As a matter of fact, as documented in a report by the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Anda-
lucía, an organization based in Andalusia, Spain, that promotes human rights, the border con-
trol policies related to the fences between the Spanish enclaves and Morocco have caused a 
series of human rights violations.  
Two of the events in which human rights violations occurred concern the response 
of Spanish and Moroccan authorities to the mass storming of the border fences of Ceuta and 
Melilla in August and October 2005, and a push-back operation by the same authorities to 
prevent immigrants from accessing Ceuta via a beachside, Playa el Tarajal, in February 2014.625 
As to the first, the mass storming of the border fences in 2005, it has been ascertained that at 
least fourteen immigrants died and hundreds were injured because of police interventions. The 
report by the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía provides a detailed list of incidents 
related to the 2005 events, concluding that ‘the law enforcement agencies used inappropriate 
methods, used excessive force, in many cases with cruelty, and were insufficiently prepared . . 
.’626 In the events of 2014, around two hundred immigrants were pushed into the sea by the 
Moroccan authorities, which attempted to prevent them from crossing the beach to Spain. 
When the immigrants were in the water, the Spanish authorities took over from their Moroc-
can colleagues, aiming to push back the immigrants to Morocco. Even though the Spanish 
authorities never took responsibility for the fatalities that ensued, and the information about 
the interventions is based on witness statements only, the report claims that it is ‘reasonable 
to assume that the use of anti-riot equipment was disproportionate to the “threat”, and there 
is little margin of doubt that the shooting and teargas were related to the tragic death by 
drowning of 15 people’.627 
In the eyes of the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía, the history of the bor-
der fences around Ceuta and Melilla demonstrates a tunnel vision. The Spanish authorities 
seem ‘incapable of thinking about any other form of migration management’ than in terms of 
‘higher fences, fences more difficult to cross’.628 According to Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos 
de Andalucía, this is a dead-end street – literally.  
 
‘In the final analysis, there is important symbolism embodied in the fences of Ceuta 
and Melilla. It is the stark illustration of the policies of Fortress Europe. Externalisa-
tion, Frontex, Eurosur . . . and walls. Walls of suffering and death. Walls of a Euro-
pean siege mentality, searching for illusory security. We can build walls on the bor-
ders, justifying them with the needs of security and, although they can never finally 
achieve their terrible purpose, we keep using them to justify ever more frontier tech-
nology . . .’629 
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Because of the fact that the ‘current migration policies, of war against immigrants, provide no 
solutions’, the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía claims that ‘a profound change of 
logic is required’.630 In fact, the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía presents action 
points based on respect for human rights to change the current external border regime. These 
action points reasonably speak to a more inclusive approach to immigrants, for example by 
applying broader family reunification criteria. But the claim of the Asociación Pro Derechos Hu-
manos de Andalucía is more radical than this. ‘The first step of this logic is to accept that there 
are no shortcuts to scrupulous respect for Human Rights. There is not National Interest nor 
border control requirement that can justify the serious violations of Human Rights carried out 
by our Government [Spain, MB] or those of Morocco or the European Union’.631 
In sum, this brief discussion shows that in the case of Ceuta and Melilla the creation 
of an AFSJ goes hand in hand with the establishment of restrictive and repressive external 
border control regime, even at the cost of fatalities among immigrants. The crucial question is 
of course how to assess the border fence around Ceuta and Melilla as a security response to 
the problem of illegal immigration. More particularly, how to assess the border fences on the 
basis of the three conceptions of collective security (technique of government, collective self-
preservation and collective self-assertion)?  
 
4.5.2 Politics of Insecurity 
In the following I will apply the three concepts of security to the case of border fences around 
Ceuta and Melilla in the following order. First I will discuss the way in which the Foucaultian 
approach to security studies would analyze it. As we will see, the analysis of border fences as 
a technique of government is close to the one outlined in the report by the Asociación Pro 
Derechos Humanos de Andalucía. Then, I will turn to analyze the case on the basis of Schmitt’s 
conception of security. The contrast with the analysis of the border fence as a technique of 
government is striking. For whereas the analysis of the border fence as a technique of govern-
ment delivers an utterly critical approach, Schmitt’s concept of security on the other hand 
provides a justification of the border control regime adopted by Spain and the EU. Lastly, I 
will analyze the border fence around Ceuta and Melilla on the basis of my own concept of 
security, collective self-assertion. In contrast to the other two conceptions, the focus in my 
analysis is not exclusively on the individual immigrant but also on the larger economic and 
social dynamics involved, i.e. what Saskia Sassen calls ‘migration systems’.632  
How to analyze the border fences around Ceuta and Melilla as a technique of gov-
ernment? In a general sense, an analysis of the fences on the basis of the definition of security 
as technique of government focuses on how immigration is framed as a security threat by 
Spain and the European Union. In the case of the border fences around Ceuta and Melilla, the 
immigrants are not primarily conceived in economic or human rights terms, respectively, as a 
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worker or an individual who enjoys human rights, but framed as a threat to the continued 
existence of Spain and the EU. That is, the sub-Saharan Africans who are waiting on Moroccan 
territory for their passage to Ceuta and Melilla are rendered as an existential threat. Security 
scholars like Didier Bigo and Jef Huysmans point to the particular dialectic or logic of security 
framing. In the eyes of security scholars, by framing the irregular immigrants as an existential 
threat, Spain and the EU constitute themselves as insecure communities. The border fence 
reiterates the insecure existence of Spain and the EU and also the fact that irregular immigrants 
are the cause thereof. 
On the basis of Bigo and Huysmans we could say that the establishment of the EU 
as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice implies the securitization of the internal market. 
In Bigo’s view, the AFSJ is aimed at controlling rather than facilitating free movement of 
individuals.633 To the extent that the AFSJ lumps together different kinds of security issues, 
such as cross border crime, migration and terrorism, it marks a new stage in what Bigo calls 
the European ‘security continuum’.634 According to Bigo, instead of marking a new stage in 
the realization of the EU as an area of free movement, the AFSJ primarily institutionalizes the 
EU as an internal security space. Indeed, as Huysmans notes, if the policies grouped under the 
AFSJ were first legitimated as ‘flanking measures for the effective creation of the internal mar-
ket’635, now the AFSJ has become an autonomous element in European integration. Question-
ing the ‘spill-over’ from the internal market into an internal security field, Huysmans claims 
that the adoption of the AFSJ as a fundamental policy objective of the EU is the result of ‘a 
political act of securitization’.636 For, in Huysmans’ view, the AFSJ implies a politics of inse-
curity in that it always ‘frames a relation between security and freedom’.637 To counter this develop-
ment, Huysmans suggests de-securitizing the EU by challenging ‘the dominant presence in 
security frameworks in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, shifting ‘the practical real-
ization of freedom away from the overwhelming role of security techniques’. Huysmans adds 
that 
 
‘such a move requires that freedom is paired to other political principles than security, 
that the practical realization of freedom is not mediated through the practical reali-
zation of freedom but through the practical realization of equality or justice for ex-
ample. Such a re-pairing is a complex practice, as can be glanced from the construc-
tion of justice in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice . . .’638 
 
Providing a critical angle, the concept of security as a technique of government leads to ques-
tioning the practice of the border fences around Ceuta and Melilla. Why is it that Spain and 
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the EU define immigrants who climb the border fence as security threat and not, or at least 
not, primarily as persons who make a claim to participating in the internal market of the EU 
or persons who make a claim to legal protection following from ‘the values of respect for 
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights’639 
on which the EU is based? What legitimates treating irregular immigrants primarily as a secu-
rity problem, as illegal immigrants, something that stands in conflict with respecting them as 
human rights holders? And, furthermore, what does the border fence tell us about the political 
identity of EU? The direction of Bigo’s and Huysmans’s answer to these questions is clear. If 
the EU truly aspires to realize itself as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, we should 
de-securitize it, meaning that when dealing with irregular immigration we need to take into 
account freedom and justice, and thus not respond to it as a mere issue of European public 
order, that is, not merely issue of boundary enforcement. 
 A strong point of the analysis of the border fences around Ceuta and Melilla, on the 
basis of the conception of security as technique of government, is the observation that the 
securitization of the EU implies that political questions as concerns the establishment of the 
EU as an AFSJ are elided, thereby narrowing down the responses available to the EU to deal 
with irregular immigration to mere boundary enforcement. What critical security scholars try 
to reveal is that a security response is not simply boundary enforcement but presupposes a 
choice to do so, a choice that could have been made differently. Critical security scholars sug-
gest that the EU can and should come to view itself in a different light, indeed, not in terms 
of security but rather as a provider of justice and freedom. Indeed, in the eyes of Bigo and 
Huysmans, irregular immigration should be viewed as an issue of normal politics, and not of 
exceptional politics. Irregular immigrants should not be conceived of as a threat, but rather as 
an issue related to (economic) freedom and (global) justice, in response to which the EU could 
opt for a politics of inclusion rather than a politics of exclusion. Yet, notwithstanding the 
cogent critique of the Foucaultian approach, what is problematic about it is the understanding 
of the relation between security and normal politics. By understanding security in an excep-
tionalist sense, the Foucaultian approach seems to detach security from the realm of normal 
politics. The Foucaultian approach seems to lack the conceptual resources to establish in what 
sense the problem of security understood in the sense of the problem of inclusion/exclusion 
returns at the level of normal politics. In what is sense is the closure, i.e. the principle of 
inclusion and exclusion, as materialized by the border fences around Ceuta and Melilla, not 
only constitutive of security but also of justice and freedom? And, accordingly, how to account 
for the internal correlation between security, freedom, and justice? It seems that the Foucaul-
tian approach cannot account for the border fences around Ceuta and Melilla as means of 
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4.5.3 Politics of Security 
In contrast to the conception of security as technique of government, Schmitt would endorse 
the current external border regime. For, to begin with, the notion of a European public order 
has a strong spatial connotation. That is, order is perforce bounded as it presupposes a closure 
between inside and outside. In this sense, the border fence around Ceuta and Melilla reflects 
the EU’s spatial boundaries; it materializes the spatial unity of Spain and the European Union 
as a nomos. The border fence separates ‘a pacified order from a quarrelsome disorder, a cosmos 
from chaos, a house from a non-house, an enclosure from the wilderness’, as Schmitt puts 
it.640 More particularly, to the extent that the border fence is constitutive of the European 
Union as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, Schmitt views it primarily as a disjunction 
between inside and outside, and not as a conjunction, ‘a place of interaction and exchange’ as 
Pietro Soddu argues in his critique of ‘Fortress Europe’.641 This is to say that, in Schmitt’s 
interpretation, the border fence is primarily a dividing line between inside and outside.642 
For Schmitt the border fences around Ceuta and Melilla are a primary means of col-
lective self-preservation of the EU. The border fences demarcate the distinction between the 
EU’s own place and that which is strange to it, between what it deems normal and abnormal, 
and, in its most radical sense, between friend and enemy. As a security response, the border 
fences should be understood as an instance of boundary enforcement, that is, the enforcement 
of normal order. Recall that, in Schmitt’s interpretation, normal order consists of two ele-
ments. The first element is the normal situation. The normal situation concerns behavior that 
is in conformity to what a collective deems normal and hence legal. In this sense, to the extent 
that the climbing of the border fences forms an infringement of the legal regulation for entry 
into and residence in the EU, these immigrants can be qualified as illegal. The second element 
of Schmitt’s definition of normal order is the normal type of man. The idea of a normal type 
of man refers to the notion of a collective’s ‘substantial similarity’.643 This is to say that indi-
viduals are considered normal if they participate in the substantial similarity of a collective. An 
example of this can be found in the preamble of the Lisbon Treaty, which states that the 
European Union draws its ‘inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance 
of Europe’.644 Schmitt would argue that to the extent that the sub-Saharan African immigrants 
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do not participate in this substantial similarity, they can be qualified as abnormal, other or 
strange, that is, as individuals that don’t belong in the EU. And in so far that these immigrants 
do not belong in the EU, they represent an infringement of normal order that requires a re-
sponse of boundary enforcement. 
As outlined in Chapter 2, Schmitt distinguishes three responses to neutralize abnor-
mal or ‘strange elements’.645 First of all, the neutralization of abnormality or strangeness can 
be realized through assimilation and expulsion. The third method of neutralization discerned 
by Schmitt is the final option of a collective to deal with abnormality and strangeness. This 
method can be defined as the ‘existential negation’ or destruction of the abnormal or strange 
element.646 Indeed, as Schmitt formulates it, ‘the friend, enemy, and combat concepts receive 
their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing’.647 
In contrast to the conception of security as technique of government, Schmitt would 
answer the question affirmatively whether the irregular immigrants who climb the border 
fences around Ceuta and Melilla should be understood as an existential threat to Spain and the 
EU. That is, to the extent that Schmitt defines the notion of public order substantially, for him 
irregular immigrants are a threat to the existence/non-existence (contingency as that-ness) to 
the EU’s unity. Indeed, according to Schmitt, because the sub-Saharan Africans cannot be 
considered to participate in the substantial similarity of Spain and the EU, they present a 
strange element intruding into what Spanish and European citizens call their own. Put legally, 
in Schmitt’s view, the climbing of the border fence by immigrants is an exceptional or border-
line case that requires the EU ‘determining definitively what constitutes public order’;648 the 
mass storming of the border fences ‘defies’649 the normal order. Accordingly, from a 
Schmittian point of view, the infringement of the Spanish and European public order by ir-
regular immigrants should be neutralized, if not through expulsion then in the extreme situa-
tion through physical killing, even if this requires a suspension of the rule of law, that is, par-
adoxically a suspension of the rule of law to safeguard the European Union as an Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice. Acts whereby immigrants who attempt to cross the border 
between Morocco and Spain are abandoned to their fate, with the perspective of near-certain 
death, as in the events of the mass storming of the fence in October 2005 and the push-back 
operation at Playa el Tarajal in February 2014, approximates this Schmittean scenario. In short, 
Schmitt would endorse the definition of irregular immigration as illegal immigration. 
In contrast to the conception of security as technique of government, Schmitt argues 
for the positive significance of the border fence around Ceuta and Melilla. The border fence 
enforces the spatial boundaries of collective existence, that is, it reflects the original spatial 
boundaries constitutive of the EU. Nevertheless, to the extent that Schmitt analyzes the border 
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fence as an instance of boundary enforcement, he reduces the question of the contingency of 
collective existence to the that-ness of collective existence. This is fateful because Schmitt 
thereby limits the range of responses available to the EU in dealing with irregular immigration. 
Indeed, problematic about Schmitt’s analysis is that he assumes a collective to exist in an orig-
inal condition of security, meaning that insecurity comes into the picture only in second in-
stance, derivatively. Schmitt’s static account of the relation between security and insecurity 
disregards the dynamic of their intrinsic relation, something that Michael Dillon denotes as 
‘the radical ambivalence of (in)security’.  According to Dillon, ‘it is only because it is contoured 
by insecurity, and because in its turn it also insecures, that security can secure’.650 In other 
words, it is an illusion to assume, as Schmitt does, that the border fence around Ceuta and 
Melilla creates a condition of security freeing a collective from insecurity. Consequently, the 
concepts of security as a technique of government and as collective self-preservation have 
their weak and strong points. Whereas the former accounts for the constructivist dimension 
of insecurity but tends to disregard the positive significance of borders as a dividing line, the 
latter tends to reify the border line and treat insecurity in a derivative sense.  
 
4.5.4 Politics of (In)security 
Now that we have analyzed the border fence on the basis of the definition of security as a 
technique of government and as collective self-preservation, let us turn to collective self-as-
sertion. In what sense does irregular immigration form a challenge to the EU, i.e. as a threat and 
an opportunity? Essential to this conception of security is that it takes into account the twofold 
contingency of collective existence. In contrast to the conception of security as technique of 
government and as collective self-preservation, the latter distinguishes between contingency 
as that-ness and as what-ness. This twofold account of contingency follows from the repre-
sentational structure of collective subjectivity. To the extent that a collective exists in the sense 
of a claimed unity, it is irreducibly insecure both as to what it is as a unity and that it is a unity. 
While representation claims to reproduce the collective’s unity it also always constitutes to a 
greater or lesser degree this unity, both in the sense that it is a unity and what it is as unity. 
This means that the notion of an existential threat includes two meanings and that the possi-
bilities available to a collective to safeguard its continued existence are much broader than 
assumed by Schmitt. For what Schmitt calls an existential threat can interpreted both as a 
challenge to the what-ness and to that-ness of collective existence. Fr this reason I prefer to 
speak of challenges rather than threats. The notion of a challenge involves both a threat and a 
range of transformative possibilities that open up to a collective. To view security as collective 
self-assertion, rather than as collective self-preservation, is to acknowledge this ambiguous 
status of what confronts a collective with its contingency. 
The responsive structure of security suggests that boundary enforcement is not the 
only possibility available to the EU to respond to that which challenges it. Nevertheless, this 
is not to deny that boundary enforcement is a possible response to the irregular immigrants 
who attempt to cross the border fences. Indeed, if the responsible authorities would not act, 
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and just let the irregular border crossing happen, then this would imply an infringement of the 
EU’s effective normal order as reflected in the legal regulations of entry and residence. And a 
continuous infringement of normal order can be experienced as challenge to the EU’s exist-
ence/non-existence in that it could form a threat to how the EU has actualized its directing 
idea.651 Indeed, if considered from the perspective of individual violating the legal regulations 
of entry and residence into the EU, boundary enforcement represents a possible response.  
But it would be reductive to interpret the climbing of the border fences around Ceuta 
and Melilla merely as a question of existence/non-existence, i.e. contingency as that-ness. The 
behavior of the irregular immigrants forms also a challenge to the what-ness of collective ex-
istence; the climbing of the border fences also forms a challenge to what the EU views as its 
unity. In the eyes of migrants Europe represents an economic wealthy part of the world where 
they hope to improve their living conditions. As Ricard Zapata-Barrero argues, ‘immigration 
flows from Africa highlight that the EU has become an “imagined community” for those who 
do not belong’.652 The normative claim made by the immigrants is that they want to be in-
cluded in the internal market of the EU and have a share in the Union’s economic wealth. 
This understanding of the behavior of irregular immigrants requires a shift in perspective. 
Indeed, according to Saskia Sassen, the climbing of the border fences should be understood 
on the background of ‘larger geopolitical and transnational economic dynamics’653, and not 
merely as individual action that can be qualified as legal or illegal. Sassen is concerned with 
what we could call the problem of ‘individualizing’ irregular migration as a security problem, 
indeed, a move whereby the larger, macro-economic dynamics are concealed. This does not 
only count for the approach that I characterize as ‘politics of security’, but also holds for the 
critique of the current border regime of EU by the Asociación Pro-Derechos Humanos de Anadalucia 
in so far that they claim that the Spanish authorities violate human rights. For also human 
rights individualize and hence draw the attention away from what Sassen calls the ‘migration 
system’. The point that Sassen wants to make is that immigration is related to ‘the current or 
past actions of receiving countries’.654 The receiving country should not be considered as pas-
sive and the immigrant as active. Instead, as Sassen argues, ‘the international activities of the 
governments or firms of countries of receiving immigrants may have contributed to the for-
mation of economic links with emigration countries, links that may invite the movement of 
people as well as capital’.655 These observations suggest that responding to irregular immi-
grants requires that we need to understand why they want to come to the EU in the first place. 
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What stake has the EU in the migration flow of sub-Saharan Africans? In what sense has the 
EU itself contributed to what it has come to view as a significant source of insecurity?  
A thorough examination of this question goes beyond the scope of this research. 
Here I can develop only the contours of what I have in mind. It is a well-established fact that 
there are economic disparities between the EU and the countries on the African continent and 
that the effects of these disparities not only concern income but also issues related to human 
development like life expectancy and literacy.656 It is also well-known and widely accepted that 
the EU has actively contributed to these economic disparities, for example by means of its 
Common Agricultural Policy. At first sight the overall aims of the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy are laudable: to increase agricultural productivity, ensure a fair standard of living for the 
agricultural community, stabilize markets, assure the availability of supplies, and ensure that 
supplies reach consumers at a reasonable price.657 A closer look reveals however that ‘the 
policy epitomises the principle of community preference, whereby the internal EU market is pro-
tected in order to favour domestically produced goods at the expense of imports’.658 By means 
of a complex system of import tariffs, export subsidies and direct subsidies the Common Ag-
ricultural Policy isolates the European industries and markets from competition, preventing, 
among others, African countries from accessing the internal market on normal, liberal terms.659 
A point in case is the Common Agricultural Policy related to the commodity of sugar. It is 
claimed that EU sugar policies effectively thwart the reduction of poverty in African coun-
tries.660 So, in short, we could say that the Common Agricultural Policy has contributed to the 
geopolitical and transnational economic dynamics that drive African immigrants to the EU. 
The recognition of the dynamic between the African countries and the EU as an 
economic entity provides an occasion to reflect on what the EU is as a unity. Since the adop-
tion of the AFSJ as a fundamental policy objective of the EU, the focus on matters of security 
and immigration has shifted more and more to the EU in the sense of a political entity, an 
entity comparable to national constitutional orders.661 Crucially, this approach has predeter-
mined the way in which the irregular border crossing of immigrants is perceived and what 
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responses are available to deal with it. In fact, this focus on what we could call the constitu-
tionalization of the EU, i.e. the shaping of the EU as full blown Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, means that responses based on the idea of migration systems in which the EU is 
entangled remain unexplored. Nevertheless, if it is true that immigration and economic dy-
namics are intertwined and that the functioning of the EU as an internal market can be dis-
cerned as a cause of the migration flow of African immigrants to the EU, these irregular mi-
grants challenge the EU to reconsider what it is as a unity. More particularly, the problem of 
immigration could lead to a reinvention of the EU as economic entity that is part of the world 
market. This could mean for example that the legal regulation of entry and residence becomes 
dictated by the needs of the internal market, implying that the AFSJ would be, anew, conceived 
as a flanking measure of the internal market. Focusing on immigration in the AFSJ as an exis-
tential threat (contingency as that-ness) deflects the attention from the challenge raised by the 
immigrants to what the EU is as a unity, in particular to the commonality of the internal market 
and how the EU relates to the commonality of a global market for which it bears responsibility. 
Here again we see the notion of a challenge, rather than as an existential threat, as opening up 
a critical space in which security as collective self-assertion allows not only for boundary en-
forcement but also and even boundary constitution. 
Two implications can be drawn from this analysis of the border fences around Ceuta 
and Melilla on the basis of the conception of security as collective self-assertion. The first 
implication is that the current response to irregular migration by the EU – ‘higher fences, 
fences more difficult to cross’, as the Asociación Pro Derechos Humanos de Andalucía puts it – 
reflects that the EU understands it as a challenge to its existence/non-existence. Indeed, the 
EU understands irregular migration as individual behavior that requires boundary enforce-
ment, that is, as a factual challenge to the EU. In the light of the fatalities among immigrants 
related to events in 2005 and 2014 in Ceuta and Melilla, this gives rise to the question in what 
sense we still can speak of the EU as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice based on ‘the 
principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and 
of the rule of law’662 if these principles are suspended, not incidentally but structurally, in the 
course of its realization. What this question suggests is that security responses, i.e. responses 
that are assumed to deal with insecurity, can themselves turn into sources of insecurity. To the 
individuals to whom these responses are directed, but also in the sense that security policies 
can trigger questioning what and who ‘we’ are as a collective, for example in the form of public 
disapproval of the external border regime. The second implication is that responses to irregular 
immigration need to take into account the ‘migration system’, as Sassen calls it, which forms 
the background for the individual’s behavior. That is, irregular migration also forms a norma-
tive challenge to the EU. When considering the macro-economic dimension of irregular im-
migration, this opens up the possibility to deal with it by means of boundary constitution. In 
fact, this would imply that we should accept rather than reject the notion of a ‘security contin-
uum’, in the sense that immigration policy is on a continuum with the EU’s economic and 
external relations policy. In order to respond to irregular migration in a way that does not 
                                                             
662 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 2012/C 325, Preamble, recital 4. 
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individualize it or treat it merely as a human rights problem, economic and external relations 
policies are part and parcel of migration policy and should be treated as such if responding to 
irregular migration as a normative challenge. 
All in all, the analysis of the border fence around Ceuta and Melilla on the basis of 
the definition of security as collective self-assertion provides insight into the different dimen-
sions of irregular or illegal border crossing as a security problem. Importantly, the conception 
of security as collective self-assertion resists simple solutions to security problems but it does 
not imply avoiding to set the boundaries in the end. Taking into account the fundamental 
contingency of the collective’s existence, it dismisses easy responses to insecurity as proposed 
by the conception of security as collective self-preservation. This is not to say however that 
security policies based on collective self-assertion can principally escape from engaging in 
boundary enforcement. But if such measures are adopted it is done with self-restraint, taking 
into account that securing eo ipso implies insecuring. So, collective self-assertion implies 
awareness about the fact that decisions about boundaries are unavoidable, both as concerns 
whether we are a collective and what we are as a collective. This is where collective self-asser-
tion is at some distance from the conception of security as technique of government, a con-
ception that mobilizes critical potential but keeps its hands clean. In short, the definition of 
security as collective self-assertion provides an alternative to both the conception of security 
as collective self-preservation and the conception of security as technique of government. 
Let me briefly round off this section. The three concepts of security offer different 
approaches to the issue of irregular immigration. The conception of security as technique of 
government is critical of defining immigration as a security problem. On the basis of the other 
two conceptions, collective self-preservation and collective self-assertion, it is indeed possible 
to analyze irregular immigration as a security problem. Nevertheless, whereas the conception 
of security as collective self-preservation affirms the qualification of irregular immigration as 
illegal immigration outright, the conception of security as collective self-assertion includes a 
critical assessment of that which is initially conceived as the source of insecurity. Moreover, 
what my analysis of the case of the border fence around Ceuta and Melilla suggests is that 
there is a range of responses available instead of just one. 
 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter I have compared the conceptions of security as developed in Chapters 1, 2, 
and 3. First I have assessed their conceptual differences, focusing on the conceptualization of 
the security referent. Whereas Schmitt defines the existence of collective subjectivity reduc-
tively in the mode of sameness, I argued that Foucault can be read as an inversion of Schmitt 
reducing collective subjectivity to a discursive unity. In contrast to both Schmitt’s and the 
Foucault’s understanding of collective subjectivity, I have developed a notion of collective 
subjectivity that takes its cue from the interrelated notions of identity as sameness and as self-
hood, and which is reflected in its representational structure. This alternative understanding 
of collective subjectivity allowed me to define security as boundary setting, both including 
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boundary enforcement and boundary constitution. After having assessed the conceptual ram-
ifications of the three notions of security, I applied them to the case of the border fences 
around Ceuta and Melilla. I argued that my conception of security provides the most adequate 
understanding of the border fence as a security measure in the sense that it allows to discuss 



















This book has been devoted to critically assessing the concept of collective security. For this 
purpose I have identified and analyzed the two prevalent conceptions of security, namely, what 
I termed the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conceptions. Despite their differences, both 
the discursive and Schmitt’s existential conception understand security in terms of the all or 
nothing question of existence/non-existence, either affirmatively or negatively. I have tried to 
track down the root of this understanding of security, which, I claimed, relates to the concep-
tualization of the security referent, i.e. the notion of collective subjectivity. In this respect, this 
book scrutinizes the deep structure of collective security; it provides an analysis of the con-
ceptual building blocks of a critical notion of collective security. Having assessed both con-
ceptions of collective security, I have sought to reorient its understanding and develop an 
alternative conception of security, releasing collective security from its exclusive focus on the 
problem of existence/non-existence. In this conclusion, I will first provide a summary of the 
argument of the book and end by formulating the answer to the central question of this thesis, 
i.e., how to define collective security critically, on the basis of a set of six propositions. 
In Chapter 1, I started out with the discursive conception of security, examining the 
conceptual framework of security studies, a sub-discipline of international relations. While the 
discipline of security studies has collective security as its central topic, there seems to be little 
agreement among security scholars as concerns the definition of their subject of study. The 
traditional approach conceptualizes security in terms of the threat-referent object matrix, fo-
cusing on international politics and military threats. A wide range of security scholars claim 
that this model has become obsolete in the post-Cold War world in which all kinds of new 
security threats and actors appear on the stage. In order to refocus security studies, security 
scholars have sought to innovate the conceptual framework of the traditional approach. I have 
discussed four attempts seeking to reorient security studies, to wit the widening debate, the 
securitization theory, critical security studies and the Foucaultian approach. What these at-
tempts reveal is that in order to overcome the shortcomings of the traditional approach, secu-
rity scholars have turned to a constructivist account of security. This theoretical reorientation 
has resulted in a critical reconsideration of the threat-referent object matrix. Moreover, the 
discursive understanding of security not only implies that the threat is a construct, but also 
that the security referent is the dependent effect of security framing.  
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My analysis of the conceptual framework of security studies leads to an important 
insight. The conceptual framework of security studies is marked by a dichotomy between ob-
jectivism and constructivism. If security was theorized in objectivist terms, a critical reconsid-
eration has taken the opposite direction, casting security in constructivist terms. In this sense, 
the discursive approach merely inverts the traditional approach. This dichotomy obstructs re-
solving the crisis of security studies, as it implies that security scholars lack the conceptual 
resources to account for the security referent as a subject, i.e. an instance that can be secure 
or insecure. Security scholars either understand the referent of security in the reified sense of 
an object (traditional approach) or they reduce it to a construct (Foucaultian approach). While 
my analysis leads to the conclusion that the theoretical framework of security studies is inad-
equate to conceptualize collective security, it also provides the key to the way out of the disci-
pline’s crisis. We need to conceptualize the security referent from the first-person perspective 
of a collective subject, and not merely from a third-person perspective, as Deleuze calls it, i.e. 
as a discursive unity. 
I turn, in Chapter 2, to search for a conceptual framework that takes its cue from the 
first-person perspective of a collective subject. To this effect I examine Carl Schmitt’s political 
and legal philosophy, the adversary of security scholars versed in the critical strand of security 
studies. Although Schmitt does not deal with it explicitly, his political and legal philosophy can 
be read as a thorough reflection on the problem of security. My interpretation of Schmitt 
revolves around the notion of concrete order. The concept of concrete order is polemically 
oriented towards the normativist notion of state as legal order, and accounts for the concrete 
existence of collective subjectivity. Schmitt develops the concept of concrete order by drawing, 
amongst others, on Hauriou’s notion of an institution. Key to the notion of an institution is 
the directing idea. The directing idea functions as the unifying principle of collective subjec-
tivity that defines a group as a unity engaged in a collective enterprise. Schmitt further elabo-
rates the notion of an institution, defining it as normal order, which consists of two elements, 
to wit the normal situation and the normal type of man. The latter aspect implies that Schmitt 
has a reified account of collective subjectivity. To the extent that Schmitt interprets collective 
subjectivity in the reified sense of a substantial unity, he further analyzes concrete order as 
homogeneity. Schmitt also analyzes the spatiality of collective existence, defining concrete or-
der as a nomos, that is, as an emplaced collective that constitutes itself as an inside over and 
against an outside. Conceptualizing collective subjectivity as a concrete order, Schmitt claims 
that it should be understood as an existential unity, even though, existence, in Schmitt’s ac-
count, becomes a reified existence. 
In contrast to the discursive conception, Schmitt’s existential conception has the ad-
vantage of accounting for the security referent as an instance that can be secure or insecure. 
Nevertheless, because Schmitt’s analysis starts from the assumption that a collective subject 
exists in an original condition of order, insecurity comes into the picture only in second in-
stance. Insecurity, in Schmitt’s view, comes from without and manifests itself institutionally as 
the abnormal, legally as the exception and politically as the heterogeneous, notions that can be 
traced back to the existential distinction between the own and the strange. I established that 
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the manifestations of insecurity can be traced back to the metaphysical notion of contingency. 
Schmitt however has a reductive interpretation of contingency in the sense that he understands 
it in terms of the problem of existence/non-existence, i.e. what I defined as contingency as 
that-ness. Referring to Spinoza’s metaphysics, Schmitt defines security as collective self-preser-
vation. Security, for Schmitt, is the response to strangeness, a response that preserves the 
original existence of the collective subject. Assuming that a collective exists as an original unity, 
Schmitt interprets collective self-preservation as synonymous to boundary enforcement. In-
deed, for Schmitt boundary setting boils down to boundary enforcement, that is, the enforce-
ment of the original boundary between inside and outside, normal and abnormal, the own and 
the strange, and friend and enemy. 
In the third Chapter I pursued my analysis of security in the wake of Schmitt’s line 
of thought. For, in my view, Schmitt provides a rich and profound conception of security, 
conceptualizing it from the first-person perspective of a collective. Yet, despite the richness 
of Schmitt’s thought, I also identified a decisive problem, which relates to his account of col-
lective subjectivity. Schmitt fails to adequately conceptualize the temporal mode of being of 
collective subjectivity. To the extent that Schmitt posits collective subjectivity as an original 
unity, he has a reductive understanding of its contingency. In order to remedy the weakness 
in Schmitt’s conception of security, I proposed to define the existence of collective subjectivity 
in terms of possibility, building on the reflexivity implied in the notion of the ‘self’ of collective 
subjectivity. The definition of the existence of collective subjectivity as possibility permits us, 
first of all, to account for collective self-relation in a reflexive sense, i.e. the reflexive relation 
between the individual members and the collective as a whole. But, secondly, it also makes 
clear that collective subjectivity is irredeemably contingent, anticipating the possibilities of be-
ing otherwise and of not-being. Moreover, elaborating the temporal mode of being of collec-
tive subjectivity, I argued that the self-relation of a collective entails performativity in that it is 
staged by representation. The representational structure of collective subjectivity further spec-
ifies the contingency of collective subjectivity. Considering that collective subjectivity exists 
through  representational acts, the collective subject is contingent in the twofold sense of a 
certain groundlessness of the claim that it exists as a unity (contingency as that-ness) and what 
it is as a unity (contingency as what-ness). 
My transformation of the existential unity of collective subjectivity allowed me to 
develop the interpretation of security as collective self-assertion. Collective self-assertion 
amounts to the capacity of a collective subject to persevere in existence by responding to 
challenges by drawing on the range of possibilities which are open to it. This entails that the 
transformation of the collective as a unity, to accommodate challenges thereto, falls within the 
scope of security.  Following from the reflexive mode of being of collective subjectivity, secu-
rity has a responsive structure and entails receptivity to the possibilities available to collective 
subjectivity. In this sense, a security response is an assessment of that which challenges collec-
tive subjectivity, whether it should primarily be interpreted as a challenge to the that-ness or 
the what-ness of a collective subject’s unity. This variable interpretation of security challenges 
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implies that collective self-assertion can basically take two forms. A collective subject can re-
spond to challenges by enforcing and by transforming its unity. That is, security responses can 
range between boundary enforcement and boundary constitution. This marks a decisive shift 
with respect to Schmitt, for whom collective self-preservation can only mean boundary en-
forcement. The ambiguous character of security makes that it has the character of a wager, in 
that there is no independent criterion about the nature of the challenge that might be available 
to those who act on behalf of the collective subject. And to the extent that security responses 
are a wager, it requires self-restraint from the collective subject who engages in collective self-
assertion. 
In Chapter 4 I have compared the three conceptions of security as developed in 
Chapters 1, 2 and 3, to wit, security as a technique of government, as collective self-preserva-
tion and as collective self-assertion. I claimed that my conception of security as collective self-
assertion is the most adequate from a conceptual point of view because it does not narrow 
down security to the problem of existence/non-existence and does not reduce security either 
to boundary enforcement or to boundary constitution. I related this back to the notion of 
collective subjectivity presupposed by the three conceptions of security. Security as collective 
self-assertion is based on a notion of collective subjectivity that escapes the alternatives of a 
purely discursive or an original unity. Applying the three conceptions of security, and returning 
to the example that I used in the Introduction to articulate the central question of this thesis, 
I analyzed in what sense irregular migration into the European Union can be approached as a 
security challenge. On the basis of the conception of security as a technique of government, 
the issue of irregular immigration is constructed into a security problem. Hence, the proper 
response is to de-securitize illegal immigration. The conception of security as collective self-
preservation substantiates the definition of irregular immigration as illegal immigration, i.e. as 
a security threat, in the sense that it forms an infringement of normal order. The proper re-
sponse to infringements of normal order is boundary enforcement. In contrast to security as 
a technique of government and as collective self-preservation, the conception of security as 
collective self-assertion acknowledges the ambiguity of the challenge raised by irregular immi-
gration. To the extent that irregular immigration is interpreted in the sense of individual action, 
it can be defined as a challenge that cannot elude boundary enforcement. However, if irregular 
immigration is perceived from a macro-economic perspective, it should be defined as chal-
lenge demanding boundary constitution predominantly by resetting the boundary between the 
EU as an internal market and the wider world. 
To conclude this book, we can formulate its main theses in six propositions: 
 
(1) The concept of collective security presupposes the notion of collective sub-
jectivity. 
 





(3) As a represented unity, collective subjectivity is irredeemable contingent, in 
 the sense that there is a residual groundlessness in the claim that it exists as 
a unity and what it is as a unity. 
 
(4) Security issues manifest themselves in the form of challenges to collective 
subjectivity in that they involve a threat and open up a range of collective 
possibilities to deal with them. 
 
(5) The identification of a security challenge requires that it be qualified as such, 
meaning that the security responses are co-constitutive of the security chal-
lenge.  
 
(6) Responses to security challenges can range between pure boundary en-
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This book is dedicated to the problem of collective security. It is aimed at developing a critical 
conception of collective security i.e., a conception that provides a critical angle but also ac-
counts for its intrinsic value. The collective perspective on security, which may, but not nec-
essarily be understood in terms of the state, is distinctive in that it forestalls a reduction to 
individual security and, for that matter, a simple opposition between security and fundamental 
rights. In order to develop a critical conception of collective security the book starts by dis-
cussing two dominant conceptions, the discursive approach based on Michel Foucault’s theory 
of governmentality and the existential approach that can be abstracted from Carl Schmitt’s 
political and legal philosophy. The analysis of these two approaches provides crucial insight 
into the deep structure of collective security. The concept of collective security presupposes 
the notion of collective subjectivity as an instance that needs to be secured and as an instance 
that can be secure or insecure. This means that there is an internal correlation between the 
conceptions of collective security defended by the discursive, Foucaultian and the existential, 
Schmittean approaches and their respective interpretations of collective subjectivity. Discuss-
ing the discursive, Foucaultian and the existential, Schmittean approaches, the book claims 
that both approaches fail to provide an adequate conception of collective security because they 
have a reductive interpretation of collective subjectivity. In order to overcome the pitfalls of 
the aforementioned approaches, the book undertakes an elaboration of an alternative concep-
tion of collective security, a critical existential conception, in close discussion with the existen-
tial, Schmittean approach while integrating the critique put forward by the discursive, Fou-
caultian approach. 
The book first analyzes the critical conception of collective security as elaborated by 
the discursive, Foucaultian approach (Chapter 1). This approach defines collective security as 
a technique of government. The conception of security as technique of government revolves 
around the idea that the definition of an issue as an existential threat, i.e. a problem of exist-
ence/non-existence, is the result of a process of security framing i.e., institutional, technocratic 
and technological processes of securitization. Security is a social and political construction that 
leads to the exceptionalization of an issue, placing it from the realm of normal into the realm 
of exceptional politics and thus limiting the options to deal with security threats. The concep-
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tion of security as technique of government follows from the interpretation of collective sub-
jectivity assumed by the discursive, Foucaultian approach. This approach interprets collective 
subjectivity reductively as a mere social and political construction, viewing it only from a third-
person perspective as an instance that needs to be secured, and not from the first-person 
perspective as an instance that can be secure or insecure. 
In order to regain the first-person perspective of a collective subject, the book turns 
to the existential, Schmittean approach (Chapter 2), one of the main targets of the discursive, 
Foucaultian approach. Giving pride a place to the collective subject from a first-person per-
spective as an existential unity, Schmitt defines collective security as collective self-preserva-
tion. In Schmitt’s interpretation, collective self-preservation boils down to enforcing the orig-
inal boundaries of a collective subject. This conception of collective security follows from 
Schmitt’s account of collective subjectivity. Schmitt interprets the existential unity of a collec-
tive subject reductively as a substantial unity. If a collective subject is understood in the reified 
sense of a substantial unity, it is inevitable that security threats are perceived as a problem of 
existence/non-existence. It is therefore inevitable that collective security, in Schmitt’s defini-
tion, calls for all or nothing responses by the collective subject, as illustrated by the distinction 
between friend and enemy. 
Since the conceptions of collective security as technique of government and as col-
lective self-preservation fail as critical conceptions of collective security – the former providing 
an exclusively critical angle and the latter only accounting for its intrinsic value – the book 
attempts to outline a third approach (Chapter 3). Radically transforming Schmitt’s interpreta-
tion of collective self-preservation and integrating the critical points put forward by the dis-
cursive, Foucaultian approach, the book elaborates a critical existential conception of collec-
tive security, defining it as collective self-assertion. The key to the conception of collective 
security as collective self-assertion is a reflexive understanding of the existential unity of a 
collective subject. The members of a collective can be conceived as a unity not simply because 
they are the same, but rather to the extent that they view themselves as partaking in the same 
unity. This reflexive self-relation of collective subjectivity takes place through time as repre-
sentation. A representation is a putative claim to unity establishing who is part of the collective 
subject and what it is about, making the existential unity of a collective subject irredeemably 
contingent both in the sense of what it is as a unity and that it exists as a unity. The reflexive, 
representational structure of collective subjectivity implies that collective security is ambigu-
ous. Security issues can be interpreted both as threats, i.e. problems of existence/non-exist-
ence, and as challenges opening up transformative possibilities of a collective subject. Accord-
ingly, collective self-assertion means boundary setting; it is not only about enforcing but also 
about transforming the boundaries of collective subjectivity. 
Comparing the three conceptions of collective security outlined in this book, they are 
applied to a case study (Chapter 4), namely, the responses by Spanish and European Union 
authorities to African migrants who seek irregular entry into Ceuta and Melilla by climbing the 
border fences which separate these two Spanish enclaves from Morocco. The discursive, Fou-
caultian approach insists that by framing the African migrants as security problem implies a 
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(re)production of insecurity, discounting these migrants as human rights holders and as work-
ers. The existential, Schmittean approach on the other hand provides a substantiation of the 
responses by authorities, even in the case of human rights violations, since it perceives the 
African migrants as an existential threat to Spain and the European Union. Alternatively, the 
critical existential approach makes an argument to broaden the security perspective, not only 
focusing on individual migrants but, for example, also taking account of the macro-economic 
dynamics related to the external borders of the European Union. To the extent that African 
migrants also form a challenge to the European Union as an economic unity, securing the 
external borders of the European Union should not be limited to the narrow understanding 
of boundary enforcement against individual migrants but should also include reflecting on the 
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